[ima-evm-utils,v4] Add tests for MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hooks

  From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

Add tests to ensure that, after applying the kernel patch 'ima: Align
ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook', the MMAP_CHECK hook
checks the protections applied by the kernel and not those requested by the
application.

Also ensure that after applying 'ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook',
the MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook checks the protections requested by the
application.

Test both with the test_mmap application that by default requests the
PROT_READ protection flag. Its syntax is:

test_mmap <file> <mode>

where mode can be:
- exec: adds the PROT_EXEC protection flag to mmap()
- read_implies_exec: calls the personality() system call with
                     READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument before mmap()
- mprotect: adds the PROT_EXEC protection flag to a memory area in addition
            to PROT_READ
- exec_on_writable: calls mmap() with PROT_EXEC on a file which has a
                    writable mapping

Check the different combinations of hooks/modes and ensure that a
measurement entry is found in the IMA measurement list only when it is
expected. No measurement entry should be found when only the PROT_READ
protection flag is requested or the matching policy rule has the
MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook and the personality() system call was called with
READ_IMPLIES_EXEC.

mprotect() with PROT_EXEC on an existing memory area protected with
PROT_READ should be denied (with an appraisal rule), regardless of the MMAP
hook specified in the policy. The same applies for mmap() with PROT_EXEC on
a file with a writable mapping.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
Changelog

v3:
- Check if there are IMA policy rules without fowner= and fsuuid=, and
  if yes, skip the tests due to possible interference (suggested by Mimi)
- Fix style issues in tests/mmap_check.test

v2:
- Distinguish setup-related errors from test-related errors in test_mmap
- Rename key_path and key_path_der variables to g_key_path and
  g_key_path_der (suggested by Stefan)
- Write data to the test file in check_mmap()
- Ensure that there are no setup-related errors from test_mmap in
  tests/mmap_check.test
- Print the found entry in the IMA measurement list (suggested by Mimi)
- Check for errors when writing the test file in check_deny()
- Pass TST_KEY_PATH to the new environment
- Add description to each test (suggested by Mimi)

v1:
- Declare PATCHES and uses new expect_pass_if() and expect_fail_if()
  (suggested by Stefan)
- Replace $FAIL with $HARDFAIL when the error occurs in the setup phase of
  the test (to not make an expect_fail test successful for other reasons
  than the focus of the test)
- Declare local variables in one line (suggested by Stefan)
- Print the test being executed at the beginning, so that the message
  always appears also if an error occurs
- Print the result of the tests in a separate line and separate the output
  of each test

 tests/Makefile.am     |   4 +-
 tests/mmap_check.test | 357 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tests/test_mmap.c     | 121 ++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 481 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100755 tests/mmap_check.test
 create mode 100644 tests/test_mmap.c
  

On Thu, 2023-02-02 at 14:51 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> 
> Add tests to ensure that, after applying the kernel patch 'ima: Align
> ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook', the MMAP_CHECK hook
> checks the protections applied by the kernel and not those requested by the
> application.
> 
> Also ensure that after applying 'ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook',
> the MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook checks the protections requested by the
> application.
> 
> Test both with the test_mmap application that by default requests the
> PROT_READ protection flag. Its syntax is:
> 
> test_mmap <file> <mode>
> 
> where mode can be:
> - exec: adds the PROT_EXEC protection flag to mmap()
> - read_implies_exec: calls the personality() system call with
>                      READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument before mmap()
> - mprotect: adds the PROT_EXEC protection flag to a memory area in addition
>             to PROT_READ
> - exec_on_writable: calls mmap() with PROT_EXEC on a file which has a
>                     writable mapping
> 
> Check the different combinations of hooks/modes and ensure that a
> measurement entry is found in the IMA measurement list only when it is
> expected. No measurement entry should be found when only the PROT_READ
> protection flag is requested or the matching policy rule has the
> MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook and the personality() system call was called with
> READ_IMPLIES_EXEC.
> 
> mprotect() with PROT_EXEC on an existing memory area protected with
> PROT_READ should be denied (with an appraisal rule), regardless of the MMAP
> hook specified in the policy. The same applies for mmap() with PROT_EXEC on
> a file with a writable mapping.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> ---
> Changelog
> 
> v3:
> - Check if there are IMA policy rules without fowner= and fsuuid=, and
>   if yes, skip the tests due to possible interference (suggested by Mimi)
> - Fix style issues in tests/mmap_check.test
> 
> v2:
> - Distinguish setup-related errors from test-related errors in test_mmap
> - Rename key_path and key_path_der variables to g_key_path and
>   g_key_path_der (suggested by Stefan)
> - Write data to the test file in check_mmap()
> - Ensure that there are no setup-related errors from test_mmap in
>   tests/mmap_check.test
> - Print the found entry in the IMA measurement list (suggested by Mimi)
> - Check for errors when writing the test file in check_deny()
> - Pass TST_KEY_PATH to the new environment
> - Add description to each test (suggested by Mimi)
> 
> v1:
> - Declare PATCHES and uses new expect_pass_if() and expect_fail_if()
>   (suggested by Stefan)
> - Replace $FAIL with $HARDFAIL when the error occurs in the setup phase of
>   the test (to not make an expect_fail test successful for other reasons
>   than the focus of the test)
> - Declare local variables in one line (suggested by Stefan)
> - Print the test being executed at the beginning, so that the message
>   always appears also if an error occurs
> - Print the result of the tests in a separate line and separate the output
>   of each test
> 
>  tests/Makefile.am     |   4 +-
>  tests/mmap_check.test | 357 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  tests/test_mmap.c     | 121 ++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 481 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>  create mode 100755 tests/mmap_check.test
>  create mode 100644 tests/test_mmap.c
> 
> diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
> index a0463b7b5b5d..ca9c4ca18380 100644
> --- a/tests/Makefile.am
> +++ b/tests/Makefile.am
> @@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ check_SCRIPTS =
>  TESTS = $(check_SCRIPTS)
>  
>  check_SCRIPTS += ima_hash.test sign_verify.test boot_aggregate.test \
> -		 fsverity.test portable_signatures.test
> +		 fsverity.test portable_signatures.test mmap_check.test
> +
> +check_PROGRAMS := test_mmap
>  
>  .PHONY: check_logs
>  check_logs:
> diff --git a/tests/mmap_check.test b/tests/mmap_check.test
> new file mode 100755
> index 000000000000..228c417a7f46
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tests/mmap_check.test
> @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
> +#!/bin/bash
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +#
> +# Copyright (C) 2022-2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> +#
> +# Check the behavior of MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT
> +
> +trap '_report_exit_and_cleanup _cleanup_env cleanup' SIGINT SIGTERM SIGSEGV EXIT
> +
> +PATCHES=(
> +'ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook'
> +'ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook'
> +)
> +
> +# Base VERBOSE on the environment variable, if set.
> +VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-0}"
> +
> +# Errors defined in test_mmap
> +ERR_SETUP=1
> +ERR_TEST=2
> +
> +cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit "$FAIL"
> +export PATH=$PWD/../src:$PWD:$PATH
> +export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
> +. ./functions.sh
> +_require evmctl
> +
> +cleanup() {
> +	if [ "$g_loop_mounted" = "1" ]; then
> +		popd > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
> +		umount "$g_mountpoint"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if [ -n "$g_dev" ]; then
> +		losetup -d "$g_dev"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if [ -n "$g_image" ]; then
> +		rm -f "$g_image"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if [ -n "$g_mountpoint" ]; then
> +		rm -Rf "$g_mountpoint"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if [ -n "$g_key_path_der" ]; then
> +		rm -f "$g_key_path_der"
> +	fi
> +}
> +
> +# Use the fsuuid= IMA policy keyword to select only files created/used by the
> +# tests below. Also use fowner= to differentiate between files created/used by
> +# individual tests.
> +IMA_UUID="28b23254-9467-44c0-b6ba-34b12e85a26e"
> +MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER=2000
> +MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER=2001
> +MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE="measure func=MMAP_CHECK fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
> +MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE="measure func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
> +APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE="appraise func=MMAP_CHECK fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
> +APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE="appraise func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
> +
> +check_load_ima_rule() {
> +	local rule_loaded result new_policy
> +
> +	rule_loaded=$(grep "$1" /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy)
> +	if [ -z "$rule_loaded" ]; then
> +		new_policy=$(mktemp -p "$g_mountpoint")
> +		echo "$1" > "$new_policy"
> +		echo "$new_policy" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> +		result=$?
> +		rm -f "$new_policy"
> +
> +		if [ "$result" -ne 0 ]; then
> +			echo "${RED}Failed to set IMA policy${NORM}"
> +			return "$HARDFAIL"
> +		fi
> +	fi
> +
> +	return "$OK"
> +}
> +
> +check_mmap() {
> +	local hook="$1"
> +	local arg="$2"
> +	local test_file fowner rule result test_file_entry
> +
> +	echo -e "\nTest: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (hook=\"$hook\", test_mmap arg: \"$arg\")"
> +
> +	if ! test_file=$(mktemp -p "$PWD"); then
> +		echo "${RED}Cannot create $test_file${NORM}"
> +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if ! echo "test" > "$test_file"; then
> +		echo "${RED}Cannot write $test_file${NORM}"
> +		return "$FAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	fowner="$MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
> +	rule="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE"
> +
> +	if [ "$hook" = "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ]; then
> +		fowner="$MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
> +		rule="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if ! chown "$fowner" "$test_file"; then
> +		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of $test_file${NORM}"
> +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	check_load_ima_rule "$rule"
> +	result=$?
> +	if [ $result -ne "$OK" ]; then
> +		return $result
> +	fi
> +
> +	test_mmap "$test_file" "$arg"
> +	result=$?
> +
> +	if [ $result -ne 0 ] && [ $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ]; then
> +		echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
> +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if [ "$TFAIL" != "yes" ]; then
> +		echo -n "Result (expect found): "
> +	else
> +		echo -n "Result (expect not found): "
> +	fi
> +
> +	test_file_entry=$(awk '$5 == "'"$test_file"'"' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements)
> +	if [ -z "$test_file_entry" ]; then
> +		echo "not found"
> +		return "$FAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	echo "found"
> +
> +	if [ "$VERBOSE" -gt 0 ]; then
> +		echo "$test_file_entry"
> +	fi
> +
> +	return "$OK"
> +}
> +
> +check_deny() {
> +	local hook="$1"
> +	local arg="$2"
> +	local test_file fowner rule result
> +
> +	echo -e "\nTest: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (hook=\"$hook\", test_mmap arg: \"$arg\")"
> +
> +	if ! test_file=$(mktemp -p "$PWD"); then
> +		echo "${RED}Cannot create $test_file${NORM}"
> +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if ! echo "test" > "$test_file"; then
> +		echo "${RED}Cannot write $test_file${NORM}"
> +		return "$FAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if ! evmctl ima_sign -a sha256 --key "$g_key_path" "$test_file" &> /dev/null; then
> +		echo "${RED}Cannot sign $test_file${NORM}"
> +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	fowner="$MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
> +	rule="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE"
> +
> +	if [ "$hook" = "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ]; then
> +		fowner="$MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
> +		rule="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if ! chown "$fowner" "$test_file"; then
> +		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of $test_file${NORM}"
> +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	check_load_ima_rule "$rule"
> +	result=$?
> +	if [ $result -ne "$OK" ]; then
> +		return $result
> +	fi
> +
> +	test_mmap "$test_file" exec
> +	result=$?
> +
> +	if [ $result -ne 0 ] && [ $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ]; then
> +		echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
> +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	test_mmap "$test_file" "$arg"
> +	result=$?
> +
> +	if [ $result -ne 0 ] && [ $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ]; then
> +		echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
> +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if [ "$TFAIL" != "yes" ]; then
> +		echo -n "Result (expect denied): "
> +	else
> +		echo -n "Result (expect allowed): "
> +	fi
> +
> +	if [ $result -eq 0 ]; then
> +		echo "allowed"
> +		return "$FAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	echo "denied"
> +	return "$OK"
> +}
> +
> +# Run in the new environment if TST_ENV is set.
> +_run_env "$TST_KERNEL" "$PWD/$(basename "$0")" "TST_ENV=$TST_ENV TST_KERNEL=$TST_KERNEL PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE TST_KEY_PATH=$TST_KEY_PATH"
> +
> +# Exit from the creator of the new environment.
> +_exit_env "$TST_KERNEL"
> +
> +# Mount filesystems in the new environment.
> +_init_env
> +
> +if [ "$(whoami)" != "root" ]; then
> +	echo "${CYAN}This script must be executed as root${NORM}"
> +	exit "$SKIP"
> +fi
> +
> +if [ ! -f /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy ]; then
> +	echo "${CYAN}IMA policy file not found${NORM}"
> +	exit "$SKIP"
> +fi
> +
> +if ! cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy &> /dev/null; then
> +	echo "${CYAN}IMA policy file is not readable${NORM}"
> +	exit "$SKIP"
> +fi
> +
> +if ! awk '$0 ~ /^(measure|appraise)/ && $0 !~ /fsuuid=/ && $0 !~ /fowner=/ { exit 1 }' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy; then
> +	echo "${CYAN}IMA policy rules without fsuuid= and fowner=, cannot continue due to possible interference with the tests${NORM}"
> +	exit "$SKIP

Since you're only adding mmap tests, I'd prefer the above test was
limited to "func=MMAP_CHECK".


> +fi
> +
> +if [ -n "$TST_KEY_PATH" ]; then
> +	if [ "${TST_KEY_PATH:0:1}" != "/" ]; then
> +		echo "${RED}Absolute path required for the signing key${NORM}"
> +		exit "$FAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	if [ ! -f "$TST_KEY_PATH" ]; then
> +		echo "${RED}Kernel signing key not found in $TST_KEY_PATH${NORM}"
> +		exit "$FAIL"
> +	fi
> +
> +	g_key_path="$TST_KEY_PATH"
> +elif [ -f "$PWD/../signing_key.pem" ]; then
> +	g_key_path="$PWD/../signing_key.pem"
> +elif [ -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem" ]; then
> +	g_key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem"
> +elif [ -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem" ]; then
> +	g_key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem"
> +else
> +	echo "${CYAN}Kernel signing key not found${NORM}"
> +	exit "$SKIP"
> +fi
> +
> +g_key_path_der=$(mktemp)
> +
> +openssl x509 -in "$g_key_path" -out "$g_key_path_der" -outform der
> +if ! keyctl padd asymmetric pubkey %keyring:.ima < "$g_key_path_der" &> /dev/null; then
> +	echo "${RED}Public key cannot be added to the IMA keyring${NORM}"
> +	exit "$FAIL"
> +fi
> +
> +g_mountpoint=$(mktemp -d)
> +g_image=$(mktemp)
> +
> +if [ -z "$g_mountpoint" ]; then
> +	echo "${RED}Mountpoint directory not created${NORM}"
> +	exit "$FAIL"
> +fi
> +
> +if ! dd if=/dev/zero of="$g_image" bs=1M count=20 &> /dev/null; then
> +	echo "${RED}Cannot create test image${NORM}"
> +	exit "$FAIL"
> +fi
> +
> +g_dev=$(losetup -f "$g_image" --show)
> +if [ -z "$g_dev" ]; then
> +	echo "${RED}Cannot create loop device${NORM}"
> +	exit "$FAIL"
> +fi
> +
> +if ! mkfs.ext4 -U "$IMA_UUID" -b 4096 "$g_dev" &> /dev/null; then
> +	echo "${RED}Cannot format $g_dev${NORM}"
> +	exit "$FAIL"
> +fi
> +
> +if ! mount -o i_version "$g_dev" "$g_mountpoint"; then
> +	echo "${RED}Cannot mount loop device${NORM}"
> +	exit "$FAIL"
> +fi
> +
> +g_loop_mounted=1
> +pushd "$g_mountpoint" > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
> +
> +# Ensure that IMA does not add a new measurement entry if an application calls
> +# mmap() with PROT_READ, and a policy rule contains the MMAP_CHECK hook.
> +# In this case, both the protections requested by the application and the final
> +# protections applied by the kernel contain only PROT_READ, so there is no
> +# match with the IMA rule, which expects PROT_EXEC to be set.
> +expect_fail check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" ""
> +
> +# Ensure that IMA adds a new measurement entry if an application calls mmap()
> +# with PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, and a policy rule contains the MMAP_CHECK hook.
> +expect_pass check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" "exec"
> +
> +# Same as in the first test, but in this case the application calls the
> +# personality() system call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC, which causes the kernel to
> +# add PROT_EXEC in the final protections passed to the MMAP_CHECK hook.
> +#
> +# Ensure that the bug introduced by 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final
> +# protections in security_mmap_file() into a helper") is fixed, by passing the
> +# final protections again to the MMAP_CHECK hook. Due to the bug, the hook
> +# received the protections requested by the application. Since those protections
> +# don't have PROT_EXEC, IMA was not creating a measurement entry.
> +expect_pass_if '0' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" "read_implies_exec"
> +
> +# Repeat the previous three tests, but with the new MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook,
> +# which behaves like the buggy MMAP_CHECK hook. In the third test, expect that
> +# no new measurement entry is created, since the MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook sees
> +# the protections requested by the application (PROT_READ).
> +expect_fail_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ""
> +expect_pass_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "exec"
> +expect_fail_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "read_implies_exec"
> +
> +# Ensure that IMA refuses an mprotect() with PROT_EXEC on a memory area
> +# obtained with an mmap() with PROT_READ. This is due to the inability of IMA
> +# to measure/appraise the file for which mmap() was called (locking issue).
> +expect_pass check_deny "MMAP_CHECK" "mprotect"
> +
> +# Ensure that MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT has the same behavior of MMAP_CHECK for the
> +# previous test.
> +expect_pass_if '1' check_deny "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "mprotect"
> +
> +# Ensure that there cannot be an mmap() with PROT_EXEC on a file with writable
> +# mappings, due to the inability of IMA to make a reliable measurement of that
> +# file.
> +expect_pass check_deny "MMAP_CHECK" "exec_on_writable"
> +
> +# Ensure that MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT has the same behavior of MMAP_CHECK for the
> +# previous test.
> +expect_pass_if '1' check_deny "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "exec_on_writable"
> diff --git a/tests/test_mmap.c b/tests/test_mmap.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..7106ba70fc53
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tests/test_mmap.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH
> + *
> + * Tool to test IMA MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hooks.
> + */
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <errno.h>
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <sys/stat.h>
> +#include <sys/mman.h>
> +#include <sys/personality.h>
> +
> +/*
> + * Convention: return 1 for errors that should not occur, as they are
> + * setup-related, return 2 for errors that might occur due to testing
> + * conditions.
> + */
> +#define ERR_SETUP 1
> +#define ERR_TEST 2
> +
> +int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> +{
> +	struct stat st;
> +	void *ptr, *ptr_write = NULL;
> +	int ret, fd, fd_write, prot = PROT_READ;
> +
> +	if (!argv[1]) {
> +		printf("Missing file parameter\n");
> +		return ERR_SETUP;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "read_implies_exec")) {
> +		ret = personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
> +		if (ret == -1) {
> +			printf("Failed to set personality, err: %d (%s)\n",
> +			       -errno, strerror(errno));
> +			return ERR_SETUP;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	if (stat(argv[1], &st) == -1) {
> +		printf("Failed to access %s, err: %d (%s)\n", argv[1], -errno,
> +		       strerror(errno));
> +		return ERR_SETUP;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "exec_on_writable")) {
> +		fd_write = open(argv[1], O_RDWR);
> +		if (fd_write == -1) {
> +			printf("Failed to open %s in r/w, err: %d (%s)\n",
> +			       argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
> +			return ERR_SETUP;
> +		}
> +
> +		ptr_write = mmap(0, st.st_size, PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED,
> +				 fd_write, 0);
> +		close(fd_write);
> +
> +		if (ptr_write == MAP_FAILED) {
> +			printf("Failed mmap() with PROT_WRITE on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
> +			       argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
> +			return ERR_SETUP;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
> +	if (fd == -1) {
> +		printf("Failed to open %s in ro, err: %d (%s)\n", argv[1],
> +		       -errno, strerror(errno));
> +
> +		if (ptr_write && munmap(ptr_write, st.st_size) == -1)
> +			printf("Failed munmap() of writable mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
> +			       argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
> +
> +		return ERR_SETUP;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (argv[2] && !strncmp(argv[2], "exec", 4))
> +		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
> +
> +	ptr = mmap(0, st.st_size, prot, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
> +
> +	close(fd);
> +
> +	if (ptr_write && munmap(ptr_write, st.st_size) == -1) {
> +		printf("Failed munmap() of writable mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
> +		       argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
> +		return ERR_SETUP;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
> +		ret = ERR_SETUP;
> +		if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "exec_on_writable") &&
> +		    errno == EACCES)
> +			ret = ERR_TEST;
> +

FYI, on an older distro kernel, the mmap fails and results in following
without any explanation.

Test: check_mmap (hook="MMAP_CHECK", test_mmap arg: "exec")
Unexpected exit status 1 from test_mmap

With some additional debugging, I'm seeing:
Failed mmap() /tmp/tmp.4gD2UjSvC4/tmp.PlzUEm09hO, err: -13 (Permission
denied)b

Mimi

> +		return ret;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = 0;
> +
> +	if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "mprotect")) {
> +		ret = mprotect(ptr, st.st_size, PROT_EXEC);
> +		if (ret == -1) {
> +			ret = ERR_SETUP;
> +			if (errno == EPERM)
> +				ret = ERR_TEST;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	if (munmap(ptr, st.st_size) == -1) {
> +		printf("Failed munmap() of mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
> +		       argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
> +		return ERR_SETUP;
> +	}
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
  

On Thu, 2023-02-02 at 11:15 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2023-02-02 at 14:51 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > 
> > Add tests to ensure that, after applying the kernel patch 'ima: Align
> > ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook', the MMAP_CHECK hook
> > checks the protections applied by the kernel and not those requested by the
> > application.
> > 
> > Also ensure that after applying 'ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook',
> > the MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook checks the protections requested by the
> > application.
> > 
> > Test both with the test_mmap application that by default requests the
> > PROT_READ protection flag. Its syntax is:
> > 
> > test_mmap <file> <mode>
> > 
> > where mode can be:
> > - exec: adds the PROT_EXEC protection flag to mmap()
> > - read_implies_exec: calls the personality() system call with
> >                      READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument before mmap()
> > - mprotect: adds the PROT_EXEC protection flag to a memory area in addition
> >             to PROT_READ
> > - exec_on_writable: calls mmap() with PROT_EXEC on a file which has a
> >                     writable mapping
> > 
> > Check the different combinations of hooks/modes and ensure that a
> > measurement entry is found in the IMA measurement list only when it is
> > expected. No measurement entry should be found when only the PROT_READ
> > protection flag is requested or the matching policy rule has the
> > MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook and the personality() system call was called with
> > READ_IMPLIES_EXEC.
> > 
> > mprotect() with PROT_EXEC on an existing memory area protected with
> > PROT_READ should be denied (with an appraisal rule), regardless of the MMAP
> > hook specified in the policy. The same applies for mmap() with PROT_EXEC on
> > a file with a writable mapping.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > ---
> > Changelog
> > 
> > v3:
> > - Check if there are IMA policy rules without fowner= and fsuuid=, and
> >   if yes, skip the tests due to possible interference (suggested by Mimi)
> > - Fix style issues in tests/mmap_check.test
> > 
> > v2:
> > - Distinguish setup-related errors from test-related errors in test_mmap
> > - Rename key_path and key_path_der variables to g_key_path and
> >   g_key_path_der (suggested by Stefan)
> > - Write data to the test file in check_mmap()
> > - Ensure that there are no setup-related errors from test_mmap in
> >   tests/mmap_check.test
> > - Print the found entry in the IMA measurement list (suggested by Mimi)
> > - Check for errors when writing the test file in check_deny()
> > - Pass TST_KEY_PATH to the new environment
> > - Add description to each test (suggested by Mimi)
> > 
> > v1:
> > - Declare PATCHES and uses new expect_pass_if() and expect_fail_if()
> >   (suggested by Stefan)
> > - Replace $FAIL with $HARDFAIL when the error occurs in the setup phase of
> >   the test (to not make an expect_fail test successful for other reasons
> >   than the focus of the test)
> > - Declare local variables in one line (suggested by Stefan)
> > - Print the test being executed at the beginning, so that the message
> >   always appears also if an error occurs
> > - Print the result of the tests in a separate line and separate the output
> >   of each test
> > 
> >  tests/Makefile.am     |   4 +-
> >  tests/mmap_check.test | 357 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  tests/test_mmap.c     | 121 ++++++++++++++
> >  3 files changed, 481 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >  create mode 100755 tests/mmap_check.test
> >  create mode 100644 tests/test_mmap.c
> > 
> > diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
> > index a0463b7b5b5d..ca9c4ca18380 100644
> > --- a/tests/Makefile.am
> > +++ b/tests/Makefile.am
> > @@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ check_SCRIPTS =
> >  TESTS = $(check_SCRIPTS)
> >  
> >  check_SCRIPTS += ima_hash.test sign_verify.test boot_aggregate.test \
> > -		 fsverity.test portable_signatures.test
> > +		 fsverity.test portable_signatures.test mmap_check.test
> > +
> > +check_PROGRAMS := test_mmap
> >  
> >  .PHONY: check_logs
> >  check_logs:
> > diff --git a/tests/mmap_check.test b/tests/mmap_check.test
> > new file mode 100755
> > index 000000000000..228c417a7f46
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/tests/mmap_check.test
> > @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
> > +#!/bin/bash
> > +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +#
> > +# Copyright (C) 2022-2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > +#
> > +# Check the behavior of MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT
> > +
> > +trap '_report_exit_and_cleanup _cleanup_env cleanup' SIGINT SIGTERM SIGSEGV EXIT
> > +
> > +PATCHES=(
> > +'ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook'
> > +'ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook'
> > +)
> > +
> > +# Base VERBOSE on the environment variable, if set.
> > +VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-0}"
> > +
> > +# Errors defined in test_mmap
> > +ERR_SETUP=1
> > +ERR_TEST=2
> > +
> > +cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit "$FAIL"
> > +export PATH=$PWD/../src:$PWD:$PATH
> > +export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
> > +. ./functions.sh
> > +_require evmctl
> > +
> > +cleanup() {
> > +	if [ "$g_loop_mounted" = "1" ]; then
> > +		popd > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
> > +		umount "$g_mountpoint"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if [ -n "$g_dev" ]; then
> > +		losetup -d "$g_dev"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if [ -n "$g_image" ]; then
> > +		rm -f "$g_image"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if [ -n "$g_mountpoint" ]; then
> > +		rm -Rf "$g_mountpoint"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if [ -n "$g_key_path_der" ]; then
> > +		rm -f "$g_key_path_der"
> > +	fi
> > +}
> > +
> > +# Use the fsuuid= IMA policy keyword to select only files created/used by the
> > +# tests below. Also use fowner= to differentiate between files created/used by
> > +# individual tests.
> > +IMA_UUID="28b23254-9467-44c0-b6ba-34b12e85a26e"
> > +MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER=2000
> > +MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER=2001
> > +MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE="measure func=MMAP_CHECK fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
> > +MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE="measure func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
> > +APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE="appraise func=MMAP_CHECK fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
> > +APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE="appraise func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
> > +
> > +check_load_ima_rule() {
> > +	local rule_loaded result new_policy
> > +
> > +	rule_loaded=$(grep "$1" /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy)
> > +	if [ -z "$rule_loaded" ]; then
> > +		new_policy=$(mktemp -p "$g_mountpoint")
> > +		echo "$1" > "$new_policy"
> > +		echo "$new_policy" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> > +		result=$?
> > +		rm -f "$new_policy"
> > +
> > +		if [ "$result" -ne 0 ]; then
> > +			echo "${RED}Failed to set IMA policy${NORM}"
> > +			return "$HARDFAIL"
> > +		fi
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	return "$OK"
> > +}
> > +
> > +check_mmap() {
> > +	local hook="$1"
> > +	local arg="$2"
> > +	local test_file fowner rule result test_file_entry
> > +
> > +	echo -e "\nTest: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (hook=\"$hook\", test_mmap arg: \"$arg\")"
> > +
> > +	if ! test_file=$(mktemp -p "$PWD"); then
> > +		echo "${RED}Cannot create $test_file${NORM}"
> > +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if ! echo "test" > "$test_file"; then
> > +		echo "${RED}Cannot write $test_file${NORM}"
> > +		return "$FAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	fowner="$MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
> > +	rule="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE"
> > +
> > +	if [ "$hook" = "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ]; then
> > +		fowner="$MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
> > +		rule="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if ! chown "$fowner" "$test_file"; then
> > +		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of $test_file${NORM}"
> > +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	check_load_ima_rule "$rule"
> > +	result=$?
> > +	if [ $result -ne "$OK" ]; then
> > +		return $result
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	test_mmap "$test_file" "$arg"
> > +	result=$?
> > +
> > +	if [ $result -ne 0 ] && [ $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ]; then
> > +		echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
> > +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if [ "$TFAIL" != "yes" ]; then
> > +		echo -n "Result (expect found): "
> > +	else
> > +		echo -n "Result (expect not found): "
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	test_file_entry=$(awk '$5 == "'"$test_file"'"' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements)
> > +	if [ -z "$test_file_entry" ]; then
> > +		echo "not found"
> > +		return "$FAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	echo "found"
> > +
> > +	if [ "$VERBOSE" -gt 0 ]; then
> > +		echo "$test_file_entry"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	return "$OK"
> > +}
> > +
> > +check_deny() {
> > +	local hook="$1"
> > +	local arg="$2"
> > +	local test_file fowner rule result
> > +
> > +	echo -e "\nTest: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (hook=\"$hook\", test_mmap arg: \"$arg\")"
> > +
> > +	if ! test_file=$(mktemp -p "$PWD"); then
> > +		echo "${RED}Cannot create $test_file${NORM}"
> > +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if ! echo "test" > "$test_file"; then
> > +		echo "${RED}Cannot write $test_file${NORM}"
> > +		return "$FAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if ! evmctl ima_sign -a sha256 --key "$g_key_path" "$test_file" &> /dev/null; then
> > +		echo "${RED}Cannot sign $test_file${NORM}"
> > +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	fowner="$MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
> > +	rule="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE"
> > +
> > +	if [ "$hook" = "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ]; then
> > +		fowner="$MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
> > +		rule="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if ! chown "$fowner" "$test_file"; then
> > +		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of $test_file${NORM}"
> > +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	check_load_ima_rule "$rule"
> > +	result=$?
> > +	if [ $result -ne "$OK" ]; then
> > +		return $result
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	test_mmap "$test_file" exec
> > +	result=$?
> > +
> > +	if [ $result -ne 0 ] && [ $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ]; then
> > +		echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
> > +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	test_mmap "$test_file" "$arg"
> > +	result=$?
> > +
> > +	if [ $result -ne 0 ] && [ $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ]; then
> > +		echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
> > +		return "$HARDFAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if [ "$TFAIL" != "yes" ]; then
> > +		echo -n "Result (expect denied): "
> > +	else
> > +		echo -n "Result (expect allowed): "
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if [ $result -eq 0 ]; then
> > +		echo "allowed"
> > +		return "$FAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	echo "denied"
> > +	return "$OK"
> > +}
> > +
> > +# Run in the new environment if TST_ENV is set.
> > +_run_env "$TST_KERNEL" "$PWD/$(basename "$0")" "TST_ENV=$TST_ENV TST_KERNEL=$TST_KERNEL PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE TST_KEY_PATH=$TST_KEY_PATH"
> > +
> > +# Exit from the creator of the new environment.
> > +_exit_env "$TST_KERNEL"
> > +
> > +# Mount filesystems in the new environment.
> > +_init_env
> > +
> > +if [ "$(whoami)" != "root" ]; then
> > +	echo "${CYAN}This script must be executed as root${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$SKIP"
> > +fi
> > +
> > +if [ ! -f /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy ]; then
> > +	echo "${CYAN}IMA policy file not found${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$SKIP"
> > +fi
> > +
> > +if ! cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy &> /dev/null; then
> > +	echo "${CYAN}IMA policy file is not readable${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$SKIP"
> > +fi
> > +
> > +if ! awk '$0 ~ /^(measure|appraise)/ && $0 !~ /fsuuid=/ && $0 !~ /fowner=/ { exit 1 }' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy; then
> > +	echo "${CYAN}IMA policy rules without fsuuid= and fowner=, cannot continue due to possible interference with the tests${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$SKIP
> 
> Since you're only adding mmap tests, I'd prefer the above test was
> limited to "func=MMAP_CHECK".
> 
> 
> > +fi
> > +
> > +if [ -n "$TST_KEY_PATH" ]; then
> > +	if [ "${TST_KEY_PATH:0:1}" != "/" ]; then
> > +		echo "${RED}Absolute path required for the signing key${NORM}"
> > +		exit "$FAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	if [ ! -f "$TST_KEY_PATH" ]; then
> > +		echo "${RED}Kernel signing key not found in $TST_KEY_PATH${NORM}"
> > +		exit "$FAIL"
> > +	fi
> > +
> > +	g_key_path="$TST_KEY_PATH"
> > +elif [ -f "$PWD/../signing_key.pem" ]; then
> > +	g_key_path="$PWD/../signing_key.pem"
> > +elif [ -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem" ]; then
> > +	g_key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem"
> > +elif [ -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem" ]; then
> > +	g_key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem"
> > +else
> > +	echo "${CYAN}Kernel signing key not found${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$SKIP"
> > +fi
> > +
> > +g_key_path_der=$(mktemp)
> > +
> > +openssl x509 -in "$g_key_path" -out "$g_key_path_der" -outform der
> > +if ! keyctl padd asymmetric pubkey %keyring:.ima < "$g_key_path_der" &> /dev/null; then
> > +	echo "${RED}Public key cannot be added to the IMA keyring${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$FAIL"
> > +fi
> > +
> > +g_mountpoint=$(mktemp -d)
> > +g_image=$(mktemp)
> > +
> > +if [ -z "$g_mountpoint" ]; then
> > +	echo "${RED}Mountpoint directory not created${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$FAIL"
> > +fi
> > +
> > +if ! dd if=/dev/zero of="$g_image" bs=1M count=20 &> /dev/null; then
> > +	echo "${RED}Cannot create test image${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$FAIL"
> > +fi
> > +
> > +g_dev=$(losetup -f "$g_image" --show)
> > +if [ -z "$g_dev" ]; then
> > +	echo "${RED}Cannot create loop device${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$FAIL"
> > +fi
> > +
> > +if ! mkfs.ext4 -U "$IMA_UUID" -b 4096 "$g_dev" &> /dev/null; then
> > +	echo "${RED}Cannot format $g_dev${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$FAIL"
> > +fi
> > +
> > +if ! mount -o i_version "$g_dev" "$g_mountpoint"; then
> > +	echo "${RED}Cannot mount loop device${NORM}"
> > +	exit "$FAIL"
> > +fi
> > +
> > +g_loop_mounted=1
> > +pushd "$g_mountpoint" > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
> > +
> > +# Ensure that IMA does not add a new measurement entry if an application calls
> > +# mmap() with PROT_READ, and a policy rule contains the MMAP_CHECK hook.
> > +# In this case, both the protections requested by the application and the final
> > +# protections applied by the kernel contain only PROT_READ, so there is no
> > +# match with the IMA rule, which expects PROT_EXEC to be set.
> > +expect_fail check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" ""
> > +
> > +# Ensure that IMA adds a new measurement entry if an application calls mmap()
> > +# with PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, and a policy rule contains the MMAP_CHECK hook.
> > +expect_pass check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" "exec"
> > +
> > +# Same as in the first test, but in this case the application calls the
> > +# personality() system call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC, which causes the kernel to
> > +# add PROT_EXEC in the final protections passed to the MMAP_CHECK hook.
> > +#
> > +# Ensure that the bug introduced by 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final
> > +# protections in security_mmap_file() into a helper") is fixed, by passing the
> > +# final protections again to the MMAP_CHECK hook. Due to the bug, the hook
> > +# received the protections requested by the application. Since those protections
> > +# don't have PROT_EXEC, IMA was not creating a measurement entry.
> > +expect_pass_if '0' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" "read_implies_exec"
> > +
> > +# Repeat the previous three tests, but with the new MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook,
> > +# which behaves like the buggy MMAP_CHECK hook. In the third test, expect that
> > +# no new measurement entry is created, since the MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook sees
> > +# the protections requested by the application (PROT_READ).
> > +expect_fail_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ""
> > +expect_pass_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "exec"
> > +expect_fail_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "read_implies_exec"
> > +
> > +# Ensure that IMA refuses an mprotect() with PROT_EXEC on a memory area
> > +# obtained with an mmap() with PROT_READ. This is due to the inability of IMA
> > +# to measure/appraise the file for which mmap() was called (locking issue).
> > +expect_pass check_deny "MMAP_CHECK" "mprotect"
> > +
> > +# Ensure that MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT has the same behavior of MMAP_CHECK for the
> > +# previous test.
> > +expect_pass_if '1' check_deny "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "mprotect"
> > +
> > +# Ensure that there cannot be an mmap() with PROT_EXEC on a file with writable
> > +# mappings, due to the inability of IMA to make a reliable measurement of that
> > +# file.
> > +expect_pass check_deny "MMAP_CHECK" "exec_on_writable"
> > +
> > +# Ensure that MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT has the same behavior of MMAP_CHECK for the
> > +# previous test.
> > +expect_pass_if '1' check_deny "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "exec_on_writable"
> > diff --git a/tests/test_mmap.c b/tests/test_mmap.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..7106ba70fc53
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/tests/test_mmap.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH
> > + *
> > + * Tool to test IMA MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hooks.
> > + */
> > +#include <stdio.h>
> > +#include <errno.h>
> > +#include <fcntl.h>
> > +#include <string.h>
> > +#include <unistd.h>
> > +#include <sys/stat.h>
> > +#include <sys/mman.h>
> > +#include <sys/personality.h>
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Convention: return 1 for errors that should not occur, as they are
> > + * setup-related, return 2 for errors that might occur due to testing
> > + * conditions.
> > + */
> > +#define ERR_SETUP 1
> > +#define ERR_TEST 2
> > +
> > +int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> > +{
> > +	struct stat st;
> > +	void *ptr, *ptr_write = NULL;
> > +	int ret, fd, fd_write, prot = PROT_READ;
> > +
> > +	if (!argv[1]) {
> > +		printf("Missing file parameter\n");
> > +		return ERR_SETUP;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "read_implies_exec")) {
> > +		ret = personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
> > +		if (ret == -1) {
> > +			printf("Failed to set personality, err: %d (%s)\n",
> > +			       -errno, strerror(errno));
> > +			return ERR_SETUP;
> > +		}
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (stat(argv[1], &st) == -1) {
> > +		printf("Failed to access %s, err: %d (%s)\n", argv[1], -errno,
> > +		       strerror(errno));
> > +		return ERR_SETUP;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "exec_on_writable")) {
> > +		fd_write = open(argv[1], O_RDWR);
> > +		if (fd_write == -1) {
> > +			printf("Failed to open %s in r/w, err: %d (%s)\n",
> > +			       argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
> > +			return ERR_SETUP;
> > +		}
> > +
> > +		ptr_write = mmap(0, st.st_size, PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED,
> > +				 fd_write, 0);
> > +		close(fd_write);
> > +
> > +		if (ptr_write == MAP_FAILED) {
> > +			printf("Failed mmap() with PROT_WRITE on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
> > +			       argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
> > +			return ERR_SETUP;
> > +		}
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
> > +	if (fd == -1) {
> > +		printf("Failed to open %s in ro, err: %d (%s)\n", argv[1],
> > +		       -errno, strerror(errno));
> > +
> > +		if (ptr_write && munmap(ptr_write, st.st_size) == -1)
> > +			printf("Failed munmap() of writable mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
> > +			       argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
> > +
> > +		return ERR_SETUP;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (argv[2] && !strncmp(argv[2], "exec", 4))
> > +		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
> > +
> > +	ptr = mmap(0, st.st_size, prot, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
> > +
> > +	close(fd);
> > +
> > +	if (ptr_write && munmap(ptr_write, st.st_size) == -1) {
> > +		printf("Failed munmap() of writable mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
> > +		       argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
> > +		return ERR_SETUP;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
> > +		ret = ERR_SETUP;
> > +		if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "exec_on_writable") &&
> > +		    errno == EACCES)
> > +			ret = ERR_TEST;
> > +
> 
> FYI, on an older distro kernel, the mmap fails and results in following
> without any explanation.
> 
> Test: check_mmap (hook="MMAP_CHECK", test_mmap arg: "exec")
> Unexpected exit status 1 from test_mmap
> 
> With some additional debugging, I'm seeing:
> Failed mmap() /tmp/tmp.4gD2UjSvC4/tmp.PlzUEm09hO, err: -13 (Permission
> denied)b

Uhm, ok. Which kernel is failing?

Thanks

Roberto

> Mimi
> 
> > +		return ret;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "mprotect")) {
> > +		ret = mprotect(ptr, st.st_size, PROT_EXEC);
> > +		if (ret == -1) {
> > +			ret = ERR_SETUP;
> > +			if (errno == EPERM)
> > +				ret = ERR_TEST;
> > +		}
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (munmap(ptr, st.st_size) == -1) {
> > +		printf("Failed munmap() of mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
> > +		       argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
> > +		return ERR_SETUP;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
  

On Thu, 2023-02-02 at 17:23 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > +   if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
> > > +           ret = ERR_SETUP;
> > > +           if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "exec_on_writable") &&
> > > +               errno == EACCES)
> > > +                   ret = ERR_TEST;
> > > +
> > 
> > FYI, on an older distro kernel, the mmap fails and results in following
> > without any explanation.
> > 
> > Test: check_mmap (hook="MMAP_CHECK", test_mmap arg: "exec")
> > Unexpected exit status 1 from test_mmap
> > 
> > With some additional debugging, I'm seeing:
> > Failed mmap() /tmp/tmp.4gD2UjSvC4/tmp.PlzUEm09hO, err: -13 (Permission
> > denied)b
> 
> Uhm, ok. Which kernel is failing?

I'm able to reproduce the error on a next-integrity or next-integrity-
testing kernel, by running the tests multiple times.  The error doesn't
occur the first time running the test, but subsequent times.

Mimi
  

On Thu, 2023-02-02 at 15:40 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2023-02-02 at 17:23 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > > +   if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
> > > > +           ret = ERR_SETUP;
> > > > +           if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "exec_on_writable") &&
> > > > +               errno == EACCES)
> > > > +                   ret = ERR_TEST;
> > > > +
> > > 
> > > FYI, on an older distro kernel, the mmap fails and results in following
> > > without any explanation.
> > > 
> > > Test: check_mmap (hook="MMAP_CHECK", test_mmap arg: "exec")
> > > Unexpected exit status 1 from test_mmap
> > > 
> > > With some additional debugging, I'm seeing:
> > > Failed mmap() /tmp/tmp.4gD2UjSvC4/tmp.PlzUEm09hO, err: -13 (Permission
> > > denied)b
> > 
> > Uhm, ok. Which kernel is failing?
> 
> I'm able to reproduce the error on a next-integrity or next-integrity-
> testing kernel, by running the tests multiple times.  The error doesn't
> occur the first time running the test, but subsequent times.

Ops, yes. The problem was that the fowners of the measure and appraise
rules were shared. Will not work, unless the files used in the measure
tests are signed too.

Roberto