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[0/2] x86/tdx: Enforce no #VE on private memory accesses

Message ID 20221028141220.29217-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Headers
Series x86/tdx: Enforce no #VE on private memory accesses |

Message

Kirill A. Shutemov Oct. 28, 2022, 2:12 p.m. UTC 
  As described in 9a22bf6debbf ("x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX
guest"), kernel relies on "no #VE on access to private memory" to keep
guest secure from attacks against syscall gap or NMI entry code.

SEPT_VE_DISABLE TD attribute controls TDX module behaviour on EPT
violation.

The attribute must be set to avoid #VE. Refuse to boot the guest if it
is not.

Kirill A. Shutemov (1):
  x86/tdx: Do not allow #VE due to EPT violation on the private memory

Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan (1):
  x86/tdx: Extract GET_INFO call from get_cc_mask()

 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)