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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n7-20020a6543c7000000b005347fcb7853si6003146pgp.140.2023.08.07.10.13.31; Mon, 07 Aug 2023 10:13:46 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=JHJNqUyf; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231771AbjHGQ3i (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 7 Aug 2023 12:29:38 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:35388 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231830AbjHGQ3G (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Aug 2023 12:29:06 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EEA112105; Mon, 7 Aug 2023 09:28:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8D9CD61F29; Mon, 7 Aug 2023 16:28:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 71A20C433CD; Mon, 7 Aug 2023 16:28:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1691425707; bh=Yft7wHndNsfc52pD9ceXPfBqRxkOxgMgHrWle8cF1T8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=JHJNqUyfYpYW0g+cmgyFuXpN/eWFvTcrwyNlWn1mOnobkLn/89QwLOb3Aatyd6A1f Vd89639u+iO0aopeNF+FshWpI2YV4zHsj7U8Dw/paMV5A66Tay1yQLOI2Lmu/zE6HV Lwj5wWKFS2ErYWSU/NNVOxJOZ6LnK4TbocQAW/8auNj8c06AeY175FSc0Kroou0fo+ wXELO+8A+beqLB5zblBKBM21Vgx0YFMxHghM0qZmCrr/Pm4ZukcjbLfEC+cerx4TAb tlRQJ+LloVZWr/pwH1v3KQtYQc7NidTJleGFfVL+NI5oD19VuJUqWlnOfexDjO6nzW 87V7zIyTAGGDg== From: Ard Biesheuvel To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , Ingo Molnar , Thomas Gleixner Subject: [PATCH v9 22/23] x86/efistub: Perform SNP feature test while running in the firmware Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 18:27:19 +0200 Message-Id: <20230807162720.545787-23-ardb@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20230807162720.545787-1-ardb@kernel.org> References: <20230807162720.545787-1-ardb@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=7725; i=ardb@kernel.org; h=from:subject; bh=Yft7wHndNsfc52pD9ceXPfBqRxkOxgMgHrWle8cF1T8=; b=owGbwMvMwCFmkMcZplerG8N4Wi2JIeWidNrjBXH3f5uqTbrONuHnneeHVmow8XByyc51N8qrZ fGd3vuwo5SFQYyDQVZMkUVg9t93O09PlKp1niULM4eVCWQIAxenAExkszcjw8JdM3S3hEc3fL74 M+7M0YYN+h/7dllcfB0g+M3beN6jB3MY/kfIBjFJV9SldCta1BxZdzzr9Fzxs7anLCNkdheEaly 8yQoA X-Developer-Key: i=ardb@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=F43D03328115A198C90016883D200E9CA6329909 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1773591254430901733 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1773591254430901733 Before refactoring the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the legacy bare metal decompressor, duplicate the SNP feature check in the EFI stub before handing over to the kernel proper. The SNP feature check can be performed while running under the EFI boot services, which means it can force the boot to fail gracefully and return an error to the bootloader if the loaded kernel does not implement support for all the features that the hypervisor enabled. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 112 ++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 17 +++ 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c index c3e343bd4760e0ab..199155b8af3bc535 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c @@ -367,20 +367,25 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void) */ #define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (0) +u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status) +{ + if (!(status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) + return 0; + + return status & SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT; +} + void snp_check_features(void) { u64 unsupported; - if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) - return; - /* * Terminate the boot if hypervisor has enabled any feature lacking * guest side implementation. Pass on the unsupported features mask through * EXIT_INFO_2 of the GHCB protocol so that those features can be reported * as part of the guest boot failure. */ - unsupported = sev_status & SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT; + unsupported = snp_get_unsupported_features(sev_status); if (unsupported) { if (ghcb_version < 2 || (!boot_ghcb && !early_setup_ghcb())) sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED); @@ -390,10 +395,45 @@ void snp_check_features(void) } } -void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) +/* + * sev_check_cpu_support - Check for SEV support in the CPU capabilities + * + * Returns < 0 if SEV is not supported, otherwise the position of the + * encryption bit in the page table descriptors. + */ +static int sev_check_cpu_support(void) { unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + + /* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */ + eax = 0x80000000; + ecx = 0; + native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + if (eax < 0x8000001f) + return -ENODEV; + + /* + * Check for the SME/SEV feature: + * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] + * - Bit 0 - Secure Memory Encryption support + * - Bit 1 - Secure Encrypted Virtualization support + * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] + * - Bits 5:0 - Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption + */ + eax = 0x8000001f; + ecx = 0; + native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + /* Check whether SEV is supported */ + if (!(eax & BIT(1))) + return -ENODEV; + + return ebx & 0x3f; +} + +void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) +{ struct msr m; + int bitpos; bool snp; /* @@ -413,26 +453,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) * which is good enough. */ - /* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */ - eax = 0x80000000; - ecx = 0; - native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - if (eax < 0x8000001f) - return; - - /* - * Check for the SME/SEV feature: - * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - * - Bit 0 - Secure Memory Encryption support - * - Bit 1 - Secure Encrypted Virtualization support - * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - * - Bits 5:0 - Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption - */ - eax = 0x8000001f; - ecx = 0; - native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - /* Check whether SEV is supported */ - if (!(eax & BIT(1))) + if (sev_check_cpu_support() < 0) return; /* @@ -443,26 +464,8 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) /* Now repeat the checks with the SNP CPUID table. */ - /* Recheck the SME/SEV support leaf */ - eax = 0x80000000; - ecx = 0; - native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - if (eax < 0x8000001f) - return; - - /* - * Recheck for the SME/SEV feature: - * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - * - Bit 0 - Secure Memory Encryption support - * - Bit 1 - Secure Encrypted Virtualization support - * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - * - Bits 5:0 - Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption - */ - eax = 0x8000001f; - ecx = 0; - native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); - /* Check whether SEV is supported */ - if (!(eax & BIT(1))) { + bitpos = sev_check_cpu_support(); + if (bitpos < 0) { if (snp) error("SEV-SNP support indicated by CC blob, but not CPUID."); return; @@ -494,7 +497,24 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) if (snp && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) error("SEV-SNP supported indicated by CC blob, but not SEV status MSR."); - sme_me_mask = BIT_ULL(ebx & 0x3f); + sme_me_mask = BIT_ULL(bitpos); +} + +/* + * sev_get_status - Retrieve the SEV status mask + * + * Returns 0 if the CPU is not SEV capable, otherwise the value of the + * AMD64_SEV MSR. + */ +u64 sev_get_status(void) +{ + struct msr m; + + if (sev_check_cpu_support() < 0) + return 0; + + boot_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV, &m); + return m.q; } /* Search for Confidential Computing blob in the EFI config table. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 66c806784c5256bd..b97d239e18ea25fc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp); void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void); int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio); void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end); +u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status); +u64 sev_get_status(void); #else static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { } static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { } @@ -235,6 +237,8 @@ static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *in } static inline void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end) { } +static inline u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status) { return 0; } +static inline u64 sev_get_status(void) { return 0; } #endif #endif diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c index acb1c65bf8ac6fb3..b4685da2b8d5c243 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "efistub.h" #include "x86-stub.h" @@ -790,6 +791,19 @@ static efi_status_t exit_boot(struct boot_params *boot_params, void *handle) return EFI_SUCCESS; } +static bool have_unsupported_snp_features(void) +{ + u64 unsupported; + + unsupported = snp_get_unsupported_features(sev_get_status()); + if (unsupported) { + efi_err("Unsupported SEV-SNP features detected: 0x%llx\n", + unsupported); + return true; + } + return false; +} + static void __noreturn enter_kernel(unsigned long kernel_addr, struct boot_params *boot_params) { @@ -820,6 +834,9 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle, if (efi_system_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE) efi_exit(handle, EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); + if (have_unsupported_snp_features()) + efi_exit(handle, EFI_UNSUPPORTED); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_DXE_MEM_ATTRIBUTES)) { efi_dxe_table = get_efi_config_table(EFI_DXE_SERVICES_TABLE_GUID); if (efi_dxe_table &&