diff mbox series

[v3] bcachefs: Refactor memcpy into direct assignment

Message ID 20231018230728.make.202-kees@kernel.org
State New
Headers
Series [v3] bcachefs: Refactor memcpy into direct assignment |

Commit Message

Kees Cook Oct. 18, 2023, 11:07 p.m. UTC 
  The memcpy() in bch2_bkey_append_ptr() is operating on an embedded fake
flexible array which looks to the compiler like it has 0 size. This
causes W=1 builds to emit warnings due to -Wstringop-overflow:

   In file included from include/linux/string.h:254,
                    from include/linux/bitmap.h:11,
                    from include/linux/cpumask.h:12,
                    from include/linux/smp.h:13,
                    from include/linux/lockdep.h:14,
                    from include/linux/radix-tree.h:14,
                    from include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h:6,
                    from fs/bcachefs/bcachefs.h:182:
   fs/bcachefs/extents.c: In function 'bch2_bkey_append_ptr':
   include/linux/fortify-string.h:57:33: warning: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
      57 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
         |                                 ^
   include/linux/fortify-string.h:648:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
     648 |         __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);                        \
         |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
   include/linux/fortify-string.h:693:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk'
     693 | #define memcpy(p, q, s)  __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s,                  \
         |                          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
   fs/bcachefs/extents.c:235:17: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
     235 |                 memcpy((void *) &k->v + bkey_val_bytes(&k->k),
         |                 ^~~~~~
   fs/bcachefs/bcachefs_format.h:287:33: note: destination object 'v' of size 0
     287 |                 struct bch_val  v;
         |                                 ^

Avoid making any structure changes and just replace the u64 copy into a
direct assignment, side-stepping the entire problem.

Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202309192314.VBsjiIm5-lkp@intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231010235609.work.594-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v3 - replace memcpy with assignment
v2 - https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231016212735.it.314-kees@kernel.org
v1 - https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231010235609.work.594-kees@kernel.org
---
 fs/bcachefs/extents.h | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Comments

Kent Overstreet Oct. 19, 2023, 12:32 a.m. UTC | #1 
On Wed, Oct 18, 2023 at 04:07:32PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> The memcpy() in bch2_bkey_append_ptr() is operating on an embedded fake
> flexible array which looks to the compiler like it has 0 size. This
> causes W=1 builds to emit warnings due to -Wstringop-overflow:
> 
>    In file included from include/linux/string.h:254,
>                     from include/linux/bitmap.h:11,
>                     from include/linux/cpumask.h:12,
>                     from include/linux/smp.h:13,
>                     from include/linux/lockdep.h:14,
>                     from include/linux/radix-tree.h:14,
>                     from include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h:6,
>                     from fs/bcachefs/bcachefs.h:182:
>    fs/bcachefs/extents.c: In function 'bch2_bkey_append_ptr':
>    include/linux/fortify-string.h:57:33: warning: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
>       57 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
>          |                                 ^
>    include/linux/fortify-string.h:648:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
>      648 |         __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);                        \
>          |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
>    include/linux/fortify-string.h:693:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk'
>      693 | #define memcpy(p, q, s)  __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s,                  \
>          |                          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>    fs/bcachefs/extents.c:235:17: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
>      235 |                 memcpy((void *) &k->v + bkey_val_bytes(&k->k),
>          |                 ^~~~~~
>    fs/bcachefs/bcachefs_format.h:287:33: note: destination object 'v' of size 0
>      287 |                 struct bch_val  v;
>          |                                 ^
> 
> Avoid making any structure changes and just replace the u64 copy into a
> direct assignment, side-stepping the entire problem.

This does make me wonder about the usefulness of the fortify source
stuff if it can be sidestepped this way, but hey, I'll take it :)

Pulled it into the testing branch, https://evilpiepirate.org/~testdashboard/ci?branch=bcachefs-testing
Kees Cook Oct. 19, 2023, 2:28 a.m. UTC | #2 
On Wed, Oct 18, 2023 at 08:32:32PM -0400, Kent Overstreet wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 18, 2023 at 04:07:32PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > The memcpy() in bch2_bkey_append_ptr() is operating on an embedded fake
> > flexible array which looks to the compiler like it has 0 size. This
> > causes W=1 builds to emit warnings due to -Wstringop-overflow:
> > 
> >    In file included from include/linux/string.h:254,
> >                     from include/linux/bitmap.h:11,
> >                     from include/linux/cpumask.h:12,
> >                     from include/linux/smp.h:13,
> >                     from include/linux/lockdep.h:14,
> >                     from include/linux/radix-tree.h:14,
> >                     from include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h:6,
> >                     from fs/bcachefs/bcachefs.h:182:
> >    fs/bcachefs/extents.c: In function 'bch2_bkey_append_ptr':
> >    include/linux/fortify-string.h:57:33: warning: writing 8 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
> >       57 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
> >          |                                 ^
> >    include/linux/fortify-string.h:648:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
> >      648 |         __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);                        \
> >          |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
> >    include/linux/fortify-string.h:693:26: note: in expansion of macro '__fortify_memcpy_chk'
> >      693 | #define memcpy(p, q, s)  __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s,                  \
> >          |                          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> >    fs/bcachefs/extents.c:235:17: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
> >      235 |                 memcpy((void *) &k->v + bkey_val_bytes(&k->k),
> >          |                 ^~~~~~
> >    fs/bcachefs/bcachefs_format.h:287:33: note: destination object 'v' of size 0
> >      287 |                 struct bch_val  v;
> >          |                                 ^
> > 
> > Avoid making any structure changes and just replace the u64 copy into a
> > direct assignment, side-stepping the entire problem.
> 
> This does make me wonder about the usefulness of the fortify source
> stuff if it can be sidestepped this way, but hey, I'll take it :)

Well, the "weird" cases like this are the ones that get attention. All
the places it's working more cleanly are very effectively stomping real
bugs.

> Pulled it into the testing branch, https://evilpiepirate.org/~testdashboard/ci?branch=bcachefs-testing

Thanks!

-Kees
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/bcachefs/extents.h b/fs/bcachefs/extents.h
index 7ee8d031bb6c..8c09c527fc4f 100644
--- a/fs/bcachefs/extents.h
+++ b/fs/bcachefs/extents.h
@@ -632,6 +632,8 @@  void bch2_bkey_extent_entry_drop(struct bkey_i *, union bch_extent_entry *);
 
 static inline void bch2_bkey_append_ptr(struct bkey_i *k, struct bch_extent_ptr ptr)
 {
+	struct bch_extent_ptr *dest;
+
 	EBUG_ON(bch2_bkey_has_device(bkey_i_to_s(k), ptr.dev));
 
 	switch (k->k.type) {
@@ -641,10 +643,8 @@  static inline void bch2_bkey_append_ptr(struct bkey_i *k, struct bch_extent_ptr
 		EBUG_ON(bkey_val_u64s(&k->k) >= BKEY_EXTENT_VAL_U64s_MAX);
 
 		ptr.type = 1 << BCH_EXTENT_ENTRY_ptr;
-
-		memcpy((void *) &k->v + bkey_val_bytes(&k->k),
-		       &ptr,
-		       sizeof(ptr));
+		dest = (struct bch_extent_ptr *)((void *) &k->v + bkey_val_bytes(&k->k));
+		*dest = ptr;
 		k->k.u64s++;
 		break;
 	default: