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Tue, 27 Feb 2024 07:19:37 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 16:19:14 +0100 In-Reply-To: <20240227151907.387873-11-ardb+git@google.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20240227151907.387873-11-ardb+git@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0.rc1.240.g4c46232300-goog Message-ID: <20240227151907.387873-17-ardb+git@google.com> Subject: [PATCH v7 6/9] x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor From: Ard Biesheuvel To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ard Biesheuvel , Kevin Loughlin , Tom Lendacky , Dionna Glaze , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , Andy Lutomirski , Brian Gerst X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1792065934360962739 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1792065934360962739 From: Ard Biesheuvel The early SME/SEV code parses the command line very early, in order to decide whether or not memory encryption should be enabled, which needs to occur even before the initial page tables are created. This is problematic for a number of reasons: - this early code runs from the 1:1 mapping provided by the decompressor or firmware, which uses a different translation than the one assumed by the linker, and so the code needs to be built in a special way; - parsing external input while the entire kernel image is still mapped writable is a bad idea in general, and really does not belong in security minded code; - the current code ignores the built-in command line entirely (although this appears to be the case for the entire decompressor) Given that the decompressor/EFI stub is an intrinsic part of the x86 bootable kernel image, move the command line parsing there and out of the core kernel. This removes the need to build lib/cmdline.o in a special way, or to use RIP-relative LEA instructions in inline asm blocks. This involves a new xloadflag in the setup header to indicate that mem_encrypt=on appeared on the kernel command line. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 15 +++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 + arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 13 -------- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 32 ++------------------ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 3 ++ 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c index bd6857a9f15a..408507e305be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c @@ -371,6 +371,19 @@ unsigned long decompress_kernel(unsigned char *outbuf, unsigned long virt_addr, return entry; } +/* + * Set the memory encryption xloadflag based on the mem_encrypt= command line + * parameter, if provided. + */ +static void parse_mem_encrypt(struct setup_header *hdr) +{ + int on = cmdline_find_option_bool("mem_encrypt=on"); + int off = cmdline_find_option_bool("mem_encrypt=off"); + + if (on > off) + hdr->xloadflags |= XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION; +} + /* * The compressed kernel image (ZO), has been moved so that its position * is against the end of the buffer used to hold the uncompressed kernel @@ -401,6 +414,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output) /* Clear flags intended for solely in-kernel use. */ boot_params_ptr->hdr.loadflags &= ~KASLR_FLAG; + parse_mem_encrypt(&boot_params_ptr->hdr); + sanitize_boot_params(boot_params_ptr); if (boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_mode == 7) { diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index 01d19fc22346..eeea058cf602 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #define XLF_EFI_KEXEC (1<<4) #define XLF_5LEVEL (1<<5) #define XLF_5LEVEL_ENABLED (1<<6) +#define XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION (1<<7) #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile index ea3a28e7b613..f0dae4fb6d07 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile @@ -14,19 +14,6 @@ ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN CFLAGS_REMOVE_delay.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) endif -# Early boot use of cmdline; don't instrument it -ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT -KCOV_INSTRUMENT_cmdline.o := n -KASAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o := n -KCSAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o := n - -ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER -CFLAGS_REMOVE_cmdline.o = -pg -endif - -CFLAGS_cmdline.o := -fno-stack-protector -fno-jump-tables -endif - inat_tables_script = $(srctree)/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk inat_tables_maps = $(srctree)/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt quiet_cmd_inat_tables = GEN $@ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index 0166ab1780cc..d210c7fc8fa2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ #include #include -#include #include #include @@ -95,9 +94,6 @@ struct sme_populate_pgd_data { */ static char sme_workarea[2 * PMD_SIZE] __section(".init.scratch"); -static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt"; -static char sme_cmdline_on[] __initdata = "on"; - static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) { unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size; @@ -504,11 +500,9 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { - const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on; unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; unsigned long feature_mask; unsigned long me_mask; - char buffer[16]; bool snp; u64 msr; @@ -551,6 +545,9 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) /* Check if memory encryption is enabled */ if (feature_mask == AMD_SME_BIT) { + if (!(bp->hdr.xloadflags & XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION)) + return; + /* * No SME if Hypervisor bit is set. This check is here to * prevent a guest from trying to enable SME. For running as a @@ -570,31 +567,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG); if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; - } else { - /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ - goto out; } - /* - * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running - * identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the SME command - * line argument data using rip-relative addressing. - */ - asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0" - : "=r" (cmdline_arg) - : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg)); - asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0" - : "=r" (cmdline_on) - : "p" (sme_cmdline_on)); - - cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | - ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32)); - - if (cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < 0 || - strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer))) - return; - -out: RIP_REL_REF(sme_me_mask) = me_mask; physical_mask &= ~me_mask; cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD; diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c index 99429bc4b0c7..0336ed175e67 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c @@ -884,6 +884,9 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle, } } + if (efi_mem_encrypt > 0) + hdr->xloadflags |= XLF_MEM_ENCRYPTION; + status = efi_decompress_kernel(&kernel_entry); if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { efi_err("Failed to decompress kernel\n");