[v5,5/6] KEYS: CA link restriction

Message ID 20230302164652.83571-6-eric.snowberg@oracle.com
State New
Headers
Series Add CA enforcement keyring restrictions |

Commit Message

Eric Snowberg March 2, 2023, 4:46 p.m. UTC
  Add a new link restriction.  Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
based on the key to be added being a CA.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/crypto/public_key.h       | 15 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
  

Comments

Jarkko Sakkinen March 11, 2023, 10:10 p.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Add a new link restriction.  Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
> based on the key to be added being a CA.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/crypto/public_key.h       | 15 ++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> + *
> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> + */
> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> +			const struct key_type *type,
> +			const union key_payload *payload,
> +			struct key *trust_keyring)
> +{
> +	const struct public_key *pkey;
> +
> +	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> +	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
> +	if (!pkey)
> +		return -ENOPKG;
> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
> +		return -ENOKEY;
> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
> +		return -ENOKEY;
> +	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
> +		return -ENOKEY;

nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
empty lines.

> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_id **pair,
>  			    const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
>  {
> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> index 03c3fb990d59..653992a6e941 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -75,6 +75,21 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *trust_keyring,
>  						 const union key_payload *payload,
>  						 struct key *trusted);
>  
> +#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE)
> +extern int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> +			       const struct key_type *type,
> +			       const union key_payload *payload,
> +			       struct key *trust_keyring);
> +#else
> +static inline int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> +				      const struct key_type *type,
> +				      const union key_payload *payload,
> +				      struct key *trust_keyring)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  extern int query_asymmetric_key(const struct kernel_pkey_params *,
>  				struct kernel_pkey_query *);
>  
> -- 
> 2.27.0
> 

BR, Jarkko
  
Eric Snowberg March 20, 2023, 5:35 p.m. UTC | #2
> On Mar 11, 2023, at 3:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> Add a new link restriction.  Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
>> based on the key to be added being a CA.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> include/crypto/public_key.h       | 15 ++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
>> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
>> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
>> 	return ret;
>> }
>> 
>> +/**
>> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
>> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
>> + * @type: The type of key being added.
>> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
>> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
>> + *
>> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
>> + * certificate as being ok to link.
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
>> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
>> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
>> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
>> + */
>> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
>> +			const struct key_type *type,
>> +			const union key_payload *payload,
>> +			struct key *trust_keyring)
>> +{
>> +	const struct public_key *pkey;
>> +
>> +	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
>> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> +
>> +	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
>> +	if (!pkey)
>> +		return -ENOPKG;
>> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
>> +		return -ENOKEY;
>> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
>> +		return -ENOKEY;
>> +	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
>> +		return -ENOKEY;
> 
> nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
> empty lines.

Ok, I will make this change in the next round.  Thanks.
  
Jarkko Sakkinen March 20, 2023, 6:28 p.m. UTC | #3
On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 05:35:05PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> 
> 
> > On Mar 11, 2023, at 3:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > 
> > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >> Add a new link restriction.  Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
> >> based on the key to be added being a CA.
> >> 
> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> >> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> >> ---
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >> include/crypto/public_key.h       | 15 ++++++++++++
> >> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> >> 
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> >> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> >> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> >> 	return ret;
> >> }
> >> 
> >> +/**
> >> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> >> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> >> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> >> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> >> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> >> + *
> >> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> >> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> >> + *
> >> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> >> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> >> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> >> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> >> + */
> >> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> >> +			const struct key_type *type,
> >> +			const union key_payload *payload,
> >> +			struct key *trust_keyring)
> >> +{
> >> +	const struct public_key *pkey;
> >> +
> >> +	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
> >> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >> +
> >> +	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
> >> +	if (!pkey)
> >> +		return -ENOPKG;
> >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
> >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
> >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> >> +	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
> >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > 
> > nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
> > empty lines.
> 
> Ok, I will make this change in the next round.  Thanks.

Cool! Mimi have you tested these patches with IMA applied?

BR, Jarkko
  
Mimi Zohar March 20, 2023, 8:35 p.m. UTC | #4
On Mon, 2023-03-20 at 20:28 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 05:35:05PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > > On Mar 11, 2023, at 3:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > 
> > > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > >> Add a new link restriction.  Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
> > >> based on the key to be added being a CA.
> > >> 
> > >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> > >> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > >> ---
> > >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > >> include/crypto/public_key.h       | 15 ++++++++++++
> > >> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> > >> 
> > >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > >> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
> > >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > >> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > >> 	return ret;
> > >> }
> > >> 
> > >> +/**
> > >> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> > >> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> > >> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> > >> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> > >> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> > >> + *
> > >> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> > >> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> > >> + *
> > >> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> > >> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> > >> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> > >> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> > >> + */
> > >> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > >> +			const struct key_type *type,
> > >> +			const union key_payload *payload,
> > >> +			struct key *trust_keyring)
> > >> +{
> > >> +	const struct public_key *pkey;
> > >> +
> > >> +	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
> > >> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > >> +
> > >> +	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
> > >> +	if (!pkey)
> > >> +		return -ENOPKG;
> > >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > >> +	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > 
> > > nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
> > > empty lines.
> > 
> > Ok, I will make this change in the next round.  Thanks.
> 
> Cool! Mimi have you tested these patches with IMA applied?

Yes, it's working as expected.
  
Jarkko Sakkinen March 29, 2023, 9:58 p.m. UTC | #5
On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 04:35:33PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2023-03-20 at 20:28 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 05:35:05PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > On Mar 11, 2023, at 3:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > >> Add a new link restriction.  Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
> > > >> based on the key to be added being a CA.
> > > >> 
> > > >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> > > >> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > > >> ---
> > > >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > >> include/crypto/public_key.h       | 15 ++++++++++++
> > > >> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> > > >> 
> > > >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > >> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
> > > >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > >> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > > >> 	return ret;
> > > >> }
> > > >> 
> > > >> +/**
> > > >> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> > > >> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> > > >> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> > > >> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> > > >> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> > > >> + *
> > > >> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> > > >> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> > > >> + *
> > > >> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> > > >> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> > > >> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> > > >> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> > > >> + */
> > > >> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > > >> +			const struct key_type *type,
> > > >> +			const union key_payload *payload,
> > > >> +			struct key *trust_keyring)
> > > >> +{
> > > >> +	const struct public_key *pkey;
> > > >> +
> > > >> +	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
> > > >> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > > >> +
> > > >> +	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
> > > >> +	if (!pkey)
> > > >> +		return -ENOPKG;
> > > >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > >> +	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > > 
> > > > nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
> > > > empty lines.
> > > 
> > > Ok, I will make this change in the next round.  Thanks.
> > 
> > Cool! Mimi have you tested these patches with IMA applied?
> 
> Yes, it's working as expected.

OK, I will pick these.

BR, Jarkko
  
Jarkko Sakkinen March 29, 2023, 11:27 p.m. UTC | #6
On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 04:35:33PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2023-03-20 at 20:28 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 05:35:05PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > On Mar 11, 2023, at 3:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > >> Add a new link restriction.  Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
> > > >> based on the key to be added being a CA.
> > > >> 
> > > >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> > > >> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > > >> ---
> > > >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > >> include/crypto/public_key.h       | 15 ++++++++++++
> > > >> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> > > >> 
> > > >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > >> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
> > > >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > >> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > > >> 	return ret;
> > > >> }
> > > >> 
> > > >> +/**
> > > >> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> > > >> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> > > >> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> > > >> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> > > >> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> > > >> + *
> > > >> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> > > >> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> > > >> + *
> > > >> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> > > >> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> > > >> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> > > >> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> > > >> + */
> > > >> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > > >> +			const struct key_type *type,
> > > >> +			const union key_payload *payload,
> > > >> +			struct key *trust_keyring)
> > > >> +{
> > > >> +	const struct public_key *pkey;
> > > >> +
> > > >> +	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
> > > >> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > > >> +
> > > >> +	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
> > > >> +	if (!pkey)
> > > >> +		return -ENOPKG;
> > > >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > >> +	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > > 
> > > > nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
> > > > empty lines.
> > > 
> > > Ok, I will make this change in the next round.  Thanks.
> > 
> > Cool! Mimi have you tested these patches with IMA applied?
> 
> Yes, it's working as expected.

Thank you. Please check that I filled additional tags correctly:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git/log/

I will then put these also to my 'next' branch and they will get mirrored
to linux-next.

BR, Jarkko
  
Mimi Zohar March 30, 2023, 6:01 a.m. UTC | #7
On Thu, 2023-03-30 at 02:27 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 04:35:33PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Mon, 2023-03-20 at 20:28 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 05:35:05PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > > On Mar 11, 2023, at 3:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > > 
> > > > > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > > >> Add a new link restriction.  Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
> > > > >> based on the key to be added being a CA.
> > > > >> 
> > > > >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> > > > >> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > > > >> ---
> > > > >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > >> include/crypto/public_key.h       | 15 ++++++++++++
> > > > >> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> > > > >> 
> > > > >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > > >> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
> > > > >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > > >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > > >> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > > > >> 	return ret;
> > > > >> }
> > > > >> 
> > > > >> +/**
> > > > >> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> > > > >> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> > > > >> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> > > > >> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> > > > >> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> > > > >> + *
> > > > >> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> > > > >> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> > > > >> + *
> > > > >> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> > > > >> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> > > > >> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> > > > >> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> > > > >> + */
> > > > >> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > > > >> +			const struct key_type *type,
> > > > >> +			const union key_payload *payload,
> > > > >> +			struct key *trust_keyring)
> > > > >> +{
> > > > >> +	const struct public_key *pkey;
> > > > >> +
> > > > >> +	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
> > > > >> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > > > >> +
> > > > >> +	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
> > > > >> +	if (!pkey)
> > > > >> +		return -ENOPKG;
> > > > >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > > >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > > >> +	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > > > 
> > > > > nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
> > > > > empty lines.
> > > > 
> > > > Ok, I will make this change in the next round.  Thanks.
> > > 
> > > Cool! Mimi have you tested these patches with IMA applied?
> > 
> > Yes, it's working as expected.
> 
> Thank you. Please check that I filled additional tags correctly:
> 
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git/log/
> 
> I will then put these also to my 'next' branch and they will get mirrored
> to linux-next.

Thanks, Jarkko.  The tags look good.
  
Jarkko Sakkinen April 21, 2023, 9:12 p.m. UTC | #8
On Thu, Mar 30, 2023 at 02:01:52AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2023-03-30 at 02:27 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 04:35:33PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2023-03-20 at 20:28 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 05:35:05PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > > On Mar 11, 2023, at 3:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 11:46:51AM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > > > >> Add a new link restriction.  Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
> > > > > >> based on the key to be added being a CA.
> > > > > >> 
> > > > > >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> > > > > >> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > > > > >> ---
> > > > > >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > >> include/crypto/public_key.h       | 15 ++++++++++++
> > > > > >> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> > > > > >> 
> > > > > >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > > > >> index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
> > > > > >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > > > >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > > > > >> @@ -108,6 +108,44 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > > > > >> 	return ret;
> > > > > >> }
> > > > > >> 
> > > > > >> +/**
> > > > > >> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> > > > > >> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> > > > > >> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> > > > > >> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> > > > > >> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> > > > > >> + *
> > > > > >> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> > > > > >> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> > > > > >> + *
> > > > > >> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> > > > > >> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> > > > > >> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> > > > > >> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> > > > > >> + */
> > > > > >> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > > > > >> +			const struct key_type *type,
> > > > > >> +			const union key_payload *payload,
> > > > > >> +			struct key *trust_keyring)
> > > > > >> +{
> > > > > >> +	const struct public_key *pkey;
> > > > > >> +
> > > > > >> +	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
> > > > > >> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > > > > >> +
> > > > > >> +	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
> > > > > >> +	if (!pkey)
> > > > > >> +		return -ENOPKG;
> > > > > >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > > > >> +	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > > > >> +	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
> > > > > >> +		return -ENOKEY;
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > nit: would be more readable, if conditions were separated by
> > > > > > empty lines.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Ok, I will make this change in the next round.  Thanks.
> > > > 
> > > > Cool! Mimi have you tested these patches with IMA applied?
> > > 
> > > Yes, it's working as expected.
> > 
> > Thank you. Please check that I filled additional tags correctly:
> > 
> > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git/log/
> > 
> > I will then put these also to my 'next' branch and they will get mirrored
> > to linux-next.
> 
> Thanks, Jarkko.  The tags look good.

Hi, sorry for radio silence. I've been transitioning to a new job.

Commits are in my next branch, and I will include them to my PR.

BR, Jarkko
  

Patch

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index 6b1ac5f5896a..48457c6f33f9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -108,6 +108,44 @@  int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: Unused.
+ *
+ * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
+ * certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
+ * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
+ * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
+ * the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+			const struct key_type *type,
+			const union key_payload *payload,
+			struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	const struct public_key *pkey;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
+	if (!pkey)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+	if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pkey->key_eflags))
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_id **pair,
 			    const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
 {
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 03c3fb990d59..653992a6e941 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -75,6 +75,21 @@  extern int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *trust_keyring,
 						 const union key_payload *payload,
 						 struct key *trusted);
 
+#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE)
+extern int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+			       const struct key_type *type,
+			       const union key_payload *payload,
+			       struct key *trust_keyring);
+#else
+static inline int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+				      const struct key_type *type,
+				      const union key_payload *payload,
+				      struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 extern int query_asymmetric_key(const struct kernel_pkey_params *,
 				struct kernel_pkey_query *);