diff mbox series

[v2,07/25] KVM: VMX: Set intercept for FRED MSRs

Message ID	20240207172646.3981-8-xin3.li@intel.com
State	New
Headers	Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel+bounces-56861-ouuuleilei=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org designates 2604:1380:45d1:ec00::1 as permitted sender) client-ip=2604:1380:45d1:ec00::1; From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, shuah@kernel.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, xin@zytor.com Subject: [PATCH v2 07/25] KVM: VMX: Set intercept for FRED MSRs Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 09:26:27 -0800 Message-ID: <20240207172646.3981-8-xin3.li@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20240207172646.3981-1-xin3.li@intel.com> References: <20240207172646.3981-1-xin3.li@intel.com> Precedence: bulk MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX
Series	Enable FRED with KVM VMX \| [v2,00/25] Enable FRED with KVM VMX [v2,01/25] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX basic information defines and usages [v2,02/25] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX misc information defines and usages [v2,03/25] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls [v2,04/25] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved [v2,05/25] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config [v2,06/25] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID [v2,07/25] KVM: VMX: Set intercept for FRED MSRs [v2,08/25] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields [v2,09/25] KVM: VMX: Switch FRED RSP0 between host and guest [v2,10/25] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore [v2,11/25] KVM: x86: Add kvm_is_fred_enabled() [v2,12/25] KVM: VMX: Handle FRED event data [v2,13/25] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED [v2,14/25] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail [v2,15/25] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() [v2,16/25] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup [v2,17/25] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls [v2,18/25] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros [v2,19/25] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields [v2,20/25] KVM: nVMX: Add support for VMX FRED controls [v2,21/25] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking [v2,22/25] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS/WRMSRNS to be exposed to guests [v2,23/25] KVM: selftests: Run debug_regs test with FRED enabled [v2,24/25] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code [v2,25/25] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests

Commit Message

Li, Xin3 Feb. 7, 2024, 5:26 p.m. UTC

  Add FRED MSRs to the valid passthrough MSR list and set FRED MSRs intercept
based on FRED enumeration.

Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
---

Change since v1:
* Enable FRED MSRs intercept if FRED is no longer enumerated in CPUID
  (Chao Gao).
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 34b6676f60d8..d58ed2d3d379 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -693,6 +693,9 @@  static bool is_valid_passthrough_msr(u32 msr)
 	case MSR_LBR_CORE_TO ... MSR_LBR_CORE_TO + 8:
 		/* LBR MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs() */
 		return true;
+	case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
+		/* FRED MSRs should be passthrough to FRED guests only */
+		return true;
 	}
 
 	r = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr) != -ENOENT;
@@ -7774,10 +7777,12 @@  static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 static void vmx_vcpu_config_fred_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool fred_enumerated;
 
 	kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED);
+	fred_enumerated = guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED);
 
-	if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+	if (fred_enumerated) {
 		vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
 		secondary_vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx,
 						  SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |
@@ -7788,6 +7793,16 @@  static void vmx_vcpu_config_fred_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 						    SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |
 						    SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
 	}
+
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, MSR_TYPE_RW, !fred_enumerated);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW, !fred_enumerated);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW, !fred_enumerated);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW, !fred_enumerated);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, MSR_TYPE_RW, !fred_enumerated);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW, !fred_enumerated);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW, !fred_enumerated);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW, !fred_enumerated);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, MSR_TYPE_RW, !fred_enumerated);
 }
 
 static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)