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Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H . J . Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , Weijiang Yang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , John Allen , kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com, christina.schimpe@intel.com Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH v5 02/39] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 13:22:40 -0800 Message-Id: <20230119212317.8324-3-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20230119212317.8324-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> References: <20230119212317.8324-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: =?utf-8?q?INBOX?= X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1755488274387252169?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1755488274387252169?= From: Yu-cheng Yu Shadow stack provides protection for applications against function return address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but without protection. Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify that at least one CET feature is configured. Tested-by: Pengfei Xu Tested-by: John Allen Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Cc: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Kees Cook --- v5: - Remove capitalization of shadow stack (Boris) v3: - Add X86_CET (Kees) - Add back WRUSS dependency (Kees) - Fix verbiage (Dave) - Change from promt to bool (Kirill) - Add more to commit log v2: - Remove already wrong kernel size increase info (tlgx) - Change prompt to remove "Intel" (tglx) - Update line about what CPUs are supported (Dave) Yu-cheng v25: - Remove X86_CET and use X86_SHADOW_STACK directly. arch/x86/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 3604074a878b..d0037181bc15 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1851,6 +1851,11 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT (CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 140000)) && \ $(as-instr,endbr64) +config X86_CET + def_bool n + help + CET features configured (Shadow stack or IBT) + config X86_KERNEL_IBT prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking" def_bool y @@ -1858,6 +1863,7 @@ config X86_KERNEL_IBT # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000 select OBJTOOL + select X86_CET help Build the kernel with support for Indirect Branch Tracking, a hardware support course-grain forward-edge Control Flow Integrity @@ -1952,6 +1958,24 @@ config X86_SGX If unsure, say N. +config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK + bool "X86 userspace shadow stack" + depends on AS_WRUSS + depends on X86_64 + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select X86_CET + help + Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function + return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks. + Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not + get protection "for free". + + CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020. + + See Documentation/x86/shstk.rst for more information. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler index 26b8c08e2fc4..00c79dd93651 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler @@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ config AS_TPAUSE def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx) help Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7 + +config AS_WRUSS + def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx)) + help + Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler