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Wed, 14 Feb 2024 22:31:30 GMT Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by iadpaimrmta02.imrmtpd1.prodappiadaev1.oraclevcn.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 3w5yk9n747-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 14 Feb 2024 22:31:30 +0000 Received: from iadpaimrmta02.imrmtpd1.prodappiadaev1.oraclevcn.com (iadpaimrmta02.imrmtpd1.prodappiadaev1.oraclevcn.com [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.17.1.5/8.17.1.5) with ESMTP id 41EMVTUs004281; Wed, 14 Feb 2024 22:31:29 GMT Received: from bur-virt-x6-2-100.us.oracle.com (bur-virt-x6-2-100.us.oracle.com [10.153.92.40]) by iadpaimrmta02.imrmtpd1.prodappiadaev1.oraclevcn.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 3w5yk9n72r-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 14 Feb 2024 22:31:29 +0000 From: Ross Philipson To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: [PATCH v8 00/15] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 14:18:32 -0800 Message-Id: <20240214221847.2066632-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.3 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.272,Aquarius:18.0.1011,Hydra:6.0.619,FMLib:17.11.176.26 definitions=2024-02-14_14,2024-02-14_01,2023-05-22_02 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 mlxlogscore=999 phishscore=0 mlxscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 malwarescore=0 adultscore=0 suspectscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2311290000 definitions=main-2402140170 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: ODJVpcSsykUgv2zewX6PNAZH4dBPWwT_ X-Proofpoint-GUID: ODJVpcSsykUgv2zewX6PNAZH4dBPWwT_ X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1790915398808731330 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1790915398808731330 The larger focus of the TrenchBoot project (https://github.com/TrenchBoot) is to enhance the boot security and integrity in a unified manner. The first area of focus has been on the Trusted Computing Group's Dynamic Launch for establishing a hardware Root of Trust for Measurement, also know as DRTM (Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement). The project has been and continues to work on providing a unified means to Dynamic Launch that is a cross-platform (Intel and AMD) and cross-architecture (x86 and Arm), with our recent involvment in the upcoming Arm DRTM specification. The order of introducing DRTM to the Linux kernel follows the maturity of DRTM in the architectures. Intel's Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) is present today and only requires a preamble loader, e.g. a boot loader, and an OS kernel that is TXT-aware. AMD DRTM implementation has been present since the introduction of AMD-V but requires an additional component that is AMD specific and referred to in the specification as the Secure Loader, which the TrenchBoot project has an active prototype in development. Finally Arm's implementation is in specification development stage and the project is looking to support it when it becomes available. This patchset provides detailed documentation of DRTM, the approach used for adding the capbility, and relevant API/ABI documentation. In addition to the documentation the patch set introduces Intel TXT support as the first platform for Linux Secure Launch. A quick note on terminology. The larger open source project itself is called TrenchBoot, which is hosted on Github (links below). The kernel feature enabling the use of Dynamic Launch technology is referred to as "Secure Launch" within the kernel code. As such the prefixes sl_/SL_ or slaunch/SLAUNCH will be seen in the code. The stub code discussed above is referred to as the SL stub. The Secure Launch feature starts with patch #2. Patch #1 was authored by Arvind Sankar. There is no further status on this patch at this point but Secure Launch depends on it so it is included with the set. Links: The TrenchBoot project including documentation: https://trenchboot.org The TrenchBoot project on Github: https://github.com/trenchboot Intel TXT is documented in its own specification and in the SDM Instruction Set volume: https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/guides/intel-txt-software-development-guide.pdf https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-sdm AMD SKINIT is documented in the System Programming manual: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf The TrenchBoot project provides a quick start guide to help get a system up and running with Secure Launch for Linux: https://github.com/TrenchBoot/documentation/blob/master/QUICKSTART.md Patch set based on commit: torvolds/master/54be6c6c5ae8e0d93a6c4641cb7528eb0b6ba478 Thanks Ross Philipson and Daniel P. Smith Changes in v2: - Modified 32b entry code to prevent causing relocations in the compressed kernel. - Dropped patches for compressed kernel TPM PCR extender. - Modified event log code to insert log delimiter events and not rely on TPM access. - Stop extending PCRs in the early Secure Launch stub code. - Removed Kconfig options for hash algorithms and use the algorithms the ACM used. - Match Secure Launch measurement algorithm use to those reported in the TPM 2.0 event log. - Read the TPM events out of the TPM and extend them into the PCRs using the mainline TPM driver. This is done in the late initcall module. - Allow use of alternate PCR 19 and 20 for post ACM measurements. - Add Kconfig constraints needed by Secure Launch (disable KASLR and add x2apic dependency). - Fix testing of SL_FLAGS when determining if Secure Launch is active and the architecture is TXT. - Use SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL macros in early entry point code. - Security audit changes: - Validate buffers passed to MLE do not overlap the MLE and are properly laid out. - Validate buffers and memory regions used by the MLE are protected by IOMMU PMRs. - Force IOMMU to not use passthrough mode during a Secure Launch. - Prevent KASLR use during a Secure Launch. Changes in v3: - Introduce x86 documentation patch to provide background, overview and configuration/ABI information for the Secure Launch kernel feature. - Remove the IOMMU patch with special cases for disabling IOMMU passthrough. Configuring the IOMMU is now a documentation matter in the previously mentioned new patch. - Remove special case KASLR disabling code. Configuring KASLR is now a documentation matter in the previously mentioned new patch. - Fix incorrect panic on TXT public register read. - Properly handle and measure setup_indirect bootparams in the early launch code. - Use correct compressed kernel image base address when testing buffers in the early launch stub code. This bug was introduced by the changes to avoid relocation in the compressed kernel. - Use CPUID feature bits instead of CPUID vendor strings to determine if SMX mode is supported and the system is Intel. - Remove early NMI re-enable on the BSP. This can be safely done later on the BSP after an IDT is setup. Changes in v4: - Expand the cover letter to provide more context to the order that DRTM support will be added. - Removed debug tracing in TPM request locality funciton and fixed local variable declarations. - Fixed missing break in default case in slmodule.c. - Reworded commit messages in patches 1 and 2 per suggestions. Changes in v5: - Comprehensive documentation rewrite. - Use boot param loadflags to communicate Secure Launch status to kernel proper. - Fix incorrect check of X86_FEATURE_BIT_SMX bit. - Rename the alternate details and authorities PCR support. - Refactor the securityfs directory and file setup in slmodule.c. - Misc. cleanup from internal code reviews. - Use reverse fir tree format for variables. Changes in v6: - Support for the new Secure Launch Resourse Table that standardizes the information passed and forms the ABI between the pre and post launch code. - Support for booting Linux through the EFI stub entry point and then being able to do a Secure Launch once EFI stub is done and EBS is called. - Updates to the documentation to reflect the previous two items listed. Changes in v7: - Switch to using MONITOR/MWAIT instead of NMIs to park the APs for later bringup by the SMP code. - Use static inline dummy functions instead of macros when the Secure Launch feature is disabled. - Move early SHA1 code to lib/crypto and pull it in from there. - Numerous formatting fixes from comments on LKML. - Remove efi-stub/DL stub patch temporarily for redesign/rework. Changes in v8: - Reintroduce efi-stub Linux kernel booting through the dynamic launch stub (DL stub). - Add new approach to setting localities > 0 through kernel and sysfs interfaces in the TPM mainline driver. - General code cleanup from v7 post comments. Arvind Sankar (1): x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Daniel P. Smith (2): x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson (12): Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation x86: Secure Launch Kconfig x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file x86: Secure Launch main header file x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch *** BLURB HERE *** Arvind Sankar (1): x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Daniel P. Smith (2): x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson (12): Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation x86: Secure Launch Kconfig x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file x86: Secure Launch main header file x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst | 21 + Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + .../security/launch-integrity/index.rst | 11 + .../security/launch-integrity/principles.rst | 320 ++++++++ .../secure_launch_details.rst | 584 +++++++++++++++ .../secure_launch_overview.rst | 226 ++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 3 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.c | 12 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha256.c | 6 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 34 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S | 53 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.h | 12 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c | 582 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S | 705 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S | 6 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 20 + arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 10 + arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c | 598 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/slmodule.c | 511 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 58 +- arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 3 + arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S | 3 + arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 32 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 24 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 15 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 30 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 55 ++ drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c | 4 + include/crypto/sha1.h | 1 + include/linux/slaunch.h | 542 ++++++++++++++ include/linux/slr_table.h | 270 +++++++ include/linux/tpm.h | 10 + kernel/kexec_core.c | 4 + lib/crypto/sha1.c | 81 ++ 41 files changed, 4867 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/principles.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/secure_launch_details.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/launch-integrity/secure_launch_overview.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha256.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/slmodule.c create mode 100644 include/linux/slaunch.h create mode 100644 include/linux/slr_table.h