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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id b7-20020a170906194700b0099cbc7832dasi2607216eje.358.2023.08.10.17.42.58; Thu, 10 Aug 2023 17:43:22 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20221208 header.b="D41wM5/g"; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233168AbjHJXta (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 10 Aug 2023 19:49:30 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:47092 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233100AbjHJXt0 (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Aug 2023 19:49:26 -0400 Received: from mail-pj1-x1049.google.com (mail-pj1-x1049.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1049]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 50DA82D4D for ; Thu, 10 Aug 2023 16:49:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pj1-x1049.google.com with SMTP id 98e67ed59e1d1-268113acd37so2980908a91.0 for ; Thu, 10 Aug 2023 16:49:23 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20221208; t=1691711363; x=1692316163; h=cc:to:from:subject:message-id:references:mime-version:in-reply-to :date:reply-to:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=0MxTrgQSzrtixzHynHiQH/awbsTAu12j+2kwyEuuwhY=; b=D41wM5/g3u8d/j3OyazCXF0tL/NoX3Es3irpgu4hQ1Zgy074Lje5t9CTlosGNkkzAm e1sZp2u9aBlvHNlEgivhCI8oKjSUi+JvPSw7+/UNJyCMlcLmc8jJ774LkjyYS+DYUJFB jJXaEsQ9nWtG1YR1q3edXWTfYPsE83IkpENakCI09mLgVyLvUaLBS/WIJ5ACFTsMd3LG fcfy2KDrQ8AFUa+JUrjH7UtkBYlnZRNSOBcWByOpaQCMFUiVrsV+xahHmGGfigoD4gAz h4Rq9diDLjmbuMfrOQUi/mL8LoHBCme/6haejzJllsBHpRBd0FaJuwt/TCZjFVjo+y30 YJjg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1691711363; x=1692316163; h=cc:to:from:subject:message-id:references:mime-version:in-reply-to :date:reply-to:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=0MxTrgQSzrtixzHynHiQH/awbsTAu12j+2kwyEuuwhY=; b=L4hIIVZvA0sGulXbDgkIpStlcP2DsAi/1PRg91fdg2WvMNaCnx4ojwIOmRU4c19aie papFzBtmWWwxfBNFpcRgYY3cY6drcEva8lzfvy9jhVd3JUvKxMaeRpyGlVOc6zQGv99P JkQ/fhj1ICZUqj8soLc7NCZFAXLJcNqyTh+lc5WIKBRQWSy3AFRB0GAmkqeBLJFJfZYo hlLXSs2LVxiL52YGNrIPvzqRKVQxbQg9aIJJh+rv/KUvnvEJQVsJ8VAJkblXSTGi9Zst 789mNiLKXxz3Lk+xrUBDpdth3XXusUlf6jVELb4aiOx3qppXhao8ORYyJr/4iYYTrvt0 86iQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yxit62QxIIXXr6W4CFlJEzPjIH02yFwXKEKWRrqInSetLhsMBP3 f0jtlVffbCNtF31i4/LPARMDsFSS9rg= X-Received: from zagreus.c.googlers.com ([fda3:e722:ac3:cc00:7f:e700:c0a8:5c37]) (user=seanjc job=sendgmr) by 2002:a17:90b:612:b0:263:3727:6045 with SMTP id gb18-20020a17090b061200b0026337276045mr90090pjb.4.1691711362872; Thu, 10 Aug 2023 16:49:22 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: Sean Christopherson Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 16:49:17 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20230810234919.145474-1-seanjc@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20230810234919.145474-1-seanjc@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.41.0.694.ge786442a9b-goog Message-ID: <20230810234919.145474-2-seanjc@google.com> Subject: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: SVM: Don't inject #UD if KVM attempts emulation of SEV guest w/o insn From: Sean Christopherson To: Sean Christopherson , Paolo Bonzini Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Wu Zongyo , Tom Lendacky X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_MED, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1773891331025689539 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1773891331025689539 Don't inject a #UD if KVM attempts to emulate an instruction for an SEV guest without a prefilled buffer, and instead resume the guest and hope that it can make forward progress. When commit 04c40f344def ("KVM: SVM: Inject #UD on attempted emulation for SEV guest w/o insn buffer") added the completely arbitrary #UD behavior, there were no known scenarios where a well-behaved guest would induce a VM-Exit that triggered emulation, i.e. it was thought that injecting #UD would be helpful. However, now that KVM (correctly) attempts to re-inject INT3/INTO, e.g. if a #NPF is encountered when attempting to deliver the INT3/INTO, an SEV guest can trigger emulation without a buffer, through no fault of its own. Resuming the guest and retrying the INT3/INTO is architecturally wrong, e.g. the vCPU will incorrectly re-hit code #DBs, but for SEV guests there is literally no other option that has a chance of making forward progress. Drop the #UD injection for all flavors of emulation, even though that means that a *misbehaving* guest will effectively end up in an infinite loop instead of getting a #UD. There's no evidence that suggests that an unexpected #UD is actually better than hanging the vCPU, e.g. a soft-hung vCPU can still respond to IRQs and NMIs to generate a backtrace. Reported-by: Wu Zongyo Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8eb933fd-2cf3-d7a9-32fe-2a1d82eac42a@mail.ustc.edu.cn Fixes: 6ef88d6e36c2 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 212706d18c62..581958c9dd4d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -4725,18 +4725,24 @@ static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type, * and cannot be decrypted by KVM, i.e. KVM would read cyphertext and * decode garbage. * - * Inject #UD if KVM reached this point without an instruction buffer. - * In practice, this path should never be hit by a well-behaved guest, - * e.g. KVM doesn't intercept #UD or #GP for SEV guests, but this path - * is still theoretically reachable, e.g. via unaccelerated fault-like - * AVIC access, and needs to be handled by KVM to avoid putting the - * guest into an infinite loop. Injecting #UD is somewhat arbitrary, - * but its the least awful option given lack of insight into the guest. + * Resume the guest if KVM reached this point without an instruction + * buffer. This path should *almost* never be hit by a well-behaved + * guest, e.g. KVM doesn't intercept #UD or #GP for SEV guests. But if + * a #NPF occurs while the guest is vectoring an INT3/INTO, then KVM + * will attempt to re-inject the INT3/INTO and skip the instruction. + * In that scenario, retrying the INT3/INTO and hoping the guest will + * make forward progress is the only option that has a chance of + * success (and in practice it will work the vast majority of the time). + * + * This path is also theoretically reachable if the guest is doing + * something odd, e.g. if the guest is triggering unaccelerated fault- + * like AVIC access. Resuming the guest will put it into an infinite + * loop of sorts, but there's no hope of forward progress and injecting + * an exception will at best yield confusing behavior, not to mention + * break the INT3/INTO+#NPF case above. */ - if (unlikely(!insn)) { - kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); + if (unlikely(!insn)) return false; - } /* * Emulate for SEV guests if the insn buffer is not empty. The buffer