Message ID | 20240214151130.616240-1-jeffxu@chromium.org |
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[34.82.72.56]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id y23-20020aa78557000000b006e09ec69d7dsm9164968pfn.98.2024.02.14.07.11.40 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 14 Feb 2024 07:11:40 -0800 (PST) From: jeffxu@chromium.org To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org, jannh@google.com, sroettger@google.com, willy@infradead.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, usama.anjum@collabora.com, corbet@lwn.net, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, surenb@google.com, merimus@google.com, rdunlap@infradead.org Cc: jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, pedro.falcato@gmail.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, deraadt@openbsd.org, =David.Laight@aculab.com, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> Subject: [PATCH v9 0/5] Introduce mseal Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 15:11:24 +0000 Message-ID: <20240214151130.616240-1-jeffxu@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0.687.g38aa6559b0-goog Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org> List-Subscribe: <mailto:linux-kernel+subscribe@vger.kernel.org> List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:linux-kernel+unsubscribe@vger.kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: 1790887712480939635 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1790887712480939635 |
Series | Introduce mseal | |
Message
Jeff Xu
Feb. 14, 2024, 3:11 p.m. UTC
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
This is V9 version, with removing MAP_SEALABLE and PROT_SEAL
from mmap(), adding perfrmance benchmark and a test
to demo the sealing of read-only memory segment of elf mapping.
------------------------------------------------------------------
This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.
In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory
range against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.
Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW)
and no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of
kernel version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature
improves the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker
cannot simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The
memory must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects
the VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.
Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For
example, such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity
guarantees since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can
become writable or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can
automatically be applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and
rodata pages and applications can additionally seal security critical
data at runtime. A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel
with the VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the
mimmutable syscall [4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for
their CFI work [2] and this patchset has been designed to be
compatible with the Chrome use case.
Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with
following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.
Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in
the case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or
read-execute (RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to
prevent them from becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings
are tied to the lifetime of the process.
Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are
managed by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX
respectively but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in
the future ARM permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those
mappings are not tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while
the memory is sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the
unused memory. For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).
However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a
security risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page
boundary and the second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the
target bytes with zeros and change the control flow. Checking
write-permission before the discard operation allows us to control
when the operation is valid. In this case, the madvise will only
succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write permissions and PKRU
changes are protected in software by control-flow integrity.
Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the
Chrome browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream
discussions that we would also want to ensure that the patch set
eventually is a complete solution for memory sealing and compatible
with other use cases. The specific scenario currently in mind is
glibc's use case of loading and sealing ELF executables. To this end,
Stephen is working on a change to glibc to add sealing support to the
dynamic linker, which will seal all non-writable segments at startup.
Once this work is completed, all applications will be able to
automatically benefit from these new protections.
In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental
in shaping this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.
To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]
The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.
The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.
Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.
Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%
Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.
In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%
For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.
It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%
From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.
In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten
times greater for munmap and mprotect.
When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such a performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best
to take this data with a grain of salt.
Change history:
===============
V9:
- remove mmap(PROT_SEAL) and mmap(MAP_SEALABLE) (Linus, Theo de Raadt)
- Update mseal_test to check for prot bit (Liam R. Howlett)
- Update documentation to give more detail on sealing check (Liam R. Howlett)
- Add seal_elf test.
- Add performance measure data.
- mseal_test: fix arm build.
V8:
- perf optimization in mmap. (Liam R. Howlett)
- add one testcase (test_seal_zero_address)
- Update mseal.rst to add note for MAP_SEALABLE.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240131175027.3287009-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/
V7:
- fix index.rst (Randy Dunlap)
- fix arm build (Randy Dunlap)
- return EPERM for blocked operations (Theo de Raadt)
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240122152905.2220849-2-jeffxu@chromium.org/T/
V6:
- Drop RFC from subject, Given Linus's general approval.
- Adjust syscall number for mseal (main Jan.11/2024)
- Code style fix (Matthew Wilcox)
- selftest: use ksft macros (Muhammad Usama Anjum)
- Document fix. (Randy Dunlap)
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240111234142.2944934-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/
V5:
- fix build issue in mseal-Wire-up-mseal-syscall
(Suggested by Linus Torvalds, and Greg KH)
- updates on selftest.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240109154547.1839886-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/#r
V4:
(Suggested by Linus Torvalds)
- new signature: mseal(start,len,flags)
- 32 bit is not supported. vm_seal is removed, use vm_flags instead.
- single bit in vm_flags for sealed state.
- CONFIG_MSEAL kernel config is removed.
- single bit of PROT_SEAL in the "Prot" field of mmap().
Other changes:
- update selftest (Suggested by Muhammad Usama Anjum)
- update documentation.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240104185138.169307-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/
V3:
- Abandon per-syscall approach, (Suggested by Linus Torvalds).
- Organize sealing types around their functionality, such as
MM_SEAL_BASE, MM_SEAL_PROT_PKEY.
- Extend the scope of sealing from calls originated in userspace to
both kernel and userspace. (Suggested by Linus Torvalds)
- Add seal type support in mmap(). (Suggested by Pedro Falcato)
- Add a new sealing type: MM_SEAL_DISCARD_RO_ANON to prevent
destructive operations of madvise. (Suggested by Jann Horn and
Stephen Röttger)
- Make sealed VMAs mergeable. (Suggested by Jann Horn)
- Add MAP_SEALABLE to mmap()
- Add documentation - mseal.rst
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20231212231706.2680890-2-jeffxu@chromium.org/
v2:
Use _BITUL to define MM_SEAL_XX type.
Use unsigned long for seal type in sys_mseal() and other functions.
Remove internal VM_SEAL_XX type and convert_user_seal_type().
Remove MM_ACTION_XX type.
Remove caller_origin(ON_BEHALF_OF_XX) and replace with sealing bitmask.
Add more comments in code.
Add a detailed commit message.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231017090815.1067790-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231016143828.647848-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/
----------------------------------------------------------------
[1] https://kernelnewbies.org/Linux_2_6_8
[2] https://v8.dev/blog/control-flow-integrity
[3] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274
[4] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2
[5] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@mail.gmail.com/
[7] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230515130553.2311248-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/
[8] https://github.com/peaktocreek/mmperf
Jeff Xu (5):
mseal: Wire up mseal syscall
mseal: add mseal syscall
selftest mm/mseal memory sealing
mseal:add documentation
selftest mm/mseal read-only elf memory segment
Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 199 ++
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 +
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 +
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +-
kernel/sys_ni.c | 1 +
mm/Makefile | 4 +
mm/internal.h | 37 +
mm/madvise.c | 12 +
mm/mmap.c | 31 +-
mm/mprotect.c | 10 +
mm/mremap.c | 31 +
mm/mseal.c | 307 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c | 1836 +++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c | 183 ++
33 files changed, 2678 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
create mode 100644 mm/mseal.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c