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Peter Anvin" , Peter Zijlstra , Josh Poimboeuf , Andy Lutomirski , Jonathan Corbet , Sean Christopherson , Paolo Bonzini , tony.luck@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com, tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, Andrew Cooper , Nikolay Borisov Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Alyssa Milburn , Daniel Sneddon , antonio.gomez.iglesias@linux.intel.com, Pawan Gupta , Alyssa Milburn , stable@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 1/6] x86/bugs: Add asm helpers for executing VERW Message-ID: <20240204-delay-verw-v7-1-59be2d704cb2@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: b4 0.12.3 References: <20240204-delay-verw-v7-0-59be2d704cb2@linux.intel.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20240204-delay-verw-v7-0-59be2d704cb2@linux.intel.com> X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1790046591383591411 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1790046591383591411 MDS mitigation requires clearing the CPU buffers before returning to user. This needs to be done late in the exit-to-user path. Current location of VERW leaves a possibility of kernel data ending up in CPU buffers for memory accesses done after VERW such as: 1. Kernel data accessed by an NMI between VERW and return-to-user can remain in CPU buffers since NMI returning to kernel does not execute VERW to clear CPU buffers. 2. Alyssa reported that after VERW is executed, CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y scrubs the stack used by a system call. Memory accesses during stack scrubbing can move kernel stack contents into CPU buffers. 3. When caller saved registers are restored after a return from function executing VERW, the kernel stack accesses can remain in CPU buffers(since they occur after VERW). To fix this VERW needs to be moved very late in exit-to-user path. In preparation for moving VERW to entry/exit asm code, create macros that can be used in asm. Also make VERW patching depend on a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF. Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta --- arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S index 8c8d38f0cb1d..bd8e77c5a375 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include .pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax" @@ -20,3 +23,22 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb); .popsection + +/* + * Defines the VERW operand that is disguised as entry code so that + * it can be referenced with KPTI enabled. This ensures VERW can be + * used late in exit-to-user path after page tables are switched. + */ +.pushsection .entry.text, "ax" + +.align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc +SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(mds_verw_sel) + UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + .word __KERNEL_DS +.align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc +SYM_CODE_END(mds_verw_sel); +/* For KVM */ +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_verw_sel); + +.popsection diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index fdf723b6f6d0..2b62cdd8dd12 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16) /* REP microcode works well */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2 ( 3*32+17) /* AMD Last Branch Record Extension Version 2 */ -/* FREE, was #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ +#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF ( 3*32+18) /* "" Clear CPU buffers using VERW */ #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19) /* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */ #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20) /* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS ( 3*32+21) /* "" Always-present feature */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 262e65539f83..ec85dfe67123 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -315,6 +315,21 @@ #endif .endm +/* + * Macros to execute VERW instruction that mitigate transient data sampling + * attacks such as MDS. On affected systems a microcode update overloaded VERW + * instruction to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers CFLAGS.ZF. + * + * Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers. + */ +.macro EXEC_VERW + verw _ASM_RIP(mds_verw_sel) +.endm + +.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS + ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(EXEC_VERW), X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF +.endm + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ @@ -536,6 +551,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear); +extern u16 mds_verw_sel; + #include /**