[tip:,x86/boot] x86/boot/compressed: Register dummy NMI handler in EFI boot loader, to avoid kdump crashes
Commit Message
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: f919e902ac2371ec46b5582a42c50544dcb097f6
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/f919e902ac2371ec46b5582a42c50544dcb097f6
Author: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
AuthorDate: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 18:27:45 +08:00
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 11:56:55 +01:00
x86/boot/compressed: Register dummy NMI handler in EFI boot loader, to avoid kdump crashes
If kdump is enabled, when using mce_inject to inject errors, EFI
boot loader would decompressed & load second kernel for saving
vmcore file.
For normal errors that is fine. However, in MCEs cases, the panic
CPU that firstly enters into mce_panic(), is running within nmi
interrupt context, and the processor blocks delivery of subsequent
NMIs until the next execution of the IRET instruction.
When the panic CPU takes long time in the panic processing route,
and causes the watchdog timeout, at this moment, the processor
already receives NMI interrupt in the background.
In the following processure, panic CPU would run into EFI loader
and raise page fault exception (like visiting `vidmem` variable
when attempts to call debug_putstr()), the CPU would execute IRET
instruction when exits from page fault handler.
But the loader never registers handler for NMI vector in IDT,
lack of vector handler would cause reboot, which interrupts
kdump processure and fails to save vmcore file.
Here is steps to reproduce the above issue (Have a certain probability):
1. # cat uncorrected
CPU 1 BANK 4
STATUS uncorrected 0xc0
MCGSTATUS EIPV MCIP
ADDR 0x1234
RIP 0xdeadbabe
RAISINGCPU 0
MCGCAP SER CMCI TES 0x6
2. # modprobe mce_inject
3. # mce-inject uncorrected
For increasing probability of reproduction of this issue, there is two ways of
modification to select:
1. modify the threshold value of watchdog;
2. add delays before panic() in mce_panic() and modify PANIC_TIMEOUT macro;
Fixes: ca0e22d4f011 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Always switch to own page table")
Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110102745.2514694-1-zengheng4@huawei.com
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 5 +++++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
@@ -379,3 +379,8 @@ void do_boot_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
*/
kernel_add_identity_map(address, end);
}
+
+void do_boot_nmi_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+{
+ /* ignore */
+}
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ void load_stage2_idt(void)
{
boot_idt_desc.address = (unsigned long)boot_idt;
+ set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_NMI, boot_nmi_fault);
set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_PF, boot_page_fault);
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(\name)
.text
.code64
+EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_nmi_fault do_boot_nmi_fault error_code=0
EXCEPTION_HANDLER boot_page_fault do_boot_page_fault error_code=1
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ static inline void cleanup_exception_handling(void) { }
#endif
/* IDT Entry Points */
+void boot_nmi_fault(void);
void boot_page_fault(void);
void boot_stage1_vc(void);
void boot_stage2_vc(void);