Message ID | be4ba4b.5d44.184a0a406a4.Coremail.linma@zju.edu.cn |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers |
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Series |
[v2] io_uring/filetable: fix file reference underflow
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Commit Message
Lin Ma
Nov. 22, 2022, 6:40 p.m. UTC
There is an interesting reference bug when -ENOMEM occurs in calling of
io_install_fixed_file(). KASan report like below:
[ 14.057131] ==================================================================
[ 14.059161] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[ 14.060975] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b09cf20 by task kworker/u8:2/45
[ 14.062684]
[ 14.062768] CPU: 2 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4 #1
[ 14.063099] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 14.063666] Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work
[ 14.063936] Call Trace:
[ 14.064065] <TASK>
[ 14.064175] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
[ 14.064360] print_report+0x172/0x475
[ 14.064547] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x83/0xe0
[ 14.064758] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xef/0x170
[ 14.064975] ? unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[ 14.065167] kasan_report+0xad/0x130
[ 14.065353] ? unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[ 14.065553] unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[ 14.065744] __io_sqe_files_unregister+0x87/0x1e0
[ 14.065989] ? io_rsrc_refs_drop+0x1c/0xd0
[ 14.066199] io_ring_exit_work+0x388/0x6a5
[ 14.066410] ? io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x5bf/0x5bf
[ 14.066674] ? try_to_wake_up+0xdb/0x910
[ 14.066873] ? virt_to_head_page+0xbe/0xbe
[ 14.067080] ? __schedule+0x574/0xd20
[ 14.067273] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20
[ 14.067492] ? strscpy+0xb5/0x190
[ 14.067665] process_one_work+0x423/0x710
[ 14.067879] worker_thread+0x2a2/0x6f0
[ 14.068073] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 14.068284] kthread+0x163/0x1a0
[ 14.068454] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 14.068697] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 14.068886] </TASK>
[ 14.069000]
[ 14.069088] Allocated by task 289:
[ 14.069269] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 14.069463] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 14.069652] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x70
[ 14.069899] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc5/0x200
[ 14.070100] __alloc_file+0x20/0x160
[ 14.070283] alloc_empty_file+0x3b/0xc0
[ 14.070479] path_openat+0xc3/0x1770
[ 14.070689] do_filp_open+0x150/0x270
[ 14.070888] do_sys_openat2+0x113/0x270
[ 14.071081] __x64_sys_openat+0xc8/0x140
[ 14.071283] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 14.071466] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 14.071791]
[ 14.071874] Freed by task 0:
[ 14.072027] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 14.072224] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 14.072415] kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50
[ 14.072627] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190
[ 14.072858] kmem_cache_free+0x98/0x340
[ 14.073075] rcu_core+0x427/0xe50
[ 14.073249] __do_softirq+0x110/0x3cd
[ 14.073440]
[ 14.073523] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 14.073801] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 14.074017] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0
[ 14.074264] call_rcu+0x41/0x550
[ 14.074436] task_work_run+0xf4/0x170
[ 14.074619] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120
[ 14.074858] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
[ 14.075092] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
[ 14.075272] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 14.075529]
[ 14.075612] Second to last potentially related work creation:
[ 14.075900] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 14.076098] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0
[ 14.076325] task_work_add+0x72/0x1b0
[ 14.076512] fput+0x65/0xc0
[ 14.076657] filp_close+0x8e/0xa0
[ 14.076825] __x64_sys_close+0x15/0x50
[ 14.077019] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 14.077199] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 14.077448]
[ 14.077530] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800b09cf00
[ 14.077530] which belongs to the cache filp of size 232
[ 14.078105] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
[ 14.078105] 232-byte region [ffff88800b09cf00, ffff88800b09cfe8)
[ 14.078685]
[ 14.078771] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 14.079046] page:000000001bd520e7 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88800b09de00 pfn:0xb09c
[ 14.079575] head:000000001bd520e7 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 14.079946] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1)
[ 14.080244] raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff88800493cc80
[ 14.080629] raw: ffff88800b09de00 0000000080190018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 14.081016] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 14.081293]
[ 14.081376] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 14.081618] ffff88800b09ce00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 14.081974] ffff88800b09ce80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 14.082336] >ffff88800b09cf00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 14.082690] ^
[ 14.082909] ffff88800b09cf80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
[ 14.083266] ffff88800b09d000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 14.083622] ==================================================================
The actual tracing of this bug is shown below:
commit 8c71fe750215 ("io_uring: ensure fput() called correspondingly
when direct install fails") adds an additional fput() in
io_fixed_fd_install() when io_file_bitmap_get() returns error values. In
that case, the routine will never make it to io_install_fixed_file() due
to an early return.
static int io_fixed_fd_install(...)
{
if (alloc_slot) {
...
ret = io_file_bitmap_get(ctx);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
io_ring_submit_unlock(ctx, issue_flags);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
...
}
...
ret = io_install_fixed_file(req, file, issue_flags, file_slot);
...
}
In the above scenario, the reference is okay as io_fixed_fd_install()
ensures the fput() is called when something bad happens, either via
bitmap or via inner io_install_fixed_file().
However, the commit 61c1b44a21d7 ("io_uring: fix deadlock on iowq file
slot alloc") breaks the balance because it places fput() into the common
path for both io_file_bitmap_get() and io_install_fixed_file(). Since
io_install_fixed_file() handles the fput() itself, the reference
underflow come across then.
There are some extra commits make the current code into
io_fixed_fd_install() -> __io_fixed_fd_install() ->
io_install_fixed_file()
However, the fact that there is an extra fput() is called if
io_install_fixed_file() calls fput(). Traversing through the code, I
find that the existing two callers to __io_fixed_fd_install():
io_fixed_fd_install() and io_msg_send_fd() have fput() when handling
error return, this patch simply removes the fput() in
io_install_fixed_file() to fix the bug.
Fixes: 61c1b44a21d7 ("io_uring: fix deadlock on iowq file slot alloc")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
---
V0->V1: fix typos
V1->V2: add crash stack
io_uring/filetable.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
Comments
On Wed, 23 Nov 2022 02:40:15 +0800 (GMT+08:00), Lin Ma wrote: > There is an interesting reference bug when -ENOMEM occurs in calling of > io_install_fixed_file(). KASan report like below: > > [ 14.057131] ================================================================== > [ 14.059161] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90 > [ 14.060975] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b09cf20 by task kworker/u8:2/45 > [ 14.062684] > [ 14.062768] CPU: 2 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4 #1 > [ 14.063099] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 > [ 14.063666] Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work > [ 14.063936] Call Trace: > [ 14.064065] <TASK> > [ 14.064175] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 > [ 14.064360] print_report+0x172/0x475 > [ 14.064547] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x83/0xe0 > [ 14.064758] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xef/0x170 > [ 14.064975] ? unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90 > [ 14.065167] kasan_report+0xad/0x130 > [ 14.065353] ? unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90 > [ 14.065553] unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90 > [ 14.065744] __io_sqe_files_unregister+0x87/0x1e0 > [ 14.065989] ? io_rsrc_refs_drop+0x1c/0xd0 > [ 14.066199] io_ring_exit_work+0x388/0x6a5 > [ 14.066410] ? io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x5bf/0x5bf > [ 14.066674] ? try_to_wake_up+0xdb/0x910 > [ 14.066873] ? virt_to_head_page+0xbe/0xbe > [ 14.067080] ? __schedule+0x574/0xd20 > [ 14.067273] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20 > [ 14.067492] ? strscpy+0xb5/0x190 > [ 14.067665] process_one_work+0x423/0x710 > [ 14.067879] worker_thread+0x2a2/0x6f0 > [ 14.068073] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710 > [ 14.068284] kthread+0x163/0x1a0 > [ 14.068454] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 > [ 14.068697] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 > [ 14.068886] </TASK> > [ 14.069000] > [ 14.069088] Allocated by task 289: > [ 14.069269] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 > [ 14.069463] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 > [ 14.069652] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x70 > [ 14.069899] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc5/0x200 > [ 14.070100] __alloc_file+0x20/0x160 > [ 14.070283] alloc_empty_file+0x3b/0xc0 > [ 14.070479] path_openat+0xc3/0x1770 > [ 14.070689] do_filp_open+0x150/0x270 > [ 14.070888] do_sys_openat2+0x113/0x270 > [ 14.071081] __x64_sys_openat+0xc8/0x140 > [ 14.071283] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 > [ 14.071466] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd > [ 14.071791] > [ 14.071874] Freed by task 0: > [ 14.072027] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 > [ 14.072224] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 > [ 14.072415] kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50 > [ 14.072627] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190 > [ 14.072858] kmem_cache_free+0x98/0x340 > [ 14.073075] rcu_core+0x427/0xe50 > [ 14.073249] __do_softirq+0x110/0x3cd > [ 14.073440] > [ 14.073523] Last potentially related work creation: > [ 14.073801] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 > [ 14.074017] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0 > [ 14.074264] call_rcu+0x41/0x550 > [ 14.074436] task_work_run+0xf4/0x170 > [ 14.074619] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 > [ 14.074858] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40 > [ 14.075092] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90 > [ 14.075272] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd > [ 14.075529] > [ 14.075612] Second to last potentially related work creation: > [ 14.075900] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 > [ 14.076098] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0 > [ 14.076325] task_work_add+0x72/0x1b0 > [ 14.076512] fput+0x65/0xc0 > [ 14.076657] filp_close+0x8e/0xa0 > [ 14.076825] __x64_sys_close+0x15/0x50 > [ 14.077019] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 > [ 14.077199] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd > [ 14.077448] > [ 14.077530] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800b09cf00 > [ 14.077530] which belongs to the cache filp of size 232 > [ 14.078105] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of > [ 14.078105] 232-byte region [ffff88800b09cf00, ffff88800b09cfe8) > [ 14.078685] > [ 14.078771] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: > [ 14.079046] page:000000001bd520e7 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88800b09de00 pfn:0xb09c > [ 14.079575] head:000000001bd520e7 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 > [ 14.079946] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1) > [ 14.080244] raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff88800493cc80 > [ 14.080629] raw: ffff88800b09de00 0000000080190018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 > [ 14.081016] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > [ 14.081293] > [ 14.081376] Memory state around the buggy address: > [ 14.081618] ffff88800b09ce00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 > [ 14.081974] ffff88800b09ce80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > [ 14.082336] >ffff88800b09cf00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > [ 14.082690] ^ > [ 14.082909] ffff88800b09cf80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc > [ 14.083266] ffff88800b09d000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > [ 14.083622] ================================================================== > > [...] Applied, thanks! [1/1] io_uring/filetable: fix file reference underflow commit: b4255aa5c6aa8f7e1a74627e7df008563be7938c Best regards,
diff --git a/io_uring/filetable.c b/io_uring/filetable.c index 7b473259f3f4..68dfc6936aa7 100644 --- a/io_uring/filetable.c +++ b/io_uring/filetable.c @@ -101,8 +101,6 @@ static int io_install_fixed_file(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct file *file, err: if (needs_switch) io_rsrc_node_switch(ctx, ctx->file_data); - if (ret) - fput(file); return ret; }