diff mbox series

[tip:,x86/tdx] x86/tdx: Disable NOTIFY_ENABLES

Message ID 167484401546.4906.1415806415892666642.tip-bot2@tip-bot2
State New
Headers
Series [tip:,x86/tdx] x86/tdx: Disable NOTIFY_ENABLES |

Commit Message

tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner Jan. 27, 2023, 6:26 p.m. UTC 
  The following commit has been merged into the x86/tdx branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     8de62af018cc9262649d7688f7eb1409b2d8f594
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/8de62af018cc9262649d7688f7eb1409b2d8f594
Author:        Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
AuthorDate:    Fri, 27 Jan 2023 01:11:59 +03:00
Committer:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
CommitterDate: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 09:46:05 -08:00

x86/tdx: Disable NOTIFY_ENABLES

== Background ==

There is a class of side-channel attacks against SGX enclaves called
"SGX Step"[1]. These attacks create lots of exceptions inside of
enclaves. Basically, run an in-enclave instruction, cause an exception.
Over and over.

There is a concern that a VMM could attack a TDX guest in the same way
by causing lots of #VE's. The TDX architecture includes new
countermeasures for these attacks. It basically counts the number of
exceptions and can send another *special* exception once the number of
VMM-induced #VE's hits a critical threshold[2].

== Problem ==

But, these special exceptions are independent of any action that the
guest takes. They can occur anywhere that the guest executes. This
includes sensitive areas like the entry code. The (non-paranoid) #VE
handler is incapable of handling exceptions in these areas.

== Solution ==

Fortunately, the special exceptions can be disabled by the guest via
write to NOTIFY_ENABLES TDCS field. NOTIFY_ENABLES is disabled by
default, but might be enabled by a bootloader, firmware or an earlier
kernel before the current kernel runs.

Disable NOTIFY_ENABLES feature explicitly and unconditionally. Any
NOTIFY_ENABLES-based #VE's that occur before this point will end up
in the early #VE exception handler and die due to unexpected exit
reason.

[1] https://github.com/jovanbulck/sgx-step
[2] https://intel.github.io/ccc-linux-guest-hardening-docs/security-spec.html#safety-against-ve-in-kernel-code

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230126221159.8635-8-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
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Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index c4a1299..b593009 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ 
 #define TDX_GET_VEINFO			3
 #define TDX_GET_REPORT			4
 #define TDX_ACCEPT_PAGE			6
+#define TDX_WR				8
+
+/* TDCS fields. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD module calls */
+#define TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES		0x9100000000000010
 
 /* TDX hypercall Leaf IDs */
 #define TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA		0x10001
@@ -863,6 +867,9 @@  void __init tdx_early_init(void)
 	tdx_parse_tdinfo(&cc_mask);
 	cc_set_mask(cc_mask);
 
+	/* Kernel does not use NOTIFY_ENABLES and does not need random #VEs */
+	tdx_module_call(TDX_WR, 0, TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES, 0, -1ULL, NULL);
+
 	/*
 	 * All bits above GPA width are reserved and kernel treats shared bit
 	 * as flag, not as part of physical address.