Message ID | 20230627033138.1177437-1-linma@zju.edu.cn |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers |
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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a7-20020aa7d747000000b0051d9b57d19dsi1685325eds.179.2023.06.26.20.59.07; Mon, 26 Jun 2023 20:59:37 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229690AbjF0DjB (ORCPT <rfc822;nicolai.engesland@gmail.com> + 99 others); Mon, 26 Jun 2023 23:39:01 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:46330 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229584AbjF0DiH (ORCPT <rfc822;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>); Mon, 26 Jun 2023 23:38:07 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 135752 seconds by postgrey-1.37 at lindbergh.monkeyblade.net; Mon, 26 Jun 2023 20:31:56 PDT Received: from zg8tmja2lje4os4yms4ymjma.icoremail.net (zg8tmja2lje4os4yms4ymjma.icoremail.net [206.189.21.223]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id B3C442D4C; Mon, 26 Jun 2023 20:31:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [122.235.246.99]) by mail-app3 (Coremail) with SMTP id cC_KCgDnzIkcWJpk26rsCA--.52058S4; Tue, 27 Jun 2023 11:31:41 +0800 (CST) From: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> To: steffen.klassert@secunet.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, simon.horman@corigine.com, adobriyan@gmail.com Cc: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Subject: [PATCH v3] net: xfrm: Fix xfrm_address_filter OOB read Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 11:31:38 +0800 Message-Id: <20230627033138.1177437-1-linma@zju.edu.cn> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 X-CM-TRANSID: cC_KCgDnzIkcWJpk26rsCA--.52058S4 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW3GrWUtw1Dur1UCrW3Kr1rZwb_yoWfWr4UpF s5KFyIkr4xJ3s8Xr4jyr1Iq3WrGFZrZF1DJrZ7Gr1UAFW7Gr17JrWDAFWDGwsrCrW8AFy7 GFnrJF4jgr18J3DanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUvG14x267AKxVW8JVW5JwAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK8VAvwI8IcIk0 rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2ocxC64kIII0Yj41l84x0c7CEw4AK67xGY2AK02 1l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvE14v26w1j6s0DM28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26F4U JVW0owA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIE14v26rxl6s0DM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVCY1x0267AKxVW0oV Cq3wAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG6I80ewAv7VC0 I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUGwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r 4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4x0x7Aq67IIx4CEVc8vx2IErcIFxwACI402YVCY1x02628v n2kIc2xKxwCY02Avz4vE14v_Gr4l42xK82IYc2Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr 0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s026x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY 17CE14v26r1q6r43MIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvE42xK8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWUJVWUCwCI42IY 6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwCI42IY6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v26r4j6r4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa 73UjIFyTuYvjfUnQ6pDUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: qtrwiiyqvtljo62m3hxhgxhubq/ X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: =?utf-8?q?INBOX?= X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1769826814542615062?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1769826814542615062?= |
Series |
[v3] net: xfrm: Fix xfrm_address_filter OOB read
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Commit Message
Lin Ma
June 27, 2023, 3:31 a.m. UTC
We found below OOB crash:
[ 44.211730] ==================================================================
[ 44.212045] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x8b/0xb0
[ 44.212045] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800870f320 by task poc.xfrm/97
[ 44.212045]
[ 44.212045] CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: poc.xfrm Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1-dirty #4
[ 44.212045] Call Trace:
[ 44.212045] <TASK>
[ 44.212045] dump_stack_lvl+0x37/0x50
[ 44.212045] print_report+0xcc/0x620
[ 44.212045] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xf3/0x170
[ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0
[ 44.212045] kasan_report+0xb2/0xe0
[ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0
[ 44.212045] kasan_check_range+0x39/0x1c0
[ 44.212045] memcmp+0x8b/0xb0
[ 44.212045] xfrm_state_walk+0x21c/0x420
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_dump_one_state+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e2/0x290
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __kernel_text_address+0xd/0x40
[ 44.212045] ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60
[ 44.212045] ? mutex_lock+0x60/0xe0
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[ 44.212045] netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_dump+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430
[ 44.212045] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa_done+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __stack_depot_save+0x382/0x4e0
[ 44.212045] ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70
[ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x32/0x50
[ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[ 44.212045] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[ 44.212045] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x59/0x70
[ 44.212045] ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xf7/0x260
[ 44.212045] ? kmalloc_reserve+0xab/0x120
[ 44.212045] ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210
[ 44.212045] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700
[ 44.212045] ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0
[ 44.212045] ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230
[ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90
[ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[ 44.212045] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700
[ 44.212045] ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0
[ 44.212045] ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230
[ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90
[ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[ 44.212045] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50
[ 44.212045] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190
[ 44.212045] ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340
[ 44.212045] ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660
[ 44.212045] ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0
[ 44.212045] ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0
[ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90
[ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[ 44.212045] ? copyout+0x3e/0x50
[ 44.212045] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50
[ 44.212045] netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660
[ 44.212045] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0
[ 44.212045] __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? rcu_core+0x44a/0xe10
[ 44.212045] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x45b/0x740
[ 44.212045] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10
[ 44.212045] __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90
[ 44.212045] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[ 44.212045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[ 44.212045] RIP: 0033:0x44b7da
[ 44.212045] RSP: 002b:00007ffdc8838548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 44.212045] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdc8839978 RCX: 000000000044b7da
[ 44.212045] RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: 00007ffdc8838770 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 44.212045] RBP: 00007ffdc88385b0 R08: 00007ffdc883858c R09: 000000000000000c
[ 44.212045] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 44.212045] R13: 00007ffdc8839968 R14: 00000000004c37d0 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 44.212045] </TASK>
[ 44.212045]
[ 44.212045] Allocated by task 97:
[ 44.212045] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[ 44.212045] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[ 44.212045] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
[ 44.212045] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x5b/0x140
[ 44.212045] kmemdup+0x21/0x50
[ 44.212045] xfrm_dump_sa+0x17d/0x290
[ 44.212045] netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0
[ 44.212045] __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430
[ 44.212045] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410
[ 44.212045] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210
[ 44.212045] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50
[ 44.212045] netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0
[ 44.212045] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700
[ 44.212045] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0
[ 44.212045] __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230
[ 44.212045] __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90
[ 44.212045] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[ 44.212045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[ 44.212045]
[ 44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800870f300
[ 44.212045] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
[ 44.212045] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
[ 44.212045] allocated 36-byte region [ffff88800870f300, ffff88800870f324)
[ 44.212045]
[ 44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 44.212045] page:00000000e4de16ee refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000000 ...
[ 44.212045] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1)
[ 44.212045] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[ 44.212045] raw: 0100000000000200 ffff888004c41640 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[ 44.212045] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 44.212045] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 44.212045]
[ 44.212045] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 44.212045] ffff88800870f200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 44.212045] ffff88800870f280: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 44.212045] >ffff88800870f300: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 44.212045] ^
[ 44.212045] ffff88800870f380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 44.212045] ffff88800870f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 44.212045] ==================================================================
By investigating the code, we find the root cause of this OOB is the lack
of checks in xfrm_dump_sa(). The buggy code allows a malicious user to pass
arbitrary value of filter->splen/dplen. Hence, with crafted xfrm states,
the attacker can achieve 8 bytes heap OOB read, which causes info leak.
if (attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]) {
filter = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]),
sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (filter == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
// NO MORE CHECKS HERE !!!
}
This patch fixes the OOB by adding necessary boundary checks, just like
the code in pfkey_dump() function.
Fixes: d3623099d350 ("ipsec: add support of limited SA dump")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
---
V1 -> V2: add kfree() hence no memory leak
V2 -> V3: add additional note and use > instead of >= to
allow complete filter comparision
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
Comments
On Tue, Jun 27, 2023 at 11:31:38AM +0800, Lin Ma wrote: > We found below OOB crash: > > [ 44.211730] ================================================================== > [ 44.212045] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 > [ 44.212045] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800870f320 by task poc.xfrm/97 > [ 44.212045] > [ 44.212045] CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: poc.xfrm Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1-dirty #4 > [ 44.212045] Call Trace: > [ 44.212045] <TASK> > [ 44.212045] dump_stack_lvl+0x37/0x50 > [ 44.212045] print_report+0xcc/0x620 > [ 44.212045] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xf3/0x170 > [ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 > [ 44.212045] kasan_report+0xb2/0xe0 > [ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 > [ 44.212045] kasan_check_range+0x39/0x1c0 > [ 44.212045] memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 > [ 44.212045] xfrm_state_walk+0x21c/0x420 ... > > By investigating the code, we find the root cause of this OOB is the lack > of checks in xfrm_dump_sa(). The buggy code allows a malicious user to pass > arbitrary value of filter->splen/dplen. Hence, with crafted xfrm states, > the attacker can achieve 8 bytes heap OOB read, which causes info leak. > > if (attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]) { > filter = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]), > sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL); > if (filter == NULL) > return -ENOMEM; > // NO MORE CHECKS HERE !!! > } > > This patch fixes the OOB by adding necessary boundary checks, just like > the code in pfkey_dump() function. > > Fixes: d3623099d350 ("ipsec: add support of limited SA dump") > Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Applied, thanks a lot!
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index c34a2a06ca94..7c91deadc36e 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1267,6 +1267,15 @@ static int xfrm_dump_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL); if (filter == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + + /* see addr_match(), (prefix length >> 5) << 2 + * will be used to compare xfrm_address_t + */ + if (filter->splen > (sizeof(xfrm_address_t) << 3) || + filter->dplen > (sizeof(xfrm_address_t) << 3)) { + kfree(filter); + return -EINVAL; + } } if (attrs[XFRMA_PROTO])