x86/purgatory: Do not use fortified string functions

Message ID 20230531003345.never.325-kees@kernel.org
State New
Headers
Series x86/purgatory: Do not use fortified string functions |

Commit Message

Kees Cook May 31, 2023, 12:33 a.m. UTC
  With the addition of -fstrict-flex-arrays=3, struct sha256_state's
trailing array is no longer ignored by CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE:

struct sha256_state {
        u32 state[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / 4];
        u64 count;
        u8 buf[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
};

This means that the memcpy() calls with "buf" as a destination in
sha256.c's code will attempt to perform run-time bounds checking, which
could lead to calling missing functions, specifically a potential
WARN_ONCE, which isn't callable from purgatory.

Reported-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/175578ec-9dec-7a9c-8d3a-43f24ff86b92@leemhuis.info/
Bisected-by: "Joan Bruguera Micó" <joanbrugueram@gmail.com>
Fixes: df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alyssa Ross <hi@alyssa.is>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
  

Comments

Thorsten Leemhuis May 31, 2023, 7:51 a.m. UTC | #1
Kees, thx for looking into this.

Joan, thx for bisecting. I should have done this earlier myself...

On 31.05.23 02:33, Kees Cook wrote:
> With the addition of -fstrict-flex-arrays=3, struct sha256_state's
> trailing array is no longer ignored by CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE:
> 
> struct sha256_state {
>         u32 state[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / 4];
>         u64 count;
>         u8 buf[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
> };
> 
> This means that the memcpy() calls with "buf" as a destination in
> sha256.c's code will attempt to perform run-time bounds checking, which
> could lead to calling missing functions, specifically a potential
> WARN_ONCE, which isn't callable from purgatory.
> 
> Reported-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/175578ec-9dec-7a9c-8d3a-43f24ff86b92@leemhuis.info/

Did a test build and booted it in a Vm, everything seems fine. So thx
again and feel free to add:

Tested-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info>

Ciao, Thorsten
  
Dave Hansen June 1, 2023, 4:45 p.m. UTC | #2
On 5/30/23 17:33, Kees Cook wrote:
> With the addition of -fstrict-flex-arrays=3, struct sha256_state's
> trailing array is no longer ignored by CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE:
> 
> struct sha256_state {
>         u32 state[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / 4];
>         u64 count;
>         u8 buf[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
> };
> 
> This means that the memcpy() calls with "buf" as a destination in
> sha256.c's code will attempt to perform run-time bounds checking, which
> could lead to calling missing functions, specifically a potential
> WARN_ONCE, which isn't callable from purgatory.
> 
> Reported-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/175578ec-9dec-7a9c-8d3a-43f24ff86b92@leemhuis.info/
> Bisected-by: "Joan Bruguera Micó" <joanbrugueram@gmail.com>
> Fixes: df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>

Hi Folks,

The -fstrict-flex-arrays=3 commit isn't upstream yet, right?  That makes
it a _bit_ wonky for us to carry this on the x86 side since among other
things, the Fixes commit doesn't exist.  I'd be fine if this goes up
along with the -fstrict-flex-arrays=3 code, so:

Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

We could also pick it up from the x86 side, but I think that would need
a _bit_ of a different commit message to allude to it being to prepare
for the _future_ setting of -fstrict-flex-arrays=3 and having no
practical benefits now.

Let me know if you don't want to send this up with the
-fstrict-flex-arrays=3 set.
  
Kees Cook June 1, 2023, 4:50 p.m. UTC | #3
On Thu, Jun 01, 2023 at 09:45:57AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 5/30/23 17:33, Kees Cook wrote:
> > With the addition of -fstrict-flex-arrays=3, struct sha256_state's
> > trailing array is no longer ignored by CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE:
> > 
> > struct sha256_state {
> >         u32 state[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / 4];
> >         u64 count;
> >         u8 buf[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
> > };
> > 
> > This means that the memcpy() calls with "buf" as a destination in
> > sha256.c's code will attempt to perform run-time bounds checking, which
> > could lead to calling missing functions, specifically a potential
> > WARN_ONCE, which isn't callable from purgatory.
> > 
> > Reported-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info>
> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/175578ec-9dec-7a9c-8d3a-43f24ff86b92@leemhuis.info/
> > Bisected-by: "Joan Bruguera Micó" <joanbrugueram@gmail.com>
> > Fixes: df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> 
> Hi Folks,
> 
> The -fstrict-flex-arrays=3 commit isn't upstream yet, right?  That makes

Correct.

> it a _bit_ wonky for us to carry this on the x86 side since among other
> things, the Fixes commit doesn't exist.  I'd be fine if this goes up
> along with the -fstrict-flex-arrays=3 code, so:
> 
> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

That would be perfect; thank you! I've added it to my tree.
  
Kees Cook June 1, 2023, 4:57 p.m. UTC | #4
On Tue, 30 May 2023 17:33:48 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> With the addition of -fstrict-flex-arrays=3, struct sha256_state's
> trailing array is no longer ignored by CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE:
> 
> struct sha256_state {
>         u32 state[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / 4];
>         u64 count;
>         u8 buf[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
> };
> 
> [...]

Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!

[1/1] x86/purgatory: Do not use fortified string functions
      https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/f6ab7fc96a53
  

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
index 82fec66d46d2..005324d6c76b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@  $(obj)/string.o: $(srctree)/arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c FORCE
 $(obj)/sha256.o: $(srctree)/lib/crypto/sha256.c FORCE
 	$(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
 
-CFLAGS_sha256.o := -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
+CFLAGS_sha256.o := -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS -D__NO_FORTIFY
 
 # When linking purgatory.ro with -r unresolved symbols are not checked,
 # also link a purgatory.chk binary without -r to check for unresolved symbols.