From patchwork Fri Nov 18 17:28:38 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Jason A. Donenfeld" X-Patchwork-Id: 22406 Return-Path: Delivered-To: ouuuleilei@gmail.com Received: by 2002:adf:f944:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id q4csp325588wrr; Fri, 18 Nov 2022 09:43:05 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA0mqf4VSSMV+ytx8FTPVGKOljQ+wBE+9wvbsi8w37nfqy6qXr6huRJtuMqw7NqFKEdioJuxCD5K X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:e48b:b0:17f:799b:297d with SMTP id i11-20020a170902e48b00b0017f799b297dmr534468ple.72.1668793385245; Fri, 18 Nov 2022 09:43:05 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1668793385; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=vVUU/T8X+B8vR5noIC4mdY4Pu4Wx+4A7e2R4ft96dJVvyBZCreXpWsi150Cyhb223Y Nh83wFilKgeG2L9C/srRYf6NPH4UosxLVzWqVlS0UVGbKNsSk4gEq8cI91y3oNIyXSY1 eF9NVsF1qHQqXDWo5FGT96JuZLCgcDFlIbvpCOEp/NAYiKXZMFVkkg0m1W7GNEgzIxRT mB3w6ZVHjp2/Ikwx1Nrzg5XrEwxEXC1eIBtlK3U9S+wWo7UAvyvnm4oTtiVZ8/ut4bvM Sbu+itBJt2DF+2sZKvCEkURA9D1FmInNVXnNhtV/qm0erGSa27FEcIhTJbdVxfUZPIsG wd9A== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from :dkim-signature; bh=9p1UIdcHRziM7m9qcPYp6vWPtjBY0MybeVn0TVZVSIU=; b=LBqwwci7gk5QP45CA52/FpWYE31U12s8ZalX4JIEn7VhFiaoyatZoot41QLyy+bgmx y5tu06CkrXkyzZzt8ytZRhaDsHIrq5dyU1A/IOKaiY86Xd14fwQGAyX92tCzjlZ3ZXMo tNCeyIZokeo62AfulnGJdNStRrF07NKZkD3tPRUjPw8ooIAVmvU5DBGFbYl8FaUZshAz nBnBT1zSd9dkPgY35OydQr0XPmnBQRrxyS52TvpVTjtCRstgPvGkXBl7PCNPDinyl8ty REM+xqU8+Nm/VO9zsibosq/3hfo1ZhxKCW0apKGiMXA3NtvgzIeSiau/KFUm8qwwfKnt XbPA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@zx2c4.com header.s=20210105 header.b=CA4UvkNZ; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=zx2c4.com Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a5-20020a170902ecc500b0017a7506e0dcsi4574003plh.231.2022.11.18.09.42.51; Fri, 18 Nov 2022 09:43:05 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@zx2c4.com header.s=20210105 header.b=CA4UvkNZ; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=zx2c4.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235364AbiKRRcO (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 18 Nov 2022 12:32:14 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:33330 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S242396AbiKRRcE (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Nov 2022 12:32:04 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 280108B13D; Fri, 18 Nov 2022 09:32:03 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A59A46268B; Fri, 18 Nov 2022 17:32:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 267DBC433D7; Fri, 18 Nov 2022 17:32:01 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com header.i=@zx2c4.com header.b="CA4UvkNZ" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; s=20210105; t=1668792720; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=9p1UIdcHRziM7m9qcPYp6vWPtjBY0MybeVn0TVZVSIU=; b=CA4UvkNZOFiaNqpDzRS53bJWuvypQSw1i9RuqmYM4MNPUbZy5P0j0bfJZxeE9eSLg4IaZM /62QGDuhxJy+hPb0XOCQ6zLTo6xgvYw+pY1OBrKOVzavS1vVDVkK1D7At0IlZmtWxL+82D SN5HA8YTwsOblwTRcmy4jgr8rZjWmlA= Received: by mail.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id 7ec53f12 (TLSv1.3:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256:NO); Fri, 18 Nov 2022 17:31:59 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, patches@lists.linux.dev Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Adhemerval Zanella Netto , Carlos O'Donell Subject: [PATCH v4 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2022 18:28:38 +0100 Message-Id: <20221118172839.2653829-3-Jason@zx2c4.com> In-Reply-To: <20221118172839.2653829-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> References: <20221118172839.2653829-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: =?utf-8?q?INBOX?= X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1749856692737343234?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1749856692737343234?= Provide a generic C vDSO getrandom() implementation, which operates on an opaque state returned by vgetrandom_alloc() and produces random bytes the same way as getrandom(). This has a the API signature: ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state); The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to the opaque allocated state. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom() syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior. The actual vDSO RNG algorithm implemented is the same one implemented by drivers/char/random.c, using the same fast-erasure techniques as that. Should the in-kernel implementation change, so too will the vDSO one. Initially, the state is keyless, and so the first call makes a getrandom() syscall to generate that key, and then uses it for subsequent calls. By keeping track of a generation counter, it knows when its key is invalidated and it should fetch a new one using the syscall. Later, more than just a generation counter might be used. Since MADV_WIPEONFORK is set on the opaque state, the key and related state is wiped during a fork(), so secrets don't roll over into new processes, and the same state doesn't accidentally generate the same random stream. The generation counter, as well, is always >0, so that the 0 counter is a useful indication of a fork() or otherwise uninitialized state. If the kernel RNG is not yet initialized, then the vDSO always calls the syscall, because that behavior cannot be emulated in userspace, but fortunately that state is short lived and only during early boot. If it has been initialized, then there is no need to inspect the `flags` argument, because the behavior does not change post-initialization regardless of the `flags` value. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + drivers/char/random.c | 5 ++ include/vdso/datapage.h | 6 +++ lib/crypto/chacha.c | 4 ++ lib/vdso/Kconfig | 5 ++ lib/vdso/getrandom.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 130 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 843dd6a49538..e0aa33f54c57 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -17287,6 +17287,7 @@ T: git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git S: Maintained F: drivers/char/random.c F: drivers/virt/vmgenid.c +F: lib/vdso/getrandom.c F: lib/vdso/getrandom.h RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index b83481eb00a9..a62255d852f9 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "../../lib/vdso/getrandom.h" /********************************************************************* @@ -305,6 +306,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work) if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX) ++next_gen; WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM)) + smp_store_release(&_vdso_rng_data.generation, next_gen + 1); if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready)) crng_init = CRNG_READY; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); @@ -754,6 +757,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) crng_reseed(NULL); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ if (static_key_initialized) execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM)) + smp_store_release(&_vdso_rng_data.is_ready, true); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); pr_notice("crng init done\n"); diff --git a/include/vdso/datapage.h b/include/vdso/datapage.h index 73eb622e7663..cbacfd923a5c 100644 --- a/include/vdso/datapage.h +++ b/include/vdso/datapage.h @@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ struct vdso_data { struct arch_vdso_data arch_data; }; +struct vdso_rng_data { + unsigned long generation; + bool is_ready; +}; + /* * We use the hidden visibility to prevent the compiler from generating a GOT * relocation. Not only is going through a GOT useless (the entry couldn't and @@ -120,6 +125,7 @@ struct vdso_data { */ extern struct vdso_data _vdso_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); extern struct vdso_data _timens_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); +extern struct vdso_rng_data _vdso_rng_data __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); /* * The generic vDSO implementation requires that gettimeofday.h diff --git a/lib/crypto/chacha.c b/lib/crypto/chacha.c index b748fd3d256e..944991bb36c7 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/chacha.c +++ b/lib/crypto/chacha.c @@ -17,8 +17,10 @@ static void chacha_permute(u32 *x, int nrounds) { int i; +#ifndef CHACHA_FOR_VDSO_INCLUDE /* whitelist the allowed round counts */ WARN_ON_ONCE(nrounds != 20 && nrounds != 12); +#endif for (i = 0; i < nrounds; i += 2) { x[0] += x[4]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[0], 16); @@ -87,6 +89,7 @@ void chacha_block_generic(u32 *state, u8 *stream, int nrounds) state[12]++; } +#ifndef CHACHA_FOR_VDSO_INCLUDE EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_block_generic); /** @@ -112,3 +115,4 @@ void hchacha_block_generic(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds) memcpy(&stream[4], &x[12], 16); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_generic); +#endif diff --git a/lib/vdso/Kconfig b/lib/vdso/Kconfig index d883ac299508..c35fac664574 100644 --- a/lib/vdso/Kconfig +++ b/lib/vdso/Kconfig @@ -30,4 +30,9 @@ config GENERIC_VDSO_TIME_NS Selected by architectures which support time namespaces in the VDSO +config HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM + bool + help + Selected by architectures that support vDSO getrandom(). + endif diff --git a/lib/vdso/getrandom.c b/lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b253e9247706 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/vdso/getrandom.c @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "getrandom.h" + +#undef memcpy +#define memcpy(d,s,l) __builtin_memcpy(d,s,l) +#undef memset +#define memset(d,c,l) __builtin_memset(d,c,l) + +#define CHACHA_FOR_VDSO_INCLUDE +#include "../crypto/chacha.c" + +static void memcpy_and_zero(void *dst, void *src, size_t len) +{ +#define CASCADE(type) \ + while (len >= sizeof(type)) { \ + *(type *)dst = *(type *)src; \ + *(type *)src = 0; \ + dst += sizeof(type); \ + src += sizeof(type); \ + len -= sizeof(type); \ + } +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS +#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 + CASCADE(u64); +#endif + CASCADE(u32); + CASCADE(u16); +#endif + CASCADE(u8); +#undef CASCADE +} + +static __always_inline ssize_t +__cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state) +{ + struct vgetrandom_state *state = opaque_state; + const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info = __arch_get_vdso_rng_data(); + u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS]; + ssize_t ret = min_t(size_t, MAX_RW_COUNT, len); + unsigned long current_generation; + size_t batch_len; + + if (unlikely(!rng_info->is_ready)) + return getrandom_syscall(buffer, len, flags); + + if (unlikely(!len)) + return 0; + + if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(state->not_forked))) + state->not_forked = true; + +retry_generation: + current_generation = READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation); + if (unlikely(state->generation != current_generation)) { + if (getrandom_syscall(state->key, sizeof(state->key), 0) != sizeof(state->key)) + return getrandom_syscall(buffer, len, flags); + state->generation = current_generation; + state->pos = sizeof(state->batch); + } + + len = ret; +more_batch: + batch_len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(state->batch) - state->pos, len); + if (batch_len) { + memcpy_and_zero(buffer, state->batch + state->pos, batch_len); + state->pos += batch_len; + buffer += batch_len; + len -= batch_len; + } + if (!len) { + if (unlikely(current_generation != READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation))) + goto retry_generation; + if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(state->not_forked))) { + state->not_forked = true; + goto retry_generation; + } + return ret; + } + + chacha_init_consts(chacha_state); + memcpy(&chacha_state[4], state->key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); + memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4); + + while (len >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { + chacha20_block(chacha_state, buffer); + if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) + ++chacha_state[13]; + buffer += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + chacha20_block(chacha_state, state->key_batch); + if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0)) + ++chacha_state[13]; + chacha20_block(chacha_state, state->key_batch + CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); + state->pos = 0; + memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state)); + goto more_batch; +}