Message ID | ZK7wKS0NgZPfqrZu@work |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers |
Return-Path: <linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org> Delivered-To: ouuuleilei@gmail.com Received: by 2002:a59:a6b2:0:b0:3e4:2afc:c1 with SMTP id c18csp1337380vqm; Wed, 12 Jul 2023 11:29:59 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APBJJlH6W8e3wG003OBI5XgPjIOkMmVw68txoHFXEt+4Vz8Oas1KiZq5YqJCsgzrtySY/NfVa0xF X-Received: by 2002:a05:6512:2034:b0:4fb:7933:dd4f with SMTP id s20-20020a056512203400b004fb7933dd4fmr15199750lfs.56.1689186599346; Wed, 12 Jul 2023 11:29:59 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1689186599; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=jPpg8J+ww4rZ5gSe1Lv4UEYEeJB7vinONADKLO6toCtG2miWVjpYpSOhks0irdeBsk +0ny6hwf4GKtczVL3GxSQbMcu4ajwTj4ihsMfiv6dV+v6vtqiZJ8uQ3qxI6OQ/yRVh0L iHwtO6hvLXyvvvOUDEyB9Vvnmj2XtieIsiTm/qtEKVCE9obLR8fZ7NStohLhPkb5YvC2 aQ2T65rCJAPr+Kgm6SSnvFlgBJU7waekgeHEkfgdVCosC8F4Atv8ITD/OtKsNaFOoOED OUvCvyEAHw3KsT/fC5BImWmq42OmI+79pjf1aJ9xcCaik5+W+aHTtk0FIRC0ZOUYSddd aT6Q== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-disposition:mime-version:message-id :subject:cc:to:from:date:dkim-signature; bh=DjinBbzKlw3HCRFqZzO2Zu6rITRZ5ZY3pEkTpsQ4J4Y=; fh=vLSLkxsjMzrXcCzWVUHY18xL1omLnE6gP4XTBwbA/bk=; b=kWT/nl1+lzliyRTNFQCZ10nT0WqNTEFR7NhBhkuE6LiFMHix/dSGZuX8p+sQRFpAVe UvrFFzOz/n7GCJKjxGzugWNBPH0sBvGy/w5obB2EDyNhb/amAyxDoWgqNTf+++Y9vKpo oyuupeugShZcHIm0pIZZ+nUQN9OQO49GuNsET8BbGCRwDj012Xplx1T5rbtf5vUZOjxF yei6LTmdoU5GikxQWaQEXDxW6c0Gb5B06JEnyPY+U5TZvDXZIYvmkmckalV5cCETj6xj MEZPxf0GK9PXAodW4pfRpowkcGI/Bq0ZiFMjIIuX7ZGrt1caW+peouj2Pbv56c5bIBgd sWBg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=BDqP0+og; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a18-20020aa7cf12000000b0051dd2d6be5esi4850124edy.507.2023.07.12.11.29.34; Wed, 12 Jul 2023 11:29:59 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=BDqP0+og; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232016AbjGLSY5 (ORCPT <rfc822;gnulinuxfreebsd@gmail.com> + 99 others); Wed, 12 Jul 2023 14:24:57 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36378 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229649AbjGLSY4 (ORCPT <rfc822;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>); Wed, 12 Jul 2023 14:24:56 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 64FEE1BE3; Wed, 12 Jul 2023 11:24:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EAADE6189F; Wed, 12 Jul 2023 18:24:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C6E98C433C8; Wed, 12 Jul 2023 18:24:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1689186294; bh=oiL8B5T0SF7z89hecNy7VIEQawHKk0jVhieQ+mQfndw=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:From; b=BDqP0+ogAMJEpRGdPK3N+vTGpYBYsDyQIiifRNqv1xyWIUnXS3Whnp/ZJcxMD2PzU vcnya0Umb/RBkCNhcsI3/lriYJj1y6EGBvV5eX2jPXEIOkzioX0cNlCIN0euhDdDaE b2YxwZstHOlImIXjFY4e4F21Lar4uil/Z7OADLfv/z9ijlutaAr8203dJOk3nuB6iR w6+P6iDVfAWyy80OnY//7/8FR/CaJ6DLY05pnt9FizZSo/4BPZnJphQ6FZkugVA0bE +dWjugeNq6++3Boy/w1UrlQ+9hi0z7+vOVo3teNTLZksBtxctr7D8Di8S6bHl1i+HW Alz75aGcJBmPg== Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 12:25:45 -0600 From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> To: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH][next] udf: Fix -Wstringop-overflow warnings Message-ID: <ZK7wKS0NgZPfqrZu@work> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1771240527479095386 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1771240527479095386 |
Series |
[next] udf: Fix -Wstringop-overflow warnings
|
|
Commit Message
Gustavo A. R. Silva
July 12, 2023, 6:25 p.m. UTC
Use unsigned type in call to macro mint_t(). This avoids confusing the
compiler about possible negative values that would cause the value in
_len_ to wrap around.
Fixes the following -Wstringop-warnings seen when building ARM
architecture with allyesconfig (GCC 13):
fs/udf/directory.c: In function 'udf_copy_fi':
include/linux/fortify-string.h:57:33: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' specified bound between 2147483648 and 4294967295 exceeds maximum object size 2147483647 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
57 | #define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy
| ^
include/linux/fortify-string.h:648:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
648 | __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size); \
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/fortify-string.h:693:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk'
693 | #define memcpy(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/udf/directory.c:99:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
99 | memcpy(&iter->fi, iter->bh[0]->b_data + off, len);
| ^~~~~~
include/linux/fortify-string.h:57:33: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' specified bound between 2147483648 and 4294967295 exceeds maximum object size 2147483647 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
57 | #define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy
| ^
include/linux/fortify-string.h:648:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
648 | __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size); \
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/fortify-string.h:693:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk'
693 | #define memcpy(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/udf/directory.c:99:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
99 | memcpy(&iter->fi, iter->bh[0]->b_data + off, len);
| ^~~~~~
AR fs/udf/built-in.a
This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable
-Wstringop-overflow.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/329
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
---
fs/udf/directory.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Comments
On Wed, Jul 12, 2023 at 12:25:45PM -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > Use unsigned type in call to macro mint_t(). This avoids confusing the > compiler about possible negative values that would cause the value in > _len_ to wrap around. > > Fixes the following -Wstringop-warnings seen when building ARM > architecture with allyesconfig (GCC 13): > fs/udf/directory.c: In function 'udf_copy_fi': > include/linux/fortify-string.h:57:33: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' specified bound between 2147483648 and 4294967295 exceeds maximum object size 2147483647 [-Wstringop-overflow=] > 57 | #define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy > | ^ > include/linux/fortify-string.h:648:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy' > 648 | __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size); \ > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ > include/linux/fortify-string.h:693:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk' > 693 | #define memcpy(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \ > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > fs/udf/directory.c:99:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy' > 99 | memcpy(&iter->fi, iter->bh[0]->b_data + off, len); > | ^~~~~~ > include/linux/fortify-string.h:57:33: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' specified bound between 2147483648 and 4294967295 exceeds maximum object size 2147483647 [-Wstringop-overflow=] > 57 | #define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy > | ^ > include/linux/fortify-string.h:648:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy' > 648 | __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size); \ > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ > include/linux/fortify-string.h:693:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk' > 693 | #define memcpy(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \ > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > fs/udf/directory.c:99:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy' > 99 | memcpy(&iter->fi, iter->bh[0]->b_data + off, len); > | ^~~~~~ > AR fs/udf/built-in.a > > This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable > -Wstringop-overflow. > > Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/329 > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> > --- > fs/udf/directory.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/fs/udf/directory.c b/fs/udf/directory.c > index 1c775e072b2f..93153665eb37 100644 > --- a/fs/udf/directory.c > +++ b/fs/udf/directory.c > @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int udf_copy_fi(struct udf_fileident_iter *iter) > } > > off = iter->pos & (blksize - 1); > - len = min_t(int, sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc), blksize - off); > + len = min_t(u32, sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc), blksize - off); > memcpy(&iter->fi, iter->bh[0]->b_data + off, len); > if (len < sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc)) > memcpy((char *)(&iter->fi) + len, iter->bh[1]->b_data, len is u32, "off" can't be less than blksize, so this all looks correct to me. Thanks! Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
On Wed 12-07-23 12:05:34, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Jul 12, 2023 at 12:25:45PM -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > > Use unsigned type in call to macro mint_t(). This avoids confusing the > > compiler about possible negative values that would cause the value in > > _len_ to wrap around. > > > > Fixes the following -Wstringop-warnings seen when building ARM > > architecture with allyesconfig (GCC 13): > > fs/udf/directory.c: In function 'udf_copy_fi': > > include/linux/fortify-string.h:57:33: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' specified bound between 2147483648 and 4294967295 exceeds maximum object size 2147483647 [-Wstringop-overflow=] > > 57 | #define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy > > | ^ > > include/linux/fortify-string.h:648:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy' > > 648 | __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size); \ > > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > include/linux/fortify-string.h:693:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk' > > 693 | #define memcpy(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \ > > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > fs/udf/directory.c:99:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy' > > 99 | memcpy(&iter->fi, iter->bh[0]->b_data + off, len); > > | ^~~~~~ > > include/linux/fortify-string.h:57:33: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' specified bound between 2147483648 and 4294967295 exceeds maximum object size 2147483647 [-Wstringop-overflow=] > > 57 | #define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy > > | ^ > > include/linux/fortify-string.h:648:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy' > > 648 | __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size); \ > > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > include/linux/fortify-string.h:693:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk' > > 693 | #define memcpy(p, q, s) __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s, \ > > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > fs/udf/directory.c:99:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy' > > 99 | memcpy(&iter->fi, iter->bh[0]->b_data + off, len); > > | ^~~~~~ > > AR fs/udf/built-in.a > > > > This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable > > -Wstringop-overflow. > > > > Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/329 > > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> > > --- > > fs/udf/directory.c | 2 +- > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/fs/udf/directory.c b/fs/udf/directory.c > > index 1c775e072b2f..93153665eb37 100644 > > --- a/fs/udf/directory.c > > +++ b/fs/udf/directory.c > > @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int udf_copy_fi(struct udf_fileident_iter *iter) > > } > > > > off = iter->pos & (blksize - 1); > > - len = min_t(int, sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc), blksize - off); > > + len = min_t(u32, sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc), blksize - off); > > memcpy(&iter->fi, iter->bh[0]->b_data + off, len); > > if (len < sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc)) > > memcpy((char *)(&iter->fi) + len, iter->bh[1]->b_data, > > len is u32, "off" can't be less than blksize, so this all looks correct > to me. Thanks! > > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Thanks! I've merged the patch to my tree. Honza
diff --git a/fs/udf/directory.c b/fs/udf/directory.c index 1c775e072b2f..93153665eb37 100644 --- a/fs/udf/directory.c +++ b/fs/udf/directory.c @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int udf_copy_fi(struct udf_fileident_iter *iter) } off = iter->pos & (blksize - 1); - len = min_t(int, sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc), blksize - off); + len = min_t(u32, sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc), blksize - off); memcpy(&iter->fi, iter->bh[0]->b_data + off, len); if (len < sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc)) memcpy((char *)(&iter->fi) + len, iter->bh[1]->b_data,