Message ID | 20240104212130.209490-2-babu.moger@amd.com |
---|---|
State | New |
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Commit Message
Moger, Babu
Jan. 4, 2024, 9:21 p.m. UTC
If the BMEC (Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration) feature is
supported, the bandwidth events can be configured. The maximum supported
bandwidth bitmask can be determined by following CPUID command.
CPUID_Fn80000020_ECX_x03 [Platform QoS Monitoring Bandwidth Event
Configuration] Read-only. Reset: 0000_007Fh.
Bits Description
31:7 Reserved
6:0 Identifies the bandwidth sources that can be tracked.
The bandwidth sources can change with the processor generations.
Remove the hard-coded value and detect using CPUID command. Also,
print the valid bitmask when the user tries to configure invalid value.
The CPUID details are documentation in the PPR listed below [1].
[1] Processor Programming Reference (PPR) Vol 1.1 for AMD Family 19h Model
11h B1 - 55901 Rev 0.25.
Fixes: dc2a3e857981 ("x86/resctrl: Add interface to read mbm_total_bytes_config")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
---
v3: Changed the event_mask name to mbm_cfg_mask. Added comments about the field.
Reverted the masking of event configuration to original code.
Few minor comment changes.
v2: Earlier sent as a part of ABMC feature.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231201005720.235639-1-babu.moger@amd.com/
But this is not related to ABMC. Sending it separate now.
Removed the global resctrl_max_evt_bitmask. Added event_mask as part of
the resource.
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c | 6 ++++--
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Comments
Hi Babu, On 1/4/2024 1:21 PM, Babu Moger wrote: > If the BMEC (Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration) feature is > supported, the bandwidth events can be configured. The maximum supported > bandwidth bitmask can be determined by following CPUID command. > > CPUID_Fn80000020_ECX_x03 [Platform QoS Monitoring Bandwidth Event > Configuration] Read-only. Reset: 0000_007Fh. > Bits Description > 31:7 Reserved > 6:0 Identifies the bandwidth sources that can be tracked. > > The bandwidth sources can change with the processor generations. > Remove the hard-coded value and detect using CPUID command. Also, I do not think "Remove the hard-coded value" is accurate anymore. > print the valid bitmask when the user tries to configure invalid value. > > The CPUID details are documentation in the PPR listed below [1]. "are documentation" -> "are documented" > [1] Processor Programming Reference (PPR) Vol 1.1 for AMD Family 19h Model > 11h B1 - 55901 Rev 0.25. > > Fixes: dc2a3e857981 ("x86/resctrl: Add interface to read mbm_total_bytes_config") > Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 > Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Same comment about "Link:" as for patch 1/2. > --- > v3: Changed the event_mask name to mbm_cfg_mask. Added comments about the field. > Reverted the masking of event configuration to original code. > Few minor comment changes. > > v2: Earlier sent as a part of ABMC feature. > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231201005720.235639-1-babu.moger@amd.com/ > But this is not related to ABMC. Sending it separate now. > Removed the global resctrl_max_evt_bitmask. Added event_mask as part of > the resource. > --- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h | 3 +++ > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c | 6 ++++++ > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c | 6 ++++-- > 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h > index d2979748fae4..e3dc35a00a19 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h > @@ -394,6 +394,8 @@ struct rdt_parse_data { > * @msr_update: Function pointer to update QOS MSRs > * @mon_scale: cqm counter * mon_scale = occupancy in bytes > * @mbm_width: Monitor width, to detect and correct for overflow. > + * @mbm_cfg_mask: Bandwidth sources that can be tracked when Bandwidth > + * Monitoring Event Configuration (BMEC) is supported. > * @cdp_enabled: CDP state of this resource > * > * Members of this structure are either private to the architecture > @@ -408,6 +410,7 @@ struct rdt_hw_resource { > struct rdt_resource *r); > unsigned int mon_scale; > unsigned int mbm_width; > + unsigned int mbm_cfg_mask; > bool cdp_enabled; > }; > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c > index f136ac046851..acca577e2b06 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c > @@ -813,6 +813,12 @@ int __init rdt_get_mon_l3_config(struct rdt_resource *r) > return ret; > > if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMEC)) { > + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; > + > + /* Detect list of bandwidth sources that can be tracked */ > + cpuid_count(0x80000020, 3, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); > + hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask = ecx & MAX_EVT_CONFIG_BITS; > + > if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL)) { > mbm_total_event.configurable = true; > mbm_config_rftype_init("mbm_total_bytes_config"); > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c > index 69a1de92384a..5b5a8f0ffb2f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c > @@ -1617,12 +1617,14 @@ static void mon_event_config_write(void *info) > static int mbm_config_write_domain(struct rdt_resource *r, > struct rdt_domain *d, u32 evtid, u32 val) Not specific to this patch, but since the valid mask is per resource I do not think it is necessary to check user provided value for every domain. The user provided value can be checked earlier and only once in mon_config_write() before iterating over all domains to write the value. > { > + struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r); > struct mon_config_info mon_info = {0}; > int ret = 0; > > /* mon_config cannot be more than the supported set of events */ > - if (val > MAX_EVT_CONFIG_BITS) { > - rdt_last_cmd_puts("Invalid event configuration\n"); > + if ((val & hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask) != val) { > + rdt_last_cmd_printf("Invalid input: The maximum valid bitmask is 0x%02x\n", > + hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask); I think keeping "Invalid event configuration" is useful to create a detailed message of: "Invalid event configuration: maximum valid bitmask is 0x%02x" Reinette
Hi Reinette, On 1/5/2024 3:18 PM, Reinette Chatre wrote: > Hi Babu, > > On 1/4/2024 1:21 PM, Babu Moger wrote: >> If the BMEC (Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration) feature is >> supported, the bandwidth events can be configured. The maximum supported >> bandwidth bitmask can be determined by following CPUID command. >> >> CPUID_Fn80000020_ECX_x03 [Platform QoS Monitoring Bandwidth Event >> Configuration] Read-only. Reset: 0000_007Fh. >> Bits Description >> 31:7 Reserved >> 6:0 Identifies the bandwidth sources that can be tracked. >> >> The bandwidth sources can change with the processor generations. >> Remove the hard-coded value and detect using CPUID command. Also, > I do not think "Remove the hard-coded value" is accurate anymore. Will change it to. "Read the supported bandwidth sources using CPUID command. Also," Also I need to update the subject line. > >> print the valid bitmask when the user tries to configure invalid value. >> >> The CPUID details are documentation in the PPR listed below [1]. > "are documentation" -> "are documented" Sure. > >> [1] Processor Programming Reference (PPR) Vol 1.1 for AMD Family 19h Model >> 11h B1 - 55901 Rev 0.25. >> >> Fixes: dc2a3e857981 ("x86/resctrl: Add interface to read mbm_total_bytes_config") >> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 >> Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> > Same comment about "Link:" as for patch 1/2. Sure. > >> --- >> v3: Changed the event_mask name to mbm_cfg_mask. Added comments about the field. >> Reverted the masking of event configuration to original code. >> Few minor comment changes. >> >> v2: Earlier sent as a part of ABMC feature. >> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231201005720.235639-1-babu.moger@amd.com/ >> But this is not related to ABMC. Sending it separate now. >> Removed the global resctrl_max_evt_bitmask. Added event_mask as part of >> the resource. >> --- >> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h | 3 +++ >> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c | 6 ++++++ >> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c | 6 ++++-- >> 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h >> index d2979748fae4..e3dc35a00a19 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h >> @@ -394,6 +394,8 @@ struct rdt_parse_data { >> * @msr_update: Function pointer to update QOS MSRs >> * @mon_scale: cqm counter * mon_scale = occupancy in bytes >> * @mbm_width: Monitor width, to detect and correct for overflow. >> + * @mbm_cfg_mask: Bandwidth sources that can be tracked when Bandwidth >> + * Monitoring Event Configuration (BMEC) is supported. >> * @cdp_enabled: CDP state of this resource >> * >> * Members of this structure are either private to the architecture >> @@ -408,6 +410,7 @@ struct rdt_hw_resource { >> struct rdt_resource *r); >> unsigned int mon_scale; >> unsigned int mbm_width; >> + unsigned int mbm_cfg_mask; >> bool cdp_enabled; >> }; >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c >> index f136ac046851..acca577e2b06 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c >> @@ -813,6 +813,12 @@ int __init rdt_get_mon_l3_config(struct rdt_resource *r) >> return ret; >> >> if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMEC)) { >> + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; >> + >> + /* Detect list of bandwidth sources that can be tracked */ >> + cpuid_count(0x80000020, 3, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); >> + hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask = ecx & MAX_EVT_CONFIG_BITS; >> + >> if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL)) { >> mbm_total_event.configurable = true; >> mbm_config_rftype_init("mbm_total_bytes_config"); >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c >> index 69a1de92384a..5b5a8f0ffb2f 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c >> @@ -1617,12 +1617,14 @@ static void mon_event_config_write(void *info) >> static int mbm_config_write_domain(struct rdt_resource *r, >> struct rdt_domain *d, u32 evtid, u32 val) > Not specific to this patch, but since the valid mask is per resource I do not think > it is necessary to check user provided value for every domain. The user provided value > can be checked earlier and only once in mon_config_write() before iterating over all > domains to write the value. Yes. Agree. > >> { >> + struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r); >> struct mon_config_info mon_info = {0}; >> int ret = 0; >> >> /* mon_config cannot be more than the supported set of events */ >> - if (val > MAX_EVT_CONFIG_BITS) { >> - rdt_last_cmd_puts("Invalid event configuration\n"); >> + if ((val & hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask) != val) { >> + rdt_last_cmd_printf("Invalid input: The maximum valid bitmask is 0x%02x\n", >> + hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask); > I think keeping "Invalid event configuration" is useful to create a detailed message of: > "Invalid event configuration: maximum valid bitmask is 0x%02x" Sure. Thanks Babu
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h index d2979748fae4..e3dc35a00a19 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h @@ -394,6 +394,8 @@ struct rdt_parse_data { * @msr_update: Function pointer to update QOS MSRs * @mon_scale: cqm counter * mon_scale = occupancy in bytes * @mbm_width: Monitor width, to detect and correct for overflow. + * @mbm_cfg_mask: Bandwidth sources that can be tracked when Bandwidth + * Monitoring Event Configuration (BMEC) is supported. * @cdp_enabled: CDP state of this resource * * Members of this structure are either private to the architecture @@ -408,6 +410,7 @@ struct rdt_hw_resource { struct rdt_resource *r); unsigned int mon_scale; unsigned int mbm_width; + unsigned int mbm_cfg_mask; bool cdp_enabled; }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c index f136ac046851..acca577e2b06 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c @@ -813,6 +813,12 @@ int __init rdt_get_mon_l3_config(struct rdt_resource *r) return ret; if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMEC)) { + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + + /* Detect list of bandwidth sources that can be tracked */ + cpuid_count(0x80000020, 3, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask = ecx & MAX_EVT_CONFIG_BITS; + if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL)) { mbm_total_event.configurable = true; mbm_config_rftype_init("mbm_total_bytes_config"); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c index 69a1de92384a..5b5a8f0ffb2f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c @@ -1617,12 +1617,14 @@ static void mon_event_config_write(void *info) static int mbm_config_write_domain(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d, u32 evtid, u32 val) { + struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r); struct mon_config_info mon_info = {0}; int ret = 0; /* mon_config cannot be more than the supported set of events */ - if (val > MAX_EVT_CONFIG_BITS) { - rdt_last_cmd_puts("Invalid event configuration\n"); + if ((val & hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask) != val) { + rdt_last_cmd_printf("Invalid input: The maximum valid bitmask is 0x%02x\n", + hw_res->mbm_cfg_mask); return -EINVAL; }