diff mbox series

[4/4] x86: switch to cpu_feature_enabled() for X86_FEATURE_XENPV

Message ID 20221103113636.25543-5-jgross@suse.com
State New
Headers
Series Switch X86_FEATURE_XENPV to cpu_feature_enabled() use |

Commit Message

Juergen Gross Nov. 3, 2022, 11:36 a.m. UTC 
  Convert the remaining cases of static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) and
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) to use cpu_feature_enabled(), allowing
more efficient code in case the kernel is configured without
CONFIG_XEN_PV.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c    | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c   | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c  | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/topology.c   | 2 +-
 arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 2 +-
 6 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

Comments

Brian Gerst Nov. 3, 2022, 1:19 p.m. UTC | #1 
On Thu, Nov 3, 2022 at 8:37 AM Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> wrote:
>
> Convert the remaining cases of static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) and
> boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) to use cpu_feature_enabled(), allowing
> more efficient code in case the kernel is configured without
> CONFIG_XEN_PV.
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c    | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c   | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c  | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 4 ++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/topology.c   | 2 +-
>  arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 2 +-
>  6 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> index 860b60273df3..697fe881e967 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> @@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>                         set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH);
>
>         /* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
> -       if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
> +       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
>                 set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
>
>         /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index da7c361f47e0..7f78e1527c5e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
>                 return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
>         }
>
> -       if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
> +       if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
>                 pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n",
>                        mitigation_options[i].option);
>                 return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
> index 21fd425088fe..1c27645fd429 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
> @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>         set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARAT);
>
>         /* Hygon CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
> -       if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
> +       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
>                 set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
>
>         check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> index 6b3418bff326..e2f469175be8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static noinstr unsigned long __rdgsbase_inactive(void)
>
>         lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
>
> -       if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
> +       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
>                 native_swapgs();
>                 gsbase = rdgsbase();
>                 native_swapgs();
> @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static noinstr void __wrgsbase_inactive(unsigned long gsbase)
>  {
>         lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
>
> -       if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
> +       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
>                 native_swapgs();
>                 wrgsbase(gsbase);
>                 native_swapgs();
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c
> index 8617d1ed9d31..1b83377274b8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c
> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int arch_register_cpu(int num)
>          * Xen PV guests don't support CPU0 hotplug at all.
>          */
>         if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
> -           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
> +           cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
>                 cpu0_hotpluggable = 0;
>
>         /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
> index 6c2f1b76a0b6..c83799753d44 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
> @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(unsigned int cpu)
>          * On Xen PV, the GDT must be read-only because the hypervisor
>          * requires it.
>          */
> -       pgprot_t gdt_prot = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ?
> +       pgprot_t gdt_prot = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ?
>                 PAGE_KERNEL_RO : PAGE_KERNEL;
>         pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
>  #endif

This is another case that can be removed because it's for 32-bit.

--
Brian Gerst
Juergen Gross Nov. 3, 2022, 1:24 p.m. UTC | #2 
On 03.11.22 14:19, Brian Gerst wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2022 at 8:37 AM Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> wrote:
>>
>> Convert the remaining cases of static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) and
>> boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) to use cpu_feature_enabled(), allowing
>> more efficient code in case the kernel is configured without
>> CONFIG_XEN_PV.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c    | 2 +-
>>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c   | 2 +-
>>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c  | 2 +-
>>   arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 4 ++--
>>   arch/x86/kernel/topology.c   | 2 +-
>>   arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 2 +-
>>   6 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
>> index 860b60273df3..697fe881e967 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
>> @@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>                          set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH);
>>
>>          /* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
>> -       if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
>> +       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
>>                  set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
>>
>>          /*
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> index da7c361f47e0..7f78e1527c5e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> @@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
>>                  return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
>>          }
>>
>> -       if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
>> +       if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
>>                  pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n",
>>                         mitigation_options[i].option);
>>                  return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
>> index 21fd425088fe..1c27645fd429 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
>> @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>          set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARAT);
>>
>>          /* Hygon CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
>> -       if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
>> +       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
>>                  set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
>>
>>          check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
>> index 6b3418bff326..e2f469175be8 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
>> @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static noinstr unsigned long __rdgsbase_inactive(void)
>>
>>          lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
>>
>> -       if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
>> +       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
>>                  native_swapgs();
>>                  gsbase = rdgsbase();
>>                  native_swapgs();
>> @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static noinstr void __wrgsbase_inactive(unsigned long gsbase)
>>   {
>>          lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
>>
>> -       if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
>> +       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
>>                  native_swapgs();
>>                  wrgsbase(gsbase);
>>                  native_swapgs();
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c
>> index 8617d1ed9d31..1b83377274b8 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c
>> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int arch_register_cpu(int num)
>>           * Xen PV guests don't support CPU0 hotplug at all.
>>           */
>>          if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
>> -           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
>> +           cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
>>                  cpu0_hotpluggable = 0;
>>
>>          /*
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
>> index 6c2f1b76a0b6..c83799753d44 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
>> @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(unsigned int cpu)
>>           * On Xen PV, the GDT must be read-only because the hypervisor
>>           * requires it.
>>           */
>> -       pgprot_t gdt_prot = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ?
>> +       pgprot_t gdt_prot = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ?
>>                  PAGE_KERNEL_RO : PAGE_KERNEL;
>>          pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
>>   #endif
> 
> This is another case that can be removed because it's for 32-bit.

Oh yes, indeed. Thanks for noticing.


Juergen
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 860b60273df3..697fe881e967 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@  static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH);
 
 	/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
-	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index da7c361f47e0..7f78e1527c5e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@  static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
-	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
+	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
 		pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n",
 		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
index 21fd425088fe..1c27645fd429 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@  static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARAT);
 
 	/* Hygon CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
-	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
 
 	check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 6b3418bff326..e2f469175be8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@  static noinstr unsigned long __rdgsbase_inactive(void)
 
 	lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
 
-	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
 		native_swapgs();
 		gsbase = rdgsbase();
 		native_swapgs();
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@  static noinstr void __wrgsbase_inactive(unsigned long gsbase)
 {
 	lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
 
-	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
 		native_swapgs();
 		wrgsbase(gsbase);
 		native_swapgs();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c
index 8617d1ed9d31..1b83377274b8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@  int arch_register_cpu(int num)
 	 * Xen PV guests don't support CPU0 hotplug at all.
 	 */
 	if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
-	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
+	    cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
 		cpu0_hotpluggable = 0;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index 6c2f1b76a0b6..c83799753d44 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@  static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(unsigned int cpu)
 	 * On Xen PV, the GDT must be read-only because the hypervisor
 	 * requires it.
 	 */
-	pgprot_t gdt_prot = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ?
+	pgprot_t gdt_prot = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ?
 		PAGE_KERNEL_RO : PAGE_KERNEL;
 	pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
 #endif