Message ID | 20231122212008.11790-1-mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr |
---|---|
State | New |
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(78-2-200-148.adsl.net.t-com.hr [78.2.200.148]) by domac.alu.hr (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 72DDB60189; Wed, 22 Nov 2023 22:23:03 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=alu.unizg.hr; s=mail; t=1700688183; bh=H7MlBg9YpVfV+cspaM8Vo5IiwZKZH0xos1nZLD/aRBc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=bKPEu64cNCG0LWGGAHW7BVVXev2wBhsy0Xur3AHoc5MI1Hzk96Yy+q5kh4iI78GQd fNEVXPU8dT/hv3JQ1x1uc9EUCTViK38qHlDA2++NJqW/0ThzgShXKo7FwWfnGO5oIc RA2PngKkVIThvh7d36XKa+CP3Rxp+cn62+blFYVXgNy7itBufrjIwQLaKrzZLRhhuy BiqzP254da45G482IwOxbqVPrLaRZpxY/YNkGc4Rd7QbciqrWfoPGMkH4LrKeTsxaq A5CeQT/DuACWvDJP3l2YZsCSs4k8wl8ZRHqLO2or5bCSlsrAF7qvVebFEuRNK0Rvop xKiutD5Yb88ng== From: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Mirsad Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr>, Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>, Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 1/1] kernfs: replace deprecated strlcpy() with strscpy() Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 22:20:10 +0100 Message-Id: <20231122212008.11790-1-mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.6 required=5.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on groat.vger.email Precedence: bulk List-ID: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-Greylist: Sender passed SPF test, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.4 (groat.vger.email [0.0.0.0]); Wed, 22 Nov 2023 13:23:16 -0800 (PST) X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1783300834749794414 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1783300834749794414 |
Series |
[RFC,v2,1/1] kernfs: replace deprecated strlcpy() with strscpy()
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Commit Message
Mirsad Todorovac
Nov. 22, 2023, 9:20 p.m. UTC
From: Mirsad Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> According to strlcpy() being officially deprecated and the encouragement to remove the remaining occurrences, this came as the intriguing example. In the kernfs_name_locked() the behaviour of truncating the kn->name is preserved, for it only used in the module for printing in the log and declared static. It is only called from pr_cont_kernfs_name() via kernfs_name() and returned result is ignored. It is avoided to go past the allocated page and cause the internal equivalent of SEGFAULT in the unlikely case kn->name is not null-terminated, which I believe was the idea behind replacing strlcpy() with strscpy(). kernfs_path_from_node_locked() has "(null)" which certainly cannot overrun, and a carefully calculated len and truncated path elsewhere. Fixes: 17627157cda13 ("kernfs: handle null pointers while printing node name and path") Fixes: 3eef34ad7dc36 ("kernfs: implement kernfs_get_parent(), kernfs_name/path() and friends") Fixes: 9f6df573a4041 ("kernfs: Add API to generate relative kernfs path") Fixes: 3abb1d90f5d93 ("kernfs: make kernfs_path*() behave in the style of strlcpy()") Fixes: e56ed358afd81 ("kernfs: make kernfs_walk_ns() use kernfs_pr_cont_buf[]") Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lwn.net/ml/ksummit-discuss/20231019054642.GF14346@lst.de/#t Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/659214/ Signed-off-by: Mirsad Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> --- v2: Fixed a Cc: address bug. Fixing the patch according to the new definition of strscpy() in LWN article https://lwn.net/Articles/659214/ that makes strscpy_truncate() obsoleted. fs/kernfs/dir.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Comments
Hello, On Wed, Nov 22, 2023 at 10:20:10PM +0100, Mirsad Goran Todorovac wrote: > From: Mirsad Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> > > According to strlcpy() being officially deprecated and the encouragement > to remove the remaining occurrences, this came as the intriguing example. > > In the kernfs_name_locked() the behaviour of truncating the kn->name is > preserved, for it only used in the module for printing in the log and > declared static. It is only called from pr_cont_kernfs_name() via kernfs_name() > and returned result is ignored. > > It is avoided to go past the allocated page and cause the internal equivalent > of SEGFAULT in the unlikely case kn->name is not null-terminated, which I > believe was the idea behind replacing strlcpy() with strscpy(). I don't follow this line of thinking. Yeah, if the input arguments are wrong, it can malfunction. strscpy() is gonna page fault too if the input string crosses into an unmapped page before the destination buffer is filled, right? But it'd be a stretch to claim that that's a problem with the function. Maybe I'm missing something but I'm having a hard time seeing the value in these conversions. > kernfs_path_from_node_locked() has "(null)" which certainly cannot overrun, > and a carefully calculated len and truncated path elsewhere. Some of the functions you're modifying were returning the full length of the input string before and it isn't clear from the patch or description whether the conversion is safe. It'd help if you can elaborate more on why the conversions are safe and how you verified them. Thanks.
Hi Mr. Tejun Heo, On 11/22/23 22:31, Tejun Heo wrote: > Hello, > > On Wed, Nov 22, 2023 at 10:20:10PM +0100, Mirsad Goran Todorovac wrote: >> From: Mirsad Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> >> >> According to strlcpy() being officially deprecated and the encouragement >> to remove the remaining occurrences, this came as the intriguing example. >> >> In the kernfs_name_locked() the behaviour of truncating the kn->name is >> preserved, for it only used in the module for printing in the log and >> declared static. It is only called from pr_cont_kernfs_name() via kernfs_name() >> and returned result is ignored. >> >> It is avoided to go past the allocated page and cause the internal equivalent >> of SEGFAULT in the unlikely case kn->name is not null-terminated, which I >> believe was the idea behind replacing strlcpy() with strscpy(). > > I don't follow this line of thinking. Yeah, if the input arguments are > wrong, it can malfunction. strscpy() is gonna page fault too if the input > string crosses into an unmapped page before the destination buffer is > filled, right? But it'd be a stretch to claim that that's a problem with the > function. Maybe I'm missing something but I'm having a hard time seeing the > value in these conversions. INTRODUCTION I will try to explain, it is not complicated, but we have to cover all cases of use of kernfs_name_locked(), kernfs_name() and cgroup_name() which uses it. We are lucky that there are only a couple of uses throughout kernel (verified with grep and Bootlin). But let's start from the beginning. We have a semantical gap where strlcpy() returned the rather useless value of strlen(src) on buffer overrun which was tried to be avoided at all cost, for it can page fault into unmapped region. When we use that value, we are in trouble when strlen(src) > buflen, and we return in effect strlen(src). Calculating it is not only useless, but possibly can cause page fault in the case src is not null-terminated. (This is not my idea, I've read it on LWN, but I cannot find the reference right now, I may be able to provide it later.) It is also inefficient to scan all characters after the "count" bytes until the end of src just to be able to say that the length overruns the buffer, when it is obvious after the first character exceeding "count". But we are happy that no part of kernel uses this value ATM, so the function kernel_name_locked() could as well be void. I will try to elaborate this into greater detail, and I tried to do it in the full but shortest possible. === Allegedly, by the article here: [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/659214/ strscpy() now (or since 2015) copies string up to "count" bytes and truncates it. And from the source of strscpy(): [2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/lib/string.c#L122 size_t max = count; while (max >= sizeof(unsigned long)) { unsigned long c, data; c = read_word_at_a_time(src+res); if (has_zero(c, &data, &constants)) { data = prep_zero_mask(c, data, &constants); data = create_zero_mask(data); *(unsigned long *)(dest+res) = c & zero_bytemask(data); return res + find_zero(data); } *(unsigned long *)(dest+res) = c; res += sizeof(unsigned long); count -= sizeof(unsigned long); max -= sizeof(unsigned long); } while (count) { char c; c = src[res]; dest[res] = c; if (!c) return res; res++; count--; } it is visible that strscpy() will not go ahead more than "count" bytes into a theoretically unterminated string, certainly not more than the sizeof(unsigned long). This should dramatically decrease chances of hitting a page boundary and page fault if the string is erroneously or maliciously not null-terminated. >> kernfs_path_from_node_locked() has "(null)" which certainly cannot overrun, >> and a carefully calculated len and truncated path elsewhere. > > Some of the functions you're modifying were returning the full length of the > input string before and it isn't clear from the patch or description whether > the conversion is safe. It'd help if you can elaborate more on why the > conversions are safe and how you verified them. Well, it is not so complicated, once you get into the Source: The only place where the return value is modified is here: 54 static int kernfs_name_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen) 55 { 56 size_t len; 57 58 if (!kn) 59 return strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen); 60 61 len = strscpy(buf, kn->parent ? kn->name : "/", buflen); 62 63 if (unlikely(len == -E2BIG)) { 64 return buflen - 1; 65 } else 66 return len; 67 } Just in this mail Linus has declined the possibility of using any variant of strlen() to establish the length of kn->name: [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wg7pwWiF4eWVTfFYkfAk_5YDHkmkgZ04cgXkNUO_9pR3A@mail.gmail.com/ kernfs_name_locked() is called from this function: 201 int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen) 202 { 203 unsigned long flags; 204 int ret; 205 206 read_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); 207 ret = kernfs_name_locked(kn, buf, buflen); 208 read_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); 209 return ret; 210 } The return value is passed to the caller. The kernfs_name() is called only here: 247 void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn) 248 { 249 unsigned long flags; 250 251 spin_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags); 252 253 kernfs_name(kn, kernfs_pr_cont_buf, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); 254 pr_cont("%s", kernfs_pr_cont_buf); 255 256 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags); 257 } and the return value is ignored. Search shows that kernfs is defined and used here: Defined in 1 files as a prototype: include/linux/kernfs.h, line 394 (as a prototype) Defined in 2 files as a function: fs/kernfs/dir.c, line 194 (as a function) include/linux/kernfs.h, line 472 (as a function) Documented in 1 files: fs/kernfs/dir.c, line 178 Referenced in 2 files: fs/kernfs/dir.c, line 246 include/linux/cgroup.h, line 596 Let's go through each case: A search shows that user@host:~/linux/kernel/torvalds4 $ grep -n -E 'kernfs_name[(]' --include '*.c' --include '*.h' -r . ./fs/kernfs/dir.c:201:int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen) ./fs/kernfs/dir.c:247:void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn) ./fs/kernfs/dir.c:253: kernfs_name(kn, kernfs_pr_cont_buf, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); ./include/linux/cgroup.h:594: return kernfs_name(cgrp->kn, buf, buflen); ./include/linux/cgroup.h:604: pr_cont_kernfs_name(cgrp->kn); ./include/linux/kernfs.h:395:int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen); ./include/linux/kernfs.h:398:void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn); ./include/linux/kernfs.h:473:static inline int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen) ./include/linux/kernfs.h:481:static inline void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn) { } ./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/cgroup.h:594: return kernfs_name(cgrp->kn, buf, buflen); ./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/cgroup.h:604: pr_cont_kernfs_name(cgrp->kn); ./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/kernfs.h:395:int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen); ./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/kernfs.h:398:void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn); ./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/kernfs.h:473:static inline int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen) ./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/kernfs.h:481:static inline void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn) { } In include/linux/kernfs.h:395: kernfs_name() is defined as: 395 int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen); In include/linux/kernfs.h:473: kernfs_name() is defined as: 472 473 static inline int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen) 474 { return -ENOSYS; } 475 elsewhere it is used in include/linux/cgroup.h:594: 592 static inline int cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen) 593 { 594 return kernfs_name(cgrp->kn, buf, buflen); 595 } Seek cgroup_name() in the Source: user@dhost:~/linux/kernel/torvalds4$ grep -n -E 'cgroup_name[(]' --include '*.c' --include '*.h' -r . ./include/linux/cgroup.h:592:static inline int cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen) ./include/linux/cgroup.h:602:static inline void pr_cont_cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp) ./kernel/cgroup/debug.c:103: cgroup_name(c, name_buf, NAME_MAX + 1); ./kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:4237: pr_cont_cgroup_name(cs->css.cgroup); ./kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:4878: pr_cont_cgroup_name(cgrp); ./mm/page_owner.c:384: cgroup_name(memcg->css.cgroup, name, sizeof(name)); ./tools/perf/util/cgroup.c:216:static int add_cgroup_name(const char *fpath, const struct stat *sb __maybe_unused, ./tools/perf/util/cgroup.c:235:static int check_and_add_cgroup_name(const char *fpath) ./tools/perf/util/cgroup.c:245: return add_cgroup_name(fpath, NULL, FTW_D, NULL); ./tools/perf/util/cgroup.c:278: ret = check_and_add_cgroup_name(s); ./tools/perf/util/cgroup.c:283: if (check_and_add_cgroup_name("/") < 0) ./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/cgroup.h:592:static inline int cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen) ./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/cgroup.h:602:static inline void pr_cont_cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp) user@host:~/linux/kernel/torvalds4$ Here in the line 103 the return value of cgroup_name() is ignored: kernel/cgroup/debug.c: 87 static int current_css_set_cg_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) 88 { 89 struct cgrp_cset_link *link; 90 struct css_set *cset; 91 char *name_buf; 92 93 name_buf = kmalloc(NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 94 if (!name_buf) 95 return -ENOMEM; 96 97 spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); 98 rcu_read_lock(); 99 cset = task_css_set(current); 100 list_for_each_entry(link, &cset->cgrp_links, cgrp_link) { 101 struct cgroup *c = link->cgrp; 102 103 cgroup_name(c, name_buf, NAME_MAX + 1); 104 seq_printf(seq, "Root %d group %s\n", 105 c->root->hierarchy_id, name_buf); 106 } 107 rcu_read_unlock(); 108 spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock); 109 kfree(name_buf); 110 return 0; 111 } mm/page_owner.c:384: cgroup_name(memcg->css.cgroup, name, sizeof(name)); Referenced in 8 files: kernel/cgroup/debug.c, line 103 mm/page_owner.c, line 384 All the other references of cgroup_name are struct or struct members: tools/perf/util/cgroup.c line 211 line 229 line 242 line 245 line 255 line 296 line 339 line 415 tools/tracing/rtla/src/osnoise_hist.c line 571 line 574 line 866 tools/tracing/rtla/src/osnoise_top.c line 415 line 418 line 699 tools/tracing/rtla/src/timerlat_hist.c line 645 line 648 line 986 line 1061 line 1061 tools/tracing/rtla/src/timerlat_top.c line 479 line 482 line 796 line 880 line 880 tools/tracing/rtla/src/timerlat_u.c line 66 line 67 And this is the only place where cgroup_name() is invoked. Second place where the strlcpy() -> strscpy() is replaced is here: 141 static int kernfs_path_from_node_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn_to, 142 struct kernfs_node *kn_from, 143 char *buf, size_t buflen) 144 { 145 struct kernfs_node *kn, *common; 146 const char parent_str[] = "/.."; 147 size_t depth_from, depth_to, len = 0; 148 int i, j; 149 150 if (!kn_to) 151 return strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen); 152 153 if (!kn_from) 154 kn_from = kernfs_root(kn_to)->kn; 155 156 if (kn_from == kn_to) 157 return strscpy(buf, "/", buflen); 158 159 common = kernfs_common_ancestor(kn_from, kn_to); 160 if (WARN_ON(!common)) 161 return -EINVAL; 162 163 depth_to = kernfs_depth(common, kn_to); 164 depth_from = kernfs_depth(common, kn_from); 165 166 buf[0] = '\0'; 167 168 for (i = 0; i < depth_from; i++) 169 len += strscpy(buf + len, parent_str, 170 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); 171 172 /* Calculate how many bytes we need for the rest */ 173 for (i = depth_to - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 174 for (kn = kn_to, j = 0; j < i; j++) 175 kn = kn->parent; 176 len += strscpy(buf + len, "/", 177 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); 178 len += strscpy(buf + len, kn->name, 179 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); 180 } 181 182 return len; 183 } This is safe, as in line 151 "(null)" cannot overrun buf of buflen which is sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf) which is PATH_MAX: 29 static char kernfs_pr_cont_buf[PATH_MAX]; Line 157 cannot possibly overrun buf, and it is equivalent to strlcpy() in all cases where there is no possibility of overrun. Lines 169, 176 and 178 carefully check if (len < buflen) and copy buflen - len or zero bytes. This is safe, for we see that in case of count == 0 strscpy() just like strlcpy() turns to a virtual NOP. Finally here: 856 static struct kernfs_node *kernfs_walk_ns(struct kernfs_node *parent, 857 const unsigned char *path, 858 const void *ns) 859 { 860 size_t len; 861 char *p, *name; 862 863 lockdep_assert_held_read(&kernfs_root(parent)->kernfs_rwsem); 864 865 spin_lock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); 866 867 len = strscpy(kernfs_pr_cont_buf, path, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); 868 869 if (unlikely(len == -E2BIG)) { 870 spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); 871 return NULL; 872 } 873 874 p = kernfs_pr_cont_buf; 875 876 while ((name = strsep(&p, "/")) && parent) { 877 if (*name == '\0') 878 continue; 879 parent = kernfs_find_ns(parent, name, ns); 880 } 881 882 spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); 883 884 return parent; 885 } the previous test was if (len >= sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)) which is safely replaced by if (len == -E2BIG) For both will happen if and only if the string overruns the buffer. CONCLUSION The only place where the src string can overrun the buffer is here: 54 static int kernfs_name_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen) 55 { 56 size_t len; 57 58 if (!kn) 59 return strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen); 60 61 len = strscpy(buf, kn->parent ? kn->name : "/", buflen); 62 63 if (unlikely(len == -E2BIG)) { 64 return buflen - 1; 65 } else 66 return len; 67 } and this function is only called from 201 int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen) 202 { 203 unsigned long flags; 204 int ret; 205 206 read_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); 207 ret = kernfs_name_locked(kn, buf, buflen); 208 read_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); 209 return ret; 210 } and 592 static inline int cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen) 593 { 594 return kernfs_name(cgrp->kn, buf, buflen); 595 } Both kernfs_name() and cgroup_name() are only called while ignoring their return value in: 247 void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn) 248 { 249 unsigned long flags; 250 251 spin_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags); 252 253 → kernfs_name(kn, kernfs_pr_cont_buf, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); 254 pr_cont("%s", kernfs_pr_cont_buf); 255 256 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags); 257 } and kernel/cgroup/debug.c: 87 static int current_css_set_cg_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) 88 { 89 struct cgrp_cset_link *link; 90 struct css_set *cset; 91 char *name_buf; 92 93 name_buf = kmalloc(NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 94 if (!name_buf) 95 return -ENOMEM; 96 97 spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); 98 rcu_read_lock(); 99 cset = task_css_set(current); 100 list_for_each_entry(link, &cset->cgrp_links, cgrp_link) { 101 struct cgroup *c = link->cgrp; 102 103 → cgroup_name(c, name_buf, NAME_MAX + 1); 104 seq_printf(seq, "Root %d group %s\n", 105 c->root->hierarchy_id, name_buf); 106 } 107 rcu_read_unlock(); 108 spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock); 109 kfree(name_buf); 110 return 0; 111 } This indicates that the change of semanthics from returning unfortunate 59 return strlcpy(buf, kn->parent ? kn->name : "/", buflen); and in effect unwanted strlen(kn->name) does not affect the rest of kernel. Which is more luck than expected. Linus in [3] says [quote]: The reason to use strscpy() is to *avoid* doing the strlen() on the source, and limit things to the limited size. If you need to do the strlen(), then use strlcpy(). It's a broken interface, but creating this kind of horror wrapper that does the same thing as strlcpy() is worse than just using the regular version. So the strscpy() conversion should *only* be done if the caller doesn't care about the difference in return values (or done *together* with changing the caller to use the nicer strscpy() return value). We are in this case lucky because none of the final callers in the stack trace cares about the return value of kernfs_name_locked(), or the value in other functions isn't changed at all, because buffer overrun is carefully avoided by calculations ensuring len < buflen. I am just running the kernel with this patch applied, but I don't know of the border case selftests for the kernfs_name() and cgroup_name() overrun. REFERENCES: [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/659214/ [2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/lib/string.c#L122 [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wg7pwWiF4eWVTfFYkfAk_5YDHkmkgZ04cgXkNUO_9pR3A@mail.gmail.com/ Hope this helps. Best regards, Mirsad Todorovac > Thanks. >
Hello, On Thu, Nov 23, 2023 at 12:37:03AM +0100, Mirsad Todorovac wrote: ... > 141 static int kernfs_path_from_node_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn_to, > 142 struct kernfs_node *kn_from, > 143 char *buf, size_t buflen) ... > 172 /* Calculate how many bytes we need for the rest */ > 173 for (i = depth_to - 1; i >= 0; i--) { > 174 for (kn = kn_to, j = 0; j < i; j++) > 175 kn = kn->parent; > 176 len += strscpy(buf + len, "/", > 177 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); > 178 len += strscpy(buf + len, kn->name, > 179 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); > 180 } > 181 > 182 return len; > 183 } ... > This is safe, for we see that in case of count == 0 strscpy() just like > strlcpy() turns to a virtual NOP. The conversion itself isn't dangerous but it changes the return value of the function. The comment is not updated and the callers are still assuming that the function returns full length when the buffer is too short. e.g. Take a look at cgroup_show_path(). All those paths seem safe but the code is more more confusing because the conversions are half-way. I'm not necessarily against the conversion but the benefit to risk / churn ratio doesn't seem too attractive. If you wanna push this through, please make the conversion complete including the comments and the callers and include a short summary of the changes and why they're safe in the commit message. Thanks.
Hello, Mr. Tejun Heo, On 11/25/23 20:35, Tejun Heo wrote: > Hello, > > On Thu, Nov 23, 2023 at 12:37:03AM +0100, Mirsad Todorovac wrote: > ... >> 141 static int kernfs_path_from_node_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn_to, >> 142 struct kernfs_node *kn_from, >> 143 char *buf, size_t buflen) > ... >> 172 /* Calculate how many bytes we need for the rest */ >> 173 for (i = depth_to - 1; i >= 0; i--) { >> 174 for (kn = kn_to, j = 0; j < i; j++) >> 175 kn = kn->parent; >> 176 len += strscpy(buf + len, "/", >> 177 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); >> 178 len += strscpy(buf + len, kn->name, >> 179 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); >> 180 } >> 181 >> 182 return len; >> 183 } > ... >> This is safe, for we see that in case of count == 0 strscpy() just like >> strlcpy() turns to a virtual NOP. > > The conversion itself isn't dangerous but it changes the return value of the > function. The comment is not updated and the callers are still assuming that > the function returns full length when the buffer is too short. e.g. Take a > look at cgroup_show_path(). All those paths seem safe but the code is more > more confusing because the conversions are half-way. I'm not necessarily > against the conversion but the benefit to risk / churn ratio doesn't seem > too attractive. If you wanna push this through, please make the conversion > complete including the comments and the callers and include a short summary > of the changes and why they're safe in the commit message. > > Thanks. Thank you kindly for your review of my lengthy analysis of the return value. I apologise for another long email, but most of it is the code you already understand or wrote, so it should be easy for you to read. Apparently, what troubles you is: 1. Lack of comment that the return value of kernfs_name_locked() changed for strlen(kn->node) >= buflen. This is noted and it is a legitimate concern. 54 static int kernfs_name_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen) 55 { 56 size_t len; 57 58 if (!kn) 59 return strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen); 60 61 len = strscpy(buf, kn->parent ? kn->name : "/", buflen); 62 63 if (unlikely(len == -E2BIG)) { 64 return buflen - 1; 65 } else 66 return len; 67 } Returning strlen(kn->name) that is greater than buflen really does not make any sense IMHO, as by the first character after buflen we already know we are in overrun. Maybe the comment should be like this: /* * The function kernfs_name_locked() returns the name of kernfs_node *kn truncated * to buflen - 1 or a "/" if it is the root node. * * The resulting buffer buf is in any case zero-terminated, and the value returned * is the number of actual characters copied (excluding the termination NUL byte). */ Would this be clear enough in your opinion? 2. The example with cgroup_show_path() that is of your concern. I have carefully examined it and there is nothing to worry about. So, the stacktrace goes like this: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:1879: cgroup_show_path(sf, kf_node, kf_root) 1893: len = kernfs_path_from_node(kf_node, ns_cgroup->kn, buf, PATH_MAX); fs/kernfs/dir.c:228: kernfs_path_from_node(to, from, buf, buflen) 235: ret = kernfs_path_from_node_locked(to, from, buf, buflen); fs/kernfs/dir.c:141: kernfs_path_from_node_locked(kn_to, kn_from, buf, buflen) Let us analyse the stacktrace: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c: ======================= 1879 int cgroup_show_path(struct seq_file *sf, struct kernfs_node *kf_node, 1880 struct kernfs_root *kf_root) 1881 { 1882 int len = 0; 1883 char *buf = NULL; 1884 struct cgroup_root *kf_cgroot = cgroup_root_from_kf(kf_root); 1885 struct cgroup *ns_cgroup; 1886 1887 buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); 1888 if (!buf) 1889 return -ENOMEM; 1890 1891 spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); 1892 ns_cgroup = current_cgns_cgroup_from_root(kf_cgroot); → 1893 len = kernfs_path_from_node(kf_node, ns_cgroup->kn, buf, PATH_MAX); 1894 spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock); 1895 1896 if (len >= PATH_MAX) 1897 len = -ERANGE; 1898 else if (len > 0) { 1899 seq_escape(sf, buf, " \t\n\\"); 1900 len = 0; 1901 } 1902 kfree(buf); 1903 return len; 1904 } fs/kernfs/dir.c: ================ 228 int kernfs_path_from_node(struct kernfs_node *to, struct kernfs_node *from, 229 char *buf, size_t buflen) 230 { 231 unsigned long flags; 232 int ret; 233 234 read_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); → 235 ret = kernfs_path_from_node_locked(to, from, buf, buflen); 236 read_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); 237 return ret; 238 } 239 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernfs_path_from_node); The problem seems to be this function: ====================================== 141 static int kernfs_path_from_node_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn_to, 142 struct kernfs_node *kn_from, 143 char *buf, size_t buflen) 144 { 145 struct kernfs_node *kn, *common; 146 const char parent_str[] = "/.."; 147 size_t depth_from, depth_to, len = 0; 148 int i, j; 149 150 if (!kn_to) → 151 return strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen); 152 153 if (!kn_from) 154 kn_from = kernfs_root(kn_to)->kn; 155 156 if (kn_from == kn_to) → 157 return strscpy(buf, "/", buflen); 158 159 common = kernfs_common_ancestor(kn_from, kn_to); 160 if (WARN_ON(!common)) 161 return -EINVAL; 162 163 depth_to = kernfs_depth(common, kn_to); 164 depth_from = kernfs_depth(common, kn_from); 165 166 buf[0] = '\0'; 167 168 for (i = 0; i < depth_from; i++) → 169 len += strscpy(buf + len, parent_str, 170 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); 171 172 /* Calculate how many bytes we need for the rest */ 173 for (i = depth_to - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 174 for (kn = kn_to, j = 0; j < i; j++) 175 kn = kn->parent; → 176 len += strscpy(buf + len, "/", 177 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); → 178 len += strscpy(buf + len, kn->name, 179 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); 180 } 181 182 return len; 183 } We have five (5) uses of strlcpy() -> strscpy() conversion. Line 151: strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen); cannot overrun and immediately returns - return value just as if strlcpy() was used. Line 157: strscpy(buf, "/", buflen); cannot overrun and immediately returns - return value just as if strlcpy() was used. Line 169: len += strscpy(buf + len, parent_str, len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); Line 176: len += strscpy(buf + len, "/", len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); Line 178: len += strscpy(buf + len, kn->name, len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); As you will clearly see, all of those cases are already carefully and cleverly protected already against overrun. This was apparently done by you and Mr. Aditya Kali. Nothing changes here with replacement one-for-one strlcpy() -> strscpy(), as there is never a buffer overrun. In case of overrun, the construct (len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0) will simply give a "count" of zero, and this will cause an early exit from strscpy(). So, my conclusion is that for callers of kernfs_path_from_node_locked() and kernfs_path_from_node() nothing changes in semantics or the return value. For the kernfs_name_locked(), we get a truncated value of kn->name in buf as before, only return value changes for this special case, but I have explained and I think proven that it is used nowhere in code. For the function: fs/kernfs/dir.c =============== 856 static struct kernfs_node *kernfs_walk_ns(struct kernfs_node *parent, 857 const unsigned char *path, 858 const void *ns) 859 { 860 size_t len; 861 char *p, *name; 862 863 lockdep_assert_held_read(&kernfs_root(parent)->kernfs_rwsem); 864 865 spin_lock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); 866 867 len = strscpy(kernfs_pr_cont_buf, path, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); 868 869 if (unlikely(len == -E2BIG)) { 870 spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); 871 return NULL; 872 } 873 874 p = kernfs_pr_cont_buf; 875 876 while ((name = strsep(&p, "/")) && parent) { 877 if (*name == '\0') 878 continue; 879 parent = kernfs_find_ns(parent, name, ns); 880 } 881 882 spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); 883 884 return parent; 885 } Nothing changes. Neither the truncation of buffer and neither the return value (NULL or parent). The previous check was: 860 len = strlcpy(kernfs_pr_cont_buf, path, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); 861 862 if (len >= sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)) { 863 spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); 864 return NULL; 865 } The string is truncated on overrun just as with strlcpy(), and the test if (len == -E2BIG) is equivalent to if (len >= sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)) NOTE: The forementioned situation in cgroup_show_path(): → 1893 len = kernfs_path_from_node(kf_node, ns_cgroup->kn, buf, PATH_MAX); 1894 spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock); 1895 1896 if (len >= PATH_MAX) 1897 len = -ERANGE; 1898 else if (len > 0) { 1899 seq_escape(sf, buf, " \t\n\\"); 1900 len = 0; 1901 } len > PATH_MAX can never happen because: kernfs_path_from_node(kf_node, ns_cgroup->kn, buf, PATH_MAX); calls 234 read_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); → 235 ret = kernfs_path_from_node_locked(to, from, buf, buflen); 236 read_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); 237 return ret; which is evaluated to: 234 read_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); → 235 ret = kernfs_path_from_node_locked(to, from, buf, PATH_MAX); 236 read_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags); 237 return ret; and then to: 141 static int kernfs_path_from_node_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn_to, 142 struct kernfs_node *kn_from, 143 char *buf, size_t buflen) 144 { 145 struct kernfs_node *kn, *common; 146 const char parent_str[] = "/.."; 147 size_t depth_from, depth_to, len = 0; 148 int i, j; 149 150 if (!kn_to) → 151 return strscpy(buf, "(null)", PATH_MAX); 152 153 if (!kn_from) 154 kn_from = kernfs_root(kn_to)->kn; 155 156 if (kn_from == kn_to) → 157 return strscpy(buf, "/", PATH_MAX); 158 159 common = kernfs_common_ancestor(kn_from, kn_to); 160 if (WARN_ON(!common)) 161 return -EINVAL; 162 163 depth_to = kernfs_depth(common, kn_to); 164 depth_from = kernfs_depth(common, kn_from); 165 166 buf[0] = '\0'; 167 168 for (i = 0; i < depth_from; i++) → 169 len += strscpy(buf + len, parent_str, 170 len < PATH_MAX ? PATH_MAX - len : 0); 171 172 /* Calculate how many bytes we need for the rest */ 173 for (i = depth_to - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 174 for (kn = kn_to, j = 0; j < i; j++) 175 kn = kn->parent; → 176 len += strscpy(buf + len, "/", 177 len < PATH_MAX ? PATH_MAX - len : 0); → 178 len += strscpy(buf + len, kn->name, 179 len < PATH_MAX ? PATH_MAX - len : 0); 180 } 181 182 return len; 183 } len will never exceed PATH_MAX, because it is increased by (PATH_MAX - len) or 0 (zero), as strscpy will copy either PATH_MAX - len or 0 (zero) characters. The second use of kernfs_path_from_node() appears safe: 2350 int cgroup_path_ns_locked(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen, 2351 struct cgroup_namespace *ns) 2352 { 2353 struct cgroup *root = cset_cgroup_from_root(ns->root_cset, cgrp->root); 2354 → 2355 return kernfs_path_from_node(cgrp->kn, root->kn, buf, buflen); 2356 } According to Bootlin, this covers all uses of the function kernfs_path_from_node(): Defined in 1 files as a prototype: include/linux/kernfs.h, line 396 (as a prototype) Defined in 2 files as a function: fs/kernfs/dir.c, line 221 (as a function) include/linux/kernfs.h, line 476 (as a function) Documented in 1 files: fs/kernfs/dir.c, line 205 Referenced in 3 files: fs/kernfs/dir.c line 232 line 265 include/linux/kernfs.h, line 596 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c line 1893 line 2355 Hope this helps. Best regards, Mirsad Todorovac
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c index 8b2bd65d70e7..a6971a6756bc 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c @@ -53,10 +53,17 @@ static bool kernfs_lockdep(struct kernfs_node *kn) static int kernfs_name_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen) { + size_t len; + if (!kn) - return strlcpy(buf, "(null)", buflen); + return strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen); + + len = strscpy(buf, kn->parent ? kn->name : "/", buflen); - return strlcpy(buf, kn->parent ? kn->name : "/", buflen); + if (unlikely(len == -E2BIG)) { + return buflen - 1; + } else + return len; } /* kernfs_node_depth - compute depth from @from to @to */ @@ -141,13 +148,13 @@ static int kernfs_path_from_node_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn_to, int i, j; if (!kn_to) - return strlcpy(buf, "(null)", buflen); + return strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen); if (!kn_from) kn_from = kernfs_root(kn_to)->kn; if (kn_from == kn_to) - return strlcpy(buf, "/", buflen); + return strscpy(buf, "/", buflen); common = kernfs_common_ancestor(kn_from, kn_to); if (WARN_ON(!common)) @@ -159,16 +166,16 @@ static int kernfs_path_from_node_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn_to, buf[0] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < depth_from; i++) - len += strlcpy(buf + len, parent_str, + len += strscpy(buf + len, parent_str, len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); /* Calculate how many bytes we need for the rest */ for (i = depth_to - 1; i >= 0; i--) { for (kn = kn_to, j = 0; j < i; j++) kn = kn->parent; - len += strlcpy(buf + len, "/", + len += strscpy(buf + len, "/", len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); - len += strlcpy(buf + len, kn->name, + len += strscpy(buf + len, kn->name, len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0); } @@ -857,9 +864,9 @@ static struct kernfs_node *kernfs_walk_ns(struct kernfs_node *parent, spin_lock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); - len = strlcpy(kernfs_pr_cont_buf, path, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); + len = strscpy(kernfs_pr_cont_buf, path, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)); - if (len >= sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf)) { + if (unlikely(len == -E2BIG)) { spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock); return NULL; }