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[2604:1380:4601:e00::3]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id cn8-20020a0564020ca800b005668343d74csi77450edb.510.2024.02.28.17.00.49 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 28 Feb 2024 17:00:49 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel+bounces-85950-ouuuleilei=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org designates 2604:1380:4601:e00::3 as permitted sender) client-ip=2604:1380:4601:e00::3; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.s=default header.b=C8aeD8Hz; arc=pass (i=1 spf=pass spfdomain=linux.microsoft.com dkim=pass dkdomain=linux.microsoft.com dmarc=pass fromdomain=linux.microsoft.com); spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel+bounces-85950-ouuuleilei=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org designates 2604:1380:4601:e00::3 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom="linux-kernel+bounces-85950-ouuuleilei=gmail.com@vger.kernel.org"; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Received: from smtp.subspace.kernel.org (wormhole.subspace.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by am.mirrors.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5DCF51F25D0F for ; Thu, 29 Feb 2024 01:00:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost.localdomain (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4708B537F0; Thu, 29 Feb 2024 00:55:37 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="C8aeD8Hz" Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5069833CF1; Thu, 29 Feb 2024 00:55:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709168126; cv=none; b=jivE42+KMCgAvTVG2yugGUsR2KxjwS8M78U2+p785pYqp7lIaUsE9NCD6Yd3MtiN9s/fQG3dWbnZ3LpNYjLSedxr9WRSup4rapwdFk4rdsN3TzBR0udsedhtPG+a8G1MWMyHUgBkuxScgNwAzSd7LfjdLKvnLO2rxJzGOP42mTc= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709168126; c=relaxed/simple; bh=KhDZE+9QPuBlEpkDm8GrmfWOrKWKCR8+w8OtY7dCpN4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=rU6ZwfrL1iGqrIxfW63OnhJ6uA53QHhy3w23I8zdm7yaXY8UfRAIMKwF983W0tIYJHZM/WQEHHis7oEDhmXEewi4ahqDgcdD6kmbyFOuW/YM9FRl0t7JPNWDdFOswsSfZlMM0D/4YfHZ7+sRu2a6WVHjsBnzAmfOI2Y98OWAVE8= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=C8aeD8Hz; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id EECC320B74D3; Wed, 28 Feb 2024 16:55:18 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com EECC320B74D3 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1709168118; bh=niuqWq1sLWYiMCz5FokXM+UDJb8eF4ZMb5zNK/FDzZQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=C8aeD8HzDb+K919Tf3/wOwkPfcua6+ScqQnJGcaF4vaXNvuOKojxHFT6yjAJhoHZU Wo5hUwKHWb3SdrmF1fBlJ+ldq6CPQ0zuauQ1GvdQLbuwDGZmGHW1iv+LuahPXCiE9S QtY8U28K+p9531G2R1UAlsiDh0cH0pf+sWV1AS+g= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v13 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 16:54:52 -0800 Message-Id: <1709168102-7677-11-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1709168102-7677-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1709168102-7677-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1792193016665045430 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1792193016665045430 From: Deven Bowers IPE, like SELinux, supports a permissive mode. This mode allows policy authors to test and evaluate IPE policy without it effecting their programs. When the mode is changed, a 1404 AUDIT_MAC_STATUS be reported. This patch adds the following audit records: audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1 audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=1 old_enforcing=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1 The audit record only emit when the value from the user input is different from the current enforce value. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. + Remove useless 0-initializations + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are exposed through sysctls. + Add more prose to the IPE base config option help text. + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. + Remove unnecessary caching system. + Remove comments from headers + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 v4: + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now exposed through securityfs. + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. v5: + fix minor grammatical errors + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, reconstruct the exact rule. v6: + No changes v7: + Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review. + Propagating changes to support the new ipe_context structure in the evaluation loop. + Split out permissive functionality into a separate patch for easier review. + Remove permissive switch compile-time configuration option - this is trivial to add later. v8: + Remove "IPE" prefix from permissive audit record + align fields to the linux-audit field dictionary. This causes the following fields to change: enforce -> permissive + Remove duplicated information correlated with syscall record, that will always be present in the audit event. + Change audit types: + AUDIT_TRUST_STATUS -> AUDIT_MAC_STATUS + There is no significant difference in meaning between these types. v9: + Clean up ipe_context related code v10: + Change audit format to comform with the existing format selinux is using + Remove the audit record emission during init to align with selinux, which does not perform this action. v11: + Remove redundant code v12: + Remove redundant code v13: + Remove audit format macro --- security/ipe/audit.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++-- security/ipe/audit.h | 1 + security/ipe/eval.c | 11 +++++-- security/ipe/eval.h | 1 + security/ipe/fs.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.c b/security/ipe/audit.c index f167fdc87986..a480f27278df 100644 --- a/security/ipe/audit.c +++ b/security/ipe/audit.c @@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, if (!ab) return; - audit_log_format(ab, "ipe_op=%s ipe_hook=%s pid=%d comm=", - op, audit_hook_names[ctx->hook], + audit_log_format(ab, "ipe_op=%s ipe_hook=%s enforcing=%d pid=%d comm=", + op, audit_hook_names[ctx->hook], READ_ONCE(enforce), task_tgid_nr(current)); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); @@ -212,3 +212,26 @@ void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p) audit_log_end(ab); } + +/** + * ipe_audit_enforce - Audit a change in IPE's enforcement state. + * @new_enforce: The new value enforce to be set. + * @old_enforce: The old value currently in enforce. + */ +void ipe_audit_enforce(bool new_enforce, bool old_enforce) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, + "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u" + " enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1", + new_enforce, old_enforce, + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), + audit_get_sessionid(current)); + + audit_log_end(ab); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.h b/security/ipe/audit.h index 0ff5a06808de..914f001e5286 100644 --- a/security/ipe/audit.h +++ b/security/ipe/audit.h @@ -14,5 +14,6 @@ void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p); void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const op, const struct ipe_policy *const np); +void ipe_audit_enforce(bool new_enforce, bool old_enforce); #endif /* _IPE_AUDIT_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index 274f7346ef42..3f3125478dd0 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; bool success_audit; +bool enforce = true; #define FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f) ((f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb) @@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) const struct ipe_rule *rule = NULL; const struct ipe_op_table *rules = NULL; struct ipe_prop *prop = NULL; + int rc = 0; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -158,9 +160,12 @@ int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) ipe_audit_match(ctx, match_type, action, rule); if (action == IPE_ACTION_DENY) - return -EACCES; + rc = -EACCES; - return 0; + if (!READ_ONCE(enforce)) + rc = 0; + + return rc; } /* Set the right module name */ @@ -171,3 +176,5 @@ int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) module_param(success_audit, bool, 0400); MODULE_PARM_DESC(success_audit, "Start IPE with success auditing enabled"); +module_param(enforce, bool, 0400); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Start IPE in enforce or permissive mode"); diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index 4631b236358e..0b50302611a4 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ extern struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; extern bool success_audit; +extern bool enforce; struct ipe_superblock { bool initramfs; diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c index 95407997cf0c..b16d87443a3b 100644 --- a/security/ipe/fs.c +++ b/security/ipe/fs.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ static struct dentry *np __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init; struct dentry *policy_root __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *audit_node __ro_after_init; +static struct dentry *enforce_node __ro_after_init; /** * setaudit - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit" @@ -67,6 +68,60 @@ static ssize_t getaudit(struct file *f, char __user *data, return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 1); } +/** + * setenforce - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t setenforce(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool new_value, old_value; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + old_value = READ_ONCE(enforce); + rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &new_value); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (new_value != old_value) { + ipe_audit_enforce(new_value, old_value); + WRITE_ONCE(enforce, new_value); + } + + return len; +} + +/** + * getenforce - Read handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the read syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t getenforce(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + const char *result; + + result = ((READ_ONCE(enforce)) ? "1" : "0"); + + return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 1); +} + /** * new_policy - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/new_policy". * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. @@ -120,6 +175,11 @@ static const struct file_operations audit_fops = { .read = getaudit, }; +static const struct file_operations enforce_fops = { + .write = setenforce, + .read = getenforce, +}; + /** * ipe_init_securityfs - Initialize IPE's securityfs tree at fsinit. * @@ -147,6 +207,13 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) goto err; } + enforce_node = securityfs_create_file("enforce", 0600, root, NULL, + &enforce_fops); + if (IS_ERR(enforce_node)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(enforce_node); + goto err; + } + policy_root = securityfs_create_dir("policies", root); if (IS_ERR(policy_root)) { rc = PTR_ERR(policy_root); @@ -163,6 +230,7 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) err: securityfs_remove(np); securityfs_remove(policy_root); + securityfs_remove(enforce_node); securityfs_remove(audit_node); securityfs_remove(root); return rc;