Message ID | 20230426134834.35199-2-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers |
Return-Path: <linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org> Delivered-To: ouuuleilei@gmail.com Received: by 2002:a59:b0ea:0:b0:3b6:4342:cba0 with SMTP id b10csp289180vqo; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 07:34:14 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AKy350alZdJcqHCmo/eLfsRVlGjUAlyYuzxYi/O5i2u84QcQTqNTg4eSQvsSSdcgNTJNpJIeo5M1 X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:ebc6:b0:1a5:22a6:4e6a with SMTP id p6-20020a170902ebc600b001a522a64e6amr21868009plg.51.1682519654306; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 07:34:14 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1682519654; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=InBH0vgKA7cW+leawTtiVZN/5t8WNzbMpQrxNHaA44A7WqB7TJXG6ihM1lx9QukI8q FifL4g9hVCDvEX5LEN70OLmlDMx9pDsa1bH5ke60QVUJDAQPfPitcOo1H3xUD9tChUwM x9sAOnc2KArVy1kp4A4qDMdVAo+VYllZjiQJKYeN0t6Dv+N22NZOyh8Dbst4Q44HJxxc vwqRJPSkR9/Jfxxd0QuGzWHjz3FmmucQBCmN+9QShN85NmEP3F2LczNtWT7BJngJHqjj 1OV5jv0YevCWHbvuwOlMUoFr2F1Ccata+/hlnw12jhHB8HgIoFLH3Am+u2eAp7sk2EVq YUwA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from :dkim-signature; bh=haMxrfNCcZsNWCFNARsj7f0YXA0WezkWwKNzmYY7JKA=; b=FpY+OdXjD4b4OYFQfmOmtfBsG7dMsCsfZ0WrphL7n/VjqiNuD4s92CzIPjQTIAjhIF zO5S6fwDzq68JI3+vy9yO390VSx1GBMY3M5YoXHE0HVIO9ptHVvC4Tv9LKUsmqMC8QvO bQSNES7T4Rw2M/EXeY7YVRBXbpzg21Dbdtx3wXtcWVsMDA/XWCpYgy/AzEMftZSLelxL pzvtN5MmPR3qMbwPsjU+O0jV4xk+TpuWRxyVdUW0Vh4QjnSCCvdPVKr2nZmys3YO0bzG /RH5Kz8zCRdqygE8DWzEk8Wgk+BssPRLVaOWvot0nu/3qVXj4gbl88q23xju/2bE3/XQ mZmg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@ibm.com header.s=pp1 header.b=ocEB6I71; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=ibm.com Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id j6-20020a170902c08600b001a6a46d70ccsi15490931pld.1.2023.04.26.07.34.00; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 07:34:14 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@ibm.com header.s=pp1 header.b=ocEB6I71; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=ibm.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S241017AbjDZNsz (ORCPT <rfc822;zxc52fgh@gmail.com> + 99 others); Wed, 26 Apr 2023 09:48:55 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41544 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S241084AbjDZNst (ORCPT <rfc822;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>); Wed, 26 Apr 2023 09:48:49 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A7A765586; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 06:48:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0353727.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.17.1.19/8.17.1.19) with ESMTP id 33QDb5aS006964; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 13:48:44 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding; s=pp1; bh=haMxrfNCcZsNWCFNARsj7f0YXA0WezkWwKNzmYY7JKA=; b=ocEB6I71njLSFw4H8v4riWhXayMCnmBjL+kHG2cu3Y+m+UvT0Ok5gjyR6O5PioTWB6i9 JO2L6X+/yVyh00bmFXjVNFGRrCJRr3ZYLVo3vYTkebeDtIkupi1uk3vFrtiG/UQ9AFR1 cK6NTWQCsxWT0lKUE6WxX8pJeqGsp9Z00tw6MnZPpND6lFN0iE118s26a/1OSVGmS7AX 9kCy/F9x73P8YnQCO6hBgpYkM8qmIkRXxsUdd/QEkZ/NxWBrYgopvOH+pI2OullRMjMh RzRrz/L60XoKXsSX4ZR+Nyht6CK615YAuw8s5xzdPxxyjniDkkcXGuX1ra0OSBpv8hfZ Rg== Received: from ppma01fra.de.ibm.com (46.49.7a9f.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [159.122.73.70]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 3q74usgkf6-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 26 Apr 2023 13:48:43 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma01fra.de.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma01fra.de.ibm.com (8.17.1.19/8.17.1.19) with ESMTP id 33QCTjnn017020; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 13:48:40 GMT Received: from smtprelay04.fra02v.mail.ibm.com ([9.218.2.228]) by ppma01fra.de.ibm.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 3q47771yum-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 26 Apr 2023 13:48:40 +0000 Received: from smtpav07.fra02v.mail.ibm.com (smtpav07.fra02v.mail.ibm.com [10.20.54.106]) by smtprelay04.fra02v.mail.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 33QDmYoY46072202 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 26 Apr 2023 13:48:35 GMT Received: from smtpav07.fra02v.mail.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id DC2E920040; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 13:48:34 +0000 (GMT) Received: from smtpav07.fra02v.mail.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 97A452004B; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 13:48:34 +0000 (GMT) Received: from p-imbrenda.boeblingen.de.ibm.com (unknown [9.152.224.56]) by smtpav07.fra02v.mail.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 13:48:34 +0000 (GMT) From: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> To: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, nrb@linux.ibm.com, nsg@linux.ibm.com, seiden@linux.ibm.com, jgg@nvidia.com Subject: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: s390: fix race in gmap_make_secure Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2023 15:48:34 +0200 Message-Id: <20230426134834.35199-2-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.40.0 In-Reply-To: <20230426134834.35199-1-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> References: <20230426134834.35199-1-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: H5ChbVY5Mlg6xUB7uQRnAt0mWqOJEbU7 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: H5ChbVY5Mlg6xUB7uQRnAt0mWqOJEbU7 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.254,Aquarius:18.0.942,Hydra:6.0.573,FMLib:17.11.170.22 definitions=2023-04-26_06,2023-04-26_03,2023-02-09_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 mlxscore=0 phishscore=0 impostorscore=0 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 adultscore=0 spamscore=0 bulkscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxlogscore=787 clxscore=1015 priorityscore=1501 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2303200000 definitions=main-2304260121 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: =?utf-8?q?INBOX?= X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1764249728713887990?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1764249728713887990?= |
Series |
fix race in gmap_make_secure
|
|
Commit Message
Claudio Imbrenda
April 26, 2023, 1:48 p.m. UTC
This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the
last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
---
arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
Comments
On Wed, Apr 26, 2023 at 03:48:34PM +0200, Claudio Imbrenda wrote: > This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the > last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET. > > Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> > Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> > Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests") > --- > arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++--------------------- > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix race" is not very helpful :) What race does this fix? When can this happen? What are the consequences if the race window is being hit?
On Thu, 27 Apr 2023 12:53:04 +0200 Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > On Wed, Apr 26, 2023 at 03:48:34PM +0200, Claudio Imbrenda wrote: > > This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the > > last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET. > > > > Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> > > Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> > > Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests") > > --- > > arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++--------------------- > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix > race" is not very helpful :) > > What race does this fix? > When can this happen? > What are the consequences if the race window is being hit? We are locking something we don't have a reference to, and as explained by Jason and David in this thread <Y9J4P/RNvY1Ztn0Q@nvidia.com> it can lead to all kind of bad things, including the page getting unmapped (MADV_DONTNEED), freed, reallocated as a larger folio and the unlock_page() would target the wrong bit. Also there is another race with the FOLL_WRITE, which could race between the follow_page and the get_locked_pte. The main point of the patch is to remove the last follow_page without FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN, removing the races can be considered a nice bonus.
On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 01:46:49PM +0200, Claudio Imbrenda wrote: > On Thu, 27 Apr 2023 12:53:04 +0200 > Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > On Wed, Apr 26, 2023 at 03:48:34PM +0200, Claudio Imbrenda wrote: > > > This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the > > > last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> > > > Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> > > > Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests") > > > --- > > > arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++--------------------- > > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > > > It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix > > race" is not very helpful :) > > > > What race does this fix? > > When can this happen? > > What are the consequences if the race window is being hit? > > We are locking something we don't have a reference to, and as explained > by Jason and David in this thread <Y9J4P/RNvY1Ztn0Q@nvidia.com> it can > lead to all kind of bad things, including the page getting > unmapped (MADV_DONTNEED), freed, reallocated as a larger folio and the > unlock_page() would target the wrong bit. > > Also there is another race with the FOLL_WRITE, which could race > between the follow_page and the get_locked_pte. > > The main point of the patch is to remove the last follow_page without > FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN, removing the races can be considered a nice bonus. I've seen that discussion. What I'm actually asking for is that all of this information should be added to the commit description. Nobody will remember any of the details in one year.
On Thu, 27 Apr 2023 14:01:27 +0200 Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 01:46:49PM +0200, Claudio Imbrenda wrote: > > On Thu, 27 Apr 2023 12:53:04 +0200 > > Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > > On Wed, Apr 26, 2023 at 03:48:34PM +0200, Claudio Imbrenda wrote: > > > > This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the > > > > last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET. > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> > > > > Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> > > > > Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests") > > > > --- > > > > arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++--------------------- > > > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > > > > > It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix > > > race" is not very helpful :) > > > > > > What race does this fix? > > > When can this happen? > > > What are the consequences if the race window is being hit? > > > > We are locking something we don't have a reference to, and as explained > > by Jason and David in this thread <Y9J4P/RNvY1Ztn0Q@nvidia.com> it can > > lead to all kind of bad things, including the page getting > > unmapped (MADV_DONTNEED), freed, reallocated as a larger folio and the > > unlock_page() would target the wrong bit. > > > > Also there is another race with the FOLL_WRITE, which could race > > between the follow_page and the get_locked_pte. > > > > The main point of the patch is to remove the last follow_page without > > FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN, removing the races can be considered a nice bonus. > > I've seen that discussion. What I'm actually asking for is that all of > this information should be added to the commit description. Nobody > will remember any of the details in one year. I will put it in the patch description. do you think the text above is enough?
On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 02:17:11PM +0200, Claudio Imbrenda wrote: > > > > On Wed, Apr 26, 2023 at 03:48:34PM +0200, Claudio Imbrenda wrote: > > > > > This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the > > > > > last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET. > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> > > > > > Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> > > > > > Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests") > > > > > --- > > > > > arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++--------------------- > > > > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix > > > > race" is not very helpful :) > > > > > > > > What race does this fix? > > > > When can this happen? > > > > What are the consequences if the race window is being hit? > > > > > > We are locking something we don't have a reference to, and as explained > > > by Jason and David in this thread <Y9J4P/RNvY1Ztn0Q@nvidia.com> it can > > > lead to all kind of bad things, including the page getting > > > unmapped (MADV_DONTNEED), freed, reallocated as a larger folio and the > > > unlock_page() would target the wrong bit. > > > > > > Also there is another race with the FOLL_WRITE, which could race > > > between the follow_page and the get_locked_pte. > > > > > > The main point of the patch is to remove the last follow_page without > > > FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN, removing the races can be considered a nice bonus. > > > > I've seen that discussion. What I'm actually asking for is that all of > > this information should be added to the commit description. Nobody > > will remember any of the details in one year. > > I will put it in the patch description. > > do you think the text above is enough? Fine with me. With a proper Link: tag this is much better than before. Thanks!
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c index 9f18a4af9c13..cb2ee06df286 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c @@ -192,21 +192,10 @@ static int expected_page_refs(struct page *page) return res; } -static int make_secure_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, - struct page *exp_page, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb) +static int make_page_secure(struct page *page, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb) { - pte_t entry = READ_ONCE(*ptep); - struct page *page; int expected, cc = 0; - if (!pte_present(entry)) - return -ENXIO; - if (pte_val(entry) & _PAGE_INVALID) - return -ENXIO; - - page = pte_page(entry); - if (page != exp_page) - return -ENXIO; if (PageWriteback(page)) return -EAGAIN; expected = expected_page_refs(page); @@ -304,17 +293,18 @@ int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb) goto out; rc = -ENXIO; - page = follow_page(vma, uaddr, FOLL_WRITE); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page)) - goto out; - - lock_page(page); ptep = get_locked_pte(gmap->mm, uaddr, &ptelock); - if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm)) - uv_convert_from_secure(page_to_phys(page)); - rc = make_secure_pte(ptep, uaddr, page, uvcb); + if (pte_present(*ptep) && !(pte_val(*ptep) & _PAGE_INVALID) && pte_write(*ptep)) { + page = pte_page(*ptep); + rc = -EAGAIN; + if (trylock_page(page)) { + if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm)) + uv_convert_from_secure(page_to_phys(page)); + rc = make_page_secure(page, uvcb); + unlock_page(page); + } + } pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptelock); - unlock_page(page); out: mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm);