diff mbox series

[4/6] x86/bugs: Use ALTERNATIVE() instead of mds_user_clear static key

Message ID 20231020-delay-verw-v1-4-cff54096326d@linux.intel.com
State New
Headers
Series Delay VERW |

Commit Message

Pawan Gupta Oct. 20, 2023, 8:45 p.m. UTC 
  The VERW mitigation at exit-to-user is enabled via a static branch
mds_user_clear. This static branch is never toggled after boot, and can
be safely replaced with an ALTERNATIVE() which is convenient to use in
asm.

Switch to ALTERNATIVE() to use the VERW mitigation late in exit-to-user
path. Also remove the now redundant VERW in exc_nmi() and
arch_exit_to_user_mode().

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst       | 20 +++++++++-----------
 arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h  |  1 -
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 11 -----------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c                |  2 --
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c               |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

Comments

Josh Poimboeuf Oct. 23, 2023, 6:48 p.m. UTC | #1 
On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 01:45:15PM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> @@ -484,11 +484,11 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
>  	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
>  		return;
>  
> -	if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
> +	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
>  		goto out;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
> +	 * X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
>  	 * mitigation, if necessary.
>  	 */

This comment line got long, the paragraph can be reformatted.
Pawan Gupta Oct. 23, 2023, 9:09 p.m. UTC | #2 
On Mon, Oct 23, 2023 at 11:48:44AM -0700, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 01:45:15PM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> > @@ -484,11 +484,11 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
> >  	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
> >  		return;
> >  
> > -	if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
> > +	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
> >  		goto out;
> >  
> >  	/*
> > -	 * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
> > +	 * X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
> >  	 * mitigation, if necessary.
> >  	 */
> 
> This comment line got long, the paragraph can be reformatted.

Yes, will fix.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst
index e73fdff62c0a..05090f33f65e 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst
@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@  The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
 
     mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
 
+Also macro USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS is meant to be used in ASM late in
+exit-to-user path. This macro works for cases where GPRs can't be clobbered.
+
 The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
 (idle) transitions.
 
@@ -138,18 +141,13 @@  Mitigation points
 
    When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
    on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
-   command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
-   mds_user_clear.
-
-   The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
-   all but one of the kernel to user space transitions.  The exception
-   is when we return from a Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI), which is
-   handled directly in do_nmi().
-
-   (The reason that NMI is special is that prepare_exit_to_usermode() can
-    enable IRQs.  In NMI context, NMIs are blocked, and we don't want to
-    enable IRQs with NMIs blocked.)
+   command line. The migitation is enabled through the feature flag
+   X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.
 
+   The mitigation is invoked just before transitioning to userspace after
+   user registers are restored. This is done to minimize the window in
+   which kernel data could be accessed after VERW e.g. via an NMI after
+   VERW.
 
 2. C-State transition
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index ce8f50192ae3..7e523bb3d2d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@  static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void)
 {
-	mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	amd_clear_divider();
 }
 #define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index e1b623a27e1b..501c26ecd722 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -595,17 +595,6 @@  static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 	asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
 }
 
-/**
- * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
- *
- * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
- */
-static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
-{
-	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
-		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
-}
-
 /**
  * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
  *
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 10499bcd4e39..75fc0a70877f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@  static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
 			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
 
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
 		    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@  static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
 	 * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
 	 * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
 	 */
-	static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 
 	if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
 		cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@  static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
 					      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 	else
 		static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
 
@@ -484,11 +484,11 @@  static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return;
 
-	if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
 		goto out;
 
 	/*
-	 * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+	 * X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
 	 * mitigation, if necessary.
 	 */
 	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index a0c551846b35..ebfff8dca661 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -551,8 +551,6 @@  DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
 	if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
 		goto nmi_restart;
 
-	if (user_mode(regs))
-		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NMI_CHECK_CPU)) {
 		WRITE_ONCE(nsp->idt_seq, nsp->idt_seq + 1);
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(nsp->idt_seq & 0x1);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 72e3943f3693..c16297a49e4d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7229,7 +7229,7 @@  static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
 		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
-	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
+	else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
 		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
 		 kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))