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[23.128.96.31]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id lt17-20020a17090b355100b00285bff71171si457420pjb.1.2023.11.29.06.55.19 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 29 Nov 2023 06:55:20 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.31 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.31; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linutronix.de header.s=2020 header.b=zQpDqlNu; dkim=neutral (no key) header.i=@linutronix.de; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.31 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=linutronix.de Received: from out1.vger.email (depot.vger.email [IPv6:2620:137:e000::3:0]) by morse.vger.email (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8F7288021778; Wed, 29 Nov 2023 06:55:03 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.103.11 at morse.vger.email Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234720AbjK2Oyy (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 29 Nov 2023 09:54:54 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:35366 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234798AbjK2Oyp (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 Nov 2023 09:54:45 -0500 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C551ED69; Wed, 29 Nov 2023 06:54:50 -0800 (PST) Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 14:54:48 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1701269689; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=BD4fc2II5JmX/ogKkIA4bMem3DQjdYD91dRBM/nPp4c=; b=zQpDqlNu3SSretm66P0pdVRM09tgf/PA6Sx6yU+DGPkKImORHF3xN1LhGINybwRj4YZDAd 29Wy0oa4jGCj4HYdyEDFmU6cZo+aNaIrZvjyeVFGSvfeH7imDPo3QjtR03GJ764mvM3dAx 3irYG4zawCXSXalbSIrkgIOwDRbg46bu/e8PoYl29kwAPmalc4uvZN5Rp9WfFNr0lljRfp VAj3WeNjUbJqes7zm1tBts0LZV9BTi6JLSrDsFl0f+7xMr4DeOfUflNxPMigdrSTUjbOwM VArBzMJpDFxuwLqP+ORqyfusbwaL4/sU9hvOvcK+Z8uwVoiMxZoSgyIk1QVg3A== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1701269689; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=BD4fc2II5JmX/ogKkIA4bMem3DQjdYD91dRBM/nPp4c=; b=QpunPe5sFqmGBGFQBwchR1eq5QgvgiAtsoK4JtjjF3IwHYx6vPMuFG6OQXYNbWbs0XfqhO PIAbUogXXuj725AQ== From: "tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra" Sender: tip-bot2@linutronix.de Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: locking/core] ptrace: Convert ptrace_attach() to use lock guards Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Oleg Nesterov , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <170126968827.398.8511748826615430128.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.9 required=5.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on morse.vger.email Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-Greylist: Sender passed SPF test, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.4 (morse.vger.email [0.0.0.0]); Wed, 29 Nov 2023 06:55:03 -0800 (PST) X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1783910598024155544 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1783910598024155544 The following commit has been merged into the locking/core branch of tip: Commit-ID: 5431fdd2c181dd2eac218e45b44deb2925fa48f0 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/5431fdd2c181dd2eac218e45b44deb2925fa48f0 Author: Peter Zijlstra AuthorDate: Sun, 17 Sep 2023 13:24:21 +02:00 Committer: Peter Zijlstra CommitterDate: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 15:43:54 +01:00 ptrace: Convert ptrace_attach() to use lock guards Created as testing for the conditional guard infrastructure. Specifically this makes use of the following form: scoped_cond_guard (mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTNOINTR, &task->signal->cred_guard_mutex) { ... } ... return 0; Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231102110706.568467727%40infradead.org --- include/linux/sched/task.h | 2 +- include/linux/spinlock.h | 26 +++++++- kernel/ptrace.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++------------------- 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/sched/task.h b/include/linux/sched/task.h index a23af22..4f3dca3 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched/task.h +++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h @@ -226,4 +226,6 @@ static inline void task_unlock(struct task_struct *p) spin_unlock(&p->alloc_lock); } +DEFINE_GUARD(task_lock, struct task_struct *, task_lock(_T), task_unlock(_T)) + #endif /* _LINUX_SCHED_TASK_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/spinlock.h b/include/linux/spinlock.h index ceb56b3..90bc853 100644 --- a/include/linux/spinlock.h +++ b/include/linux/spinlock.h @@ -548,5 +548,31 @@ DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(spinlock_irqsave, spinlock_t, DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1_COND(spinlock_irqsave, _try, spin_trylock_irqsave(_T->lock, _T->flags)) +DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(read_lock, rwlock_t, + read_lock(_T->lock), + read_unlock(_T->lock)) + +DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(read_lock_irq, rwlock_t, + read_lock_irq(_T->lock), + read_unlock_irq(_T->lock)) + +DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(read_lock_irqsave, rwlock_t, + read_lock_irqsave(_T->lock, _T->flags), + read_unlock_irqrestore(_T->lock, _T->flags), + unsigned long flags) + +DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(write_lock, rwlock_t, + write_lock(_T->lock), + write_unlock(_T->lock)) + +DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(write_lock_irq, rwlock_t, + write_lock_irq(_T->lock), + write_unlock_irq(_T->lock)) + +DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(write_lock_irqsave, rwlock_t, + write_lock_irqsave(_T->lock, _T->flags), + write_unlock_irqrestore(_T->lock, _T->flags), + unsigned long flags) + #undef __LINUX_INSIDE_SPINLOCK_H #endif /* __LINUX_SPINLOCK_H */ diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index d8b5e13..5c579fb 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -386,6 +386,34 @@ static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data) return 0; } +static inline void ptrace_set_stopped(struct task_struct *task) +{ + guard(spinlock)(&task->sighand->siglock); + + /* + * If the task is already STOPPED, set JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP and + * TRAPPING, and kick it so that it transits to TRACED. TRAPPING + * will be cleared if the child completes the transition or any + * event which clears the group stop states happens. We'll wait + * for the transition to complete before returning from this + * function. + * + * This hides STOPPED -> RUNNING -> TRACED transition from the + * attaching thread but a different thread in the same group can + * still observe the transient RUNNING state. IOW, if another + * thread's WNOHANG wait(2) on the stopped tracee races against + * ATTACH, the wait(2) may fail due to the transient RUNNING. + * + * The following task_is_stopped() test is safe as both transitions + * in and out of STOPPED are protected by siglock. + */ + if (task_is_stopped(task) && + task_set_jobctl_pending(task, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP | JOBCTL_TRAPPING)) { + task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_STOPPED; + signal_wake_up_state(task, __TASK_STOPPED); + } +} + static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags) @@ -393,17 +421,17 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, bool seize = (request == PTRACE_SEIZE); int retval; - retval = -EIO; if (seize) { if (addr != 0) - goto out; + return -EIO; /* * This duplicates the check in check_ptrace_options() because * ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() have historically * used different error codes for unknown ptrace options. */ if (flags & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK) - goto out; + return -EIO; + retval = check_ptrace_options(flags); if (retval) return retval; @@ -414,88 +442,54 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, audit_ptrace(task); - retval = -EPERM; if (unlikely(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) - goto out; + return -EPERM; if (same_thread_group(task, current)) - goto out; + return -EPERM; /* * Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference; * SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently * under ptrace. */ - retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) - goto out; + scoped_cond_guard (mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTNOINTR, + &task->signal->cred_guard_mutex) { - task_lock(task); - retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS); - task_unlock(task); - if (retval) - goto unlock_creds; + scoped_guard (task_lock, task) { + retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS); + if (retval) + return retval; + } - write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - retval = -EPERM; - if (unlikely(task->exit_state)) - goto unlock_tasklist; - if (task->ptrace) - goto unlock_tasklist; + scoped_guard (write_lock_irq, &tasklist_lock) { + if (unlikely(task->exit_state)) + return -EPERM; + if (task->ptrace) + return -EPERM; - task->ptrace = flags; + task->ptrace = flags; - ptrace_link(task, current); + ptrace_link(task, current); - /* SEIZE doesn't trap tracee on attach */ - if (!seize) - send_sig_info(SIGSTOP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, task); + /* SEIZE doesn't trap tracee on attach */ + if (!seize) + send_sig_info(SIGSTOP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, task); - spin_lock(&task->sighand->siglock); + ptrace_set_stopped(task); + } + } /* - * If the task is already STOPPED, set JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP and - * TRAPPING, and kick it so that it transits to TRACED. TRAPPING - * will be cleared if the child completes the transition or any - * event which clears the group stop states happens. We'll wait - * for the transition to complete before returning from this - * function. - * - * This hides STOPPED -> RUNNING -> TRACED transition from the - * attaching thread but a different thread in the same group can - * still observe the transient RUNNING state. IOW, if another - * thread's WNOHANG wait(2) on the stopped tracee races against - * ATTACH, the wait(2) may fail due to the transient RUNNING. - * - * The following task_is_stopped() test is safe as both transitions - * in and out of STOPPED are protected by siglock. + * We do not bother to change retval or clear JOBCTL_TRAPPING + * if wait_on_bit() was interrupted by SIGKILL. The tracer will + * not return to user-mode, it will exit and clear this bit in + * __ptrace_unlink() if it wasn't already cleared by the tracee; + * and until then nobody can ptrace this task. */ - if (task_is_stopped(task) && - task_set_jobctl_pending(task, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP | JOBCTL_TRAPPING)) { - task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_STOPPED; - signal_wake_up_state(task, __TASK_STOPPED); - } - - spin_unlock(&task->sighand->siglock); - - retval = 0; -unlock_tasklist: - write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); -unlock_creds: - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); -out: - if (!retval) { - /* - * We do not bother to change retval or clear JOBCTL_TRAPPING - * if wait_on_bit() was interrupted by SIGKILL. The tracer will - * not return to user-mode, it will exit and clear this bit in - * __ptrace_unlink() if it wasn't already cleared by the tracee; - * and until then nobody can ptrace this task. - */ - wait_on_bit(&task->jobctl, JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT, TASK_KILLABLE); - proc_ptrace_connector(task, PTRACE_ATTACH); - } + wait_on_bit(&task->jobctl, JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT, TASK_KILLABLE); + proc_ptrace_connector(task, PTRACE_ATTACH); - return retval; + return 0; } /**