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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id b7-20020a170902d50700b001b7e5ed70d4si4557459plg.440.2023.07.19.16.22.09; Wed, 19 Jul 2023 16:22:23 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linutronix.de header.s=2020 header.b="GLduqw7/"; dkim=neutral (no key) header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=2rdEwFwn; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=linutronix.de Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231308AbjGSWsm (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 19 Jul 2023 18:48:42 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42606 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230512AbjGSWru (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Jul 2023 18:47:50 -0400 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [IPv6:2a0a:51c0:0:12e:550::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F1AD72121; Wed, 19 Jul 2023 15:47:36 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 22:47:34 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1689806855; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Jpao/DukEzvG5d44DsDDaQVQhQWzCfmPyvpHDMkvxBk=; b=GLduqw7/r8nzEbh8++4tnTBP5doa7jNePLjFGEF8Dly3lcu3QRbF4f2z+KR4DGRAFXzbh2 Y/wqKtzZu4tWpmdckCt6cXAXhpvCpMAQDtVZP4c2UwenQxjuPcAGxCOI2OQ2SPdIFt2qMB 3eSaQwqhArMfuRVZ65P51PL7Vb8/3/uK06VO+HI1PUOfDv5aF4gC1p0xlWU3ocC2+XNbCz lcpxyC7Ohnr2jnx98Ayd8bduq6WFsy0fSxoQHB4y8E1R7Oie0oaV0i4otVoLo7YTgDOpdN fbtykWS8DuGiy+SPkJt0Xq+Q7Czql/XPjQKyLmu/d7KrB/dODVqCTj7FMdp2Nw== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1689806855; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Jpao/DukEzvG5d44DsDDaQVQhQWzCfmPyvpHDMkvxBk=; b=2rdEwFwnC9qDv2/Nek2MFhGUI+g5JlzUZptLhQVameKbL/kGf4YGi1qMVaTiwVc3QN6g/X bYInpED9W70opiDw== From: "tip-bot2 for Rick Edgecombe" Sender: tip-bot2@linutronix.de Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: x86/shstk] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Cc: Rick Edgecombe , Dave Hansen , "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" , Kees Cook , "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" , David Hildenbrand , Pengfei Xu , John Allen , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <168980685456.28540.8149705038742119504.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1771893102888181044 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1771893102888181044 The following commit has been merged into the x86/shstk branch of tip: Commit-ID: 7c8f82db8acb9f0935703c0d96cda552bbf91ff2 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/7c8f82db8acb9f0935703c0d96cda552bbf91ff2 Author: Rick Edgecombe AuthorDate: Mon, 12 Jun 2023 17:10:48 -07:00 Committer: Rick Edgecombe CommitterDate: Tue, 11 Jul 2023 14:12:47 -07:00 mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly. In userspace, shadow stack memory is writable only in very specific, controlled ways. However, since userspace can, even in the limited ways, modify shadow stack contents, the kernel treats it as writable memory. As a result, without additional work there would remain many ways for userspace to trigger the kernel to write arbitrary data to shadow stacks via get_user_pages(, FOLL_WRITE) based operations. To help userspace protect their shadow stacks, make this a little less exposed by blocking writable get_user_pages() operations for shadow stack VMAs. Still allow FOLL_FORCE to write through shadow stack protections, as it does for read-only protections. This is required for debugging use cases. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) Acked-by: David Hildenbrand Tested-by: Pengfei Xu Tested-by: John Allen Tested-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-23-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 +++++ mm/gup.c | 6 +----- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h index 61b5244..e95cfd3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -1631,6 +1631,11 @@ static inline bool __pte_access_permitted(unsigned long pteval, bool write) { unsigned long need_pte_bits = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER; + /* + * Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs are shadow stack, which the kernel + * shouldn't generally allow access to, but since they + * are already Write=0, the below logic covers both cases. + */ if (write) need_pte_bits |= _PAGE_RW; diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index 76d222c..86ccdb7 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c @@ -1050,11 +1050,7 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags) return -EFAULT; if (write) { - if (!vma_anon && - !writable_file_mapping_allowed(vma, gup_flags)) - return -EFAULT; - - if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) { + if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE) || (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) { if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE)) return -EFAULT; /* hugetlb does not support FOLL_FORCE|FOLL_WRITE. */