[v3,09/10] KEYS: CA link restriction
Commit Message
Add a new link restriction. Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
based on the key to be added being a CA.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 5 +++-
include/crypto/public_key.h | 16 +++++++++++
3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Comments
On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 07:34:00PM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> +/**
> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> + *
> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> + */
> +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> + const struct key_type *type,
> + const union key_payload *payload,
> + struct key *trust_keyring)
Why you want to define trust_keyring, other than matching the parameter
list in restrict_link_by_signature()?
Also if it is unused, it should be then just "struct key *)", right?
BR, Jarkko
On Wed, Jan 04, 2023 at 11:51:52AM +0000, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 07:34:00PM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > +/**
> > + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> > + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> > + * @type: The type of key being added.
> > + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> > + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> > + *
> > + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> > + * certificate as being ok to link.
> > + *
> > + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
> > + * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
> > + * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
> > + * the signature check cannot be performed.
> > + */
> > +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
> > + const struct key_type *type,
> > + const union key_payload *payload,
> > + struct key *trust_keyring)
>
> Why you want to define trust_keyring, other than matching the parameter
> list in restrict_link_by_signature()?
>
> Also if it is unused, it should be then just "struct key *)", right?
Please ignore, I forgot how this worked, i.e. "restriction" is set to
the correct function so this looks correct to me :-) So it's good.
Sorry for the confusion.
BR, Jarkko
@@ -108,6 +108,41 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
return ret;
}
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: Unused.
+ *
+ * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
+ * certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
+ * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
+ * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
+ * the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+ const struct public_key *pkey;
+
+ if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
+ if (!pkey)
+ return -ENOPKG;
+
+ if (!pkey->key_is_ca)
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int restrict_link_by_ca_and_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
const union key_payload *payload,
@@ -209,8 +209,11 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
}
if (cert->kcs_set) {
- if (cert->root_ca)
+ if (cert->root_ca) {
prep->payload_flags |= KEY_ALLOC_PECA;
+ cert->pub->key_is_ca = true;
+ }
+
/*
* In this case it could be an Intermediate CA. Set
* KEY_MAYBE_PECA for now. If the restriction check
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ struct public_key {
void *params;
u32 paramlen;
bool key_is_private;
+ bool key_is_ca;
const char *id_type;
const char *pkey_algo;
};
@@ -76,6 +77,21 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_ca_and_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
const union key_payload *payload,
struct key *unused);
+#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE)
+extern int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trust_keyring);
+#else
+static inline int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
extern int query_asymmetric_key(const struct kernel_pkey_params *,
struct kernel_pkey_query *);