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[2620:137:e000::3:4]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id e6-20020a63ee06000000b005c627018c38si2242049pgi.307.2023.11.30.15.22.03 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 30 Nov 2023 15:22:03 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::3:4 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::3:4; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::3:4 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: from out1.vger.email (depot.vger.email [IPv6:2620:137:e000::3:0]) by howler.vger.email (Postfix) with ESMTP id 59B7680898FB; Thu, 30 Nov 2023 15:21:03 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.103.11 at howler.vger.email Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1377216AbjK3XUx (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 30 Nov 2023 18:20:53 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51748 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1377240AbjK3XUv (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Nov 2023 18:20:51 -0500 Received: from frasgout11.his.huawei.com (frasgout11.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.23]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B2D6A1719; Thu, 30 Nov 2023 15:20:49 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.51]) by frasgout11.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4ShBfB0LCLz9y50M; Fri, 1 Dec 2023 07:06:58 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.47]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0956814065A; Fri, 1 Dec 2023 07:20:36 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwAXU3OdGGllXRuuAQ--.2350S4; Fri, 01 Dec 2023 00:20:35 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v7 21/23] evm: Move to LSM infrastructure Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 00:19:46 +0100 Message-Id: <20231130231948.2545638-3-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20231130231948.2545638-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20231130231948.2545638-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwAXU3OdGGllXRuuAQ--.2350S4 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvAXoW3Cr4fCw17Cr1ruFW8ur4kZwb_yoW8CFy8Ko WIvwsrKFWkWr1fJrW5G3WxKFyv9ay7GrW5JFn5C3yDu3W2vw1UC34fCF43J3W5Xr1rGrW2 q34Iv34jgFWUXr1kn29KB7ZKAUJUUUUU529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7v73VFW2AGmfu7bjvjm3 AaLaJ3UjIYCTnIWjp_UUUYX7kC6x804xWl14x267AKxVWrJVCq3wAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK 8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2048vs2IY020E87I2jVAFwI0_Jr yl82xGYIkIc2x26xkF7I0E14v26ryj6s0DM28lY4IEw2IIxxk0rwA2F7IY1VAKz4vEj48v e4kI8wA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_JF4l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI 0_Cr0_Gr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6r4j6r4UJwAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG6I80ew Av7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUGVWUXwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFVCjc4AY 6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28IcxkI7V AKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2IqxVCj r7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVW8ZVWrXwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42IY6x IIjxv20xvE14v26r1j6r1xMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVWxJVW8Jr1lIxAIcVCF 04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIEc7 CjxVAFwI0_Gr0_Gr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UHuWLUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgARBF1jj5MfZgAAsM X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=5.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on howler.vger.email Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-Greylist: Sender passed SPF test, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.4 (howler.vger.email [0.0.0.0]); Thu, 30 Nov 2023 15:21:03 -0800 (PST) X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1784033074979595513 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1784033074979595513 From: Roberto Sassu As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in security_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- fs/attr.c | 2 - fs/posix_acl.c | 3 - fs/xattr.c | 2 - include/linux/evm.h | 107 -------------------------- include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/security.c | 45 +++-------- 7 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 163 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 38841f3ebbcb..b51bd7c9b4a7 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include "internal.h" @@ -502,7 +501,6 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid); security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); - evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); } return error; diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c index e3fbe1a9f3f5..ae67479cd2b6 100644 --- a/fs/posix_acl.c +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include @@ -1138,7 +1137,6 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); - evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); } out_inode_unlock: @@ -1247,7 +1245,6 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); - evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); } out_inode_unlock: diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index f891c260a971..f8b643f91a98 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -557,7 +556,6 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, fsnotify_xattr(dentry); security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); out: return error; diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 437d4076a3b3..cb481eccc967 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -21,44 +21,6 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint); -extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); -extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); -extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags); -extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, - int flags); -extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); -extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name); -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name); -} -extern int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl); -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); -} -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl) -{ - return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); -} - int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count); @@ -93,75 +55,6 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, } #endif -static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, - int flags) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name) -{ - return; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl) -{ - return; -} - static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h index ee7d034255a9..825339bcd580 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx { #define LSM_ID_BPF 109 #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110 #define LSM_ID_IMA 111 +#define LSM_ID_EVM 112 /* * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index ea84a6f835ff..ce45f4eebcec 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -566,9 +566,9 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ -int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) +static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; @@ -598,8 +598,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that * the current value is valid. */ -int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name) { /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded @@ -649,9 +649,11 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is * valid. + * + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure. */ -int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) +static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { enum integrity_status evm_status; @@ -690,6 +692,24 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, return -EPERM; } +/** + * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl + * + * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated + * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is + * valid. + * + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure. + */ +static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name) +{ + return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); +} + static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -738,9 +758,11 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's * i_mutex lock. */ -void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, - int flags) +static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len, + int flags) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; @@ -756,6 +778,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } +/** + * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl + * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls + * + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting + * posix acls. + */ +static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl) +{ + return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); +} + /** * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -766,7 +803,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex. */ -void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; @@ -782,6 +820,22 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } +/** + * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl + * + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after + * removing posix acls. + */ +static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name) +{ + evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name); +} + static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { @@ -805,8 +859,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. */ -int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - struct iattr *attr) +static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) { unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; enum integrity_status evm_status; @@ -853,8 +907,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller * to lock the inode's i_mutex. */ -void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - int ia_valid) +static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) return; @@ -964,4 +1018,40 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) return error; } +static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security), +}; + +static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = { + .name = "evm", + .id = LSM_ID_EVM, +}; + +static int __init init_evm_lsm(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), &evm_lsmid); + return 0; +} + +static struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { + .lbs_xattr_count = 1, +}; + +DEFINE_LSM(evm) = { + .name = "evm", + .init = init_evm_lsm, + .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, + .blobs = &evm_blob_sizes, +}; + late_initcall(init_evm); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index c7303282efd3..778043a626a6 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -20,13 +20,13 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \ - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0)) + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0)) /* * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the @@ -1715,8 +1716,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, return 0; if (initxattrs) { - /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */ - new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 2, + /* Allocate +1 as terminator. */ + new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1, sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS); if (!new_xattrs) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1740,10 +1741,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, if (!xattr_count) goto out; - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, - &xattr_count); - if (ret) - goto out; ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); out: for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--) @@ -2235,14 +2232,9 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { - int ret; - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); + return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); @@ -2307,9 +2299,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, if (ret == 1) ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); + return ret; } /** @@ -2328,15 +2318,10 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { - int ret; - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, - kacl); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); + return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, + kacl); } /** @@ -2389,14 +2374,9 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) { - int ret; - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); + return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); } /** @@ -2432,7 +2412,6 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); - evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); } /** @@ -2493,9 +2472,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); if (ret == 1) ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); + return ret; } /** From patchwork Thu Nov 30 23:19:47 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 172158 Return-Path: Delivered-To: ouuuleilei@gmail.com Received: by 2002:a59:bcd1:0:b0:403:3b70:6f57 with SMTP id r17csp750876vqy; Thu, 30 Nov 2023 15:21:18 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IHtChFbyuvzfOkGYv3QsYCWlSjIlumaO/Rm3IQdhZubsIKEFfIIVMOYiUcheaGIaQuZK3V6 X-Received: by 2002:a17:90a:e004:b0:285:be58:6abb with SMTP id u4-20020a17090ae00400b00285be586abbmr19534572pjy.24.1701386477901; 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[2620:137:e000::3:3]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id b3-20020a17090a9bc300b0028586287439si2210191pjw.93.2023.11.30.15.21.17 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 30 Nov 2023 15:21:17 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::3:3 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::3:3; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::3:3 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: from out1.vger.email (depot.vger.email [IPv6:2620:137:e000::3:0]) by lipwig.vger.email (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2251D80F5F0B; Thu, 30 Nov 2023 15:21:15 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.103.11 at lipwig.vger.email Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1377245AbjK3XVA (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 30 Nov 2023 18:21:00 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:45174 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1377240AbjK3XU6 (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Nov 2023 18:20:58 -0500 Received: from frasgout11.his.huawei.com (frasgout11.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.23]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 924851734; Thu, 30 Nov 2023 15:20:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.29]) by frasgout11.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4ShBfK2XSCz9y9TC; Fri, 1 Dec 2023 07:07:05 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.47]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3ECC214074C; Fri, 1 Dec 2023 07:20:48 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwAXU3OdGGllXRuuAQ--.2350S5; Fri, 01 Dec 2023 00:20:47 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v7 22/23] integrity: Remove 'integrity' LSM and move integrity functions to 'ima' LSM Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 00:19:47 +0100 Message-Id: <20231130231948.2545638-4-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20231130231948.2545638-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20231130231948.2545638-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwAXU3OdGGllXRuuAQ--.2350S5 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW3WFWDJFW7JF4kWw4ktF1rtFb_yoWxZw4xpF sFgayUJr1rZFy29FWkAFy5uF4fK39Ygry7Wws8Cw1vyFyvvr1jqF4DAryUZFy3WFWrt3WI yrs0gr45Cw1DtrJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUWw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUCwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV W8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrVC2j2 WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_JrI_JrylYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE7xkE bVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCF04k20xvY0x 0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E 7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_GFv_WrylIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUCwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY 6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lIxAIcVC2z280aV CY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UQZ2-UUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQARBF1jj5ceSwAAsn X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=5.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lipwig.vger.email Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-Greylist: Sender passed SPF test, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.4 (lipwig.vger.email [0.0.0.0]); Thu, 30 Nov 2023 15:21:15 -0800 (PST) X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1784033027390810009 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1784033027390810009 From: Roberto Sassu Move the 'integrity' LSM tasks to the 'ima' LSM, and remove the former. In particular, let 'ima' manage integrity metadata by reserving space in the security blob for a pointer to the integrity_iint_cache structure, by initializing the corresponding memory cache, and by registering integrity_inode_free() for the inode_free_security LSM hook. Also move the global declaration of integrity_inode_get() and integrity_inode_free() to security/integrity/integrity.h, so that they can be still called by IMA. Finally, register integrity_kernel_module_request() in 'ima' for the kernel_module_request LSM hook, since it is the one affected by the crypto subsystem trying to load kernel modules, and remove the 'integrity' LSM. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- include/linux/integrity.h | 26 -------------------------- security/integrity/iint.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 +++++ security/integrity/integrity.h | 9 +++++++++ security/security.c | 9 +-------- 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h index 2ea0f2f65ab6..afaae7ad26f4 100644 --- a/include/linux/integrity.h +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h @@ -21,38 +21,12 @@ enum integrity_status { /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY -extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode); -extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode); extern void __init integrity_load_keys(void); #else -static inline struct integrity_iint_cache * - integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode) -{ - return NULL; -} - -static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode) -{ - return; -} - static inline void integrity_load_keys(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */ -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - -extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); - -#else - -static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ - #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index d4419a2a1e24..c36054041b84 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -127,6 +127,13 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode) struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint; + /* + * After removing the 'integrity' LSM, the 'ima' LSM calls + * integrity_iintcache_init() to initialize iint_cache. + */ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA)) + return NULL; + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) return iint; @@ -193,19 +200,17 @@ static void iint_init_once(void *foo) memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); } -static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void) +/* + * Initialize the integrity metadata cache from IMA, since it is the only LSM + * that really needs it. EVM can work without it. + */ +int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void) { iint_cache = kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache), 0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once); return 0; } -DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = { - .name = "integrity", - .init = integrity_iintcache_init, - .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, -}; - /* * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 079f629bf369..3f59cce3fa02 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -1138,6 +1138,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update), +#endif + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, integrity_inode_free), +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, integrity_kernel_module_request), #endif }; @@ -1148,6 +1152,7 @@ static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = { static int __init init_ima_lsm(void) { + integrity_iintcache_init(); security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid); init_ima_appraise_lsm(&ima_lsmid); return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 59eaddd84434..26d3b08dca1c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -180,6 +180,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { * integrity data associated with an inode. */ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); +struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode); +void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode); +int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void); int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void *addr, unsigned long count); @@ -236,12 +239,18 @@ static inline int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id, #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *data, int datalen); +int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); #else static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *data, int datalen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } + +static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + return 0; +} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 778043a626a6..351a124b771c 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -1597,7 +1596,6 @@ static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) */ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { - integrity_inode_free(inode); call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); /* * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and @@ -3182,12 +3180,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) */ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); - if (ret) - return ret; - return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); + return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); } /**