SEV-SNP defines PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK (bit 34) in page-fault error bits to
represent the guest page is encrypted. Use the bit to designate that the
page fault is private and that it requires looking up memory attributes.
The vendor kvm page fault handler should set PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK bit based
on their fault information. It may or may not use the hardware value
directly or parse the hardware value to set the bit.
Based on a patch by Isaku Yamahata.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
Compared to what is in the Intel TDX tree, I am dropping the
if (vcpu->kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM)
return RET_PF_RETRY;
change in __kvm_faultin_pfn(). It is not well documented why it
is needed and selftests seem to pass.
Also, checking has_private_mem is needed so as not to break SEV-ES.
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 9 +++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
#define PFERR_SGX_BIT 15
#define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT 32
#define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT 33
+#define PFERR_GUEST_ENC_BIT 34
#define PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS_BIT 48
#define PFERR_PRESENT_MASK BIT(PFERR_PRESENT_BIT)
@@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
#define PFERR_SGX_MASK BIT(PFERR_SGX_BIT)
#define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK BIT_ULL(PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT)
#define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK BIT_ULL(PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT)
+#define PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK BIT_ULL(PFERR_GUEST_ENC_BIT)
#define PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS BIT_ULL(PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS_BIT)
#define PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE (PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK | \
@@ -5846,6 +5846,7 @@ int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 err
{
int r, emulation_type = EMULTYPE_PF;
bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;
+ struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
/*
* IMPLICIT_ACCESS is a KVM-defined flag used to correctly perform SMAP
@@ -5861,6 +5862,14 @@ int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 err
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa)))
return RET_PF_RETRY;
+ /*
+ * There is no vendor code that can set PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK for
+ * software-protected VMs. Compute it here.
+ */
+ if (kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM &&
+ kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, cr2_or_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT))
+ error_code |= PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK;
+
r = RET_PF_INVALID;
if (unlikely(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)) {
r = handle_mmio_page_fault(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct);
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
.present = err & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK,
.rsvd = err & PFERR_RSVD_MASK,
.user = err & PFERR_USER_MASK,
+ .is_private = vcpu->kvm->arch.has_private_mem && (err & PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK),
.prefetch = prefetch,
.is_tdp = likely(vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault == kvm_tdp_page_fault),
.nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled =
@@ -298,7 +299,6 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
.max_level = KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL,
.req_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
.goal_level = PG_LEVEL_4K,
- .is_private = kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, cr2_or_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT),
};
int r;