[v1,2/9] x86/resctrl: Hold a spinlock in __rmid_read() on AMD

Message ID 20230421141723.2405942-3-peternewman@google.com
State New
Headers
Series x86/resctrl: Use soft RMIDs for reliable MBM on AMD |

Commit Message

Peter Newman April 21, 2023, 2:17 p.m. UTC
  From: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>

In AMD PQoS Versions 1.0 and 2.0, IA32_QM_EVTSEL MSR is shared by all
processors in a QOS domain.  So there's a chance it can read a different
event when two processors are reading the counter concurrently.  Add a
spinlock to prevent this race.

Co-developed-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c     | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h |  5 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c  | 14 +++++++--
 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
  

Comments

Reinette Chatre May 11, 2023, 9:35 p.m. UTC | #1
Hi Peter,

On 4/21/2023 7:17 AM, Peter Newman wrote:
> From: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
> 
> In AMD PQoS Versions 1.0 and 2.0, IA32_QM_EVTSEL MSR is shared by all
> processors in a QOS domain.  So there's a chance it can read a different
> event when two processors are reading the counter concurrently.  Add a
> spinlock to prevent this race.

This is unclear to me. As I understand it this changelog is written as
though there is a race that is being fixed. I believe that rdtgroup_mutex
currently protects against such races. I thus at first thought that
this is a prep patch for the introduction of the new soft RMID feature,
but instead this new spinlock is used independent of the soft RMID feature.

I think the spinlock is unnecessary when the soft RMID feature is disabled.

> Co-developed-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c     | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h |  5 ++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c  | 14 +++++++--
>  3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
> index 85ceaf9a31ac..02a062558c67 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
> @@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ struct arch_mbm_state {
>   * @ctrl_val:	array of cache or mem ctrl values (indexed by CLOSID)
>   * @arch_mbm_total:	arch private state for MBM total bandwidth
>   * @arch_mbm_local:	arch private state for MBM local bandwidth
> + * @lock:	serializes counter reads when QM_EVTSEL MSR is shared per-domain
>   *
>   * Members of this structure are accessed via helpers that provide abstraction.
>   */
> @@ -333,6 +334,7 @@ struct rdt_hw_domain {
>  	u32				*ctrl_val;
>  	struct arch_mbm_state		*arch_mbm_total;
>  	struct arch_mbm_state		*arch_mbm_local;
> +	raw_spinlock_t			evtsel_lock;
>  };

Please note the difference between the member name in the struct ("evtsel_lock")
and its description ("lock").


>  
>  static inline struct rdt_hw_domain *resctrl_to_arch_dom(struct rdt_domain *r)
> @@ -428,6 +430,9 @@ extern struct rdt_hw_resource rdt_resources_all[];
>  extern struct rdtgroup rdtgroup_default;
>  DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdt_alloc_enable_key);
>  
> +/* Serialization required in resctrl_arch_rmid_read(). */
> +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rmid_read_locked);
> +
>  extern struct dentry *debugfs_resctrl;
>  
>  enum resctrl_res_level {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
> index 20952419be75..2de8397f91cd 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
> @@ -146,10 +146,15 @@ static inline struct rmid_entry *__rmid_entry(u32 rmid)
>  	return entry;
>  }
>  
> -static int __rmid_read(u32 rmid, enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
> +static int __rmid_read(struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom, u32 rmid,
> +		       enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
>  {
> +	unsigned long flags;
>  	u64 msr_val;
>  
> +	if (static_branch_likely(&rmid_read_locked))

Why static_branch_likely() as opposed to static_branch_unlikely()?

> +		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&hw_dom->evtsel_lock, flags);
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * As per the SDM, when IA32_QM_EVTSEL.EvtID (bits 7:0) is configured
>  	 * with a valid event code for supported resource type and the bits
> @@ -161,6 +166,9 @@ static int __rmid_read(u32 rmid, enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
>  	wrmsr(MSR_IA32_QM_EVTSEL, eventid, rmid);
>  	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_QM_CTR, msr_val);
>  
> +	if (static_branch_likely(&rmid_read_locked))
> +		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hw_dom->evtsel_lock, flags);
> +

If the first "if (static_branch_likely(&rmid_read_locked))" was taken then the second
if branch _has_ to be taken. It should not be optional to release a lock if it was taken. I
think it would be more robust if a single test of the static key decides whether the
spinlock should be used.

>  	if (msr_val & RMID_VAL_ERROR)
>  		return -EIO;
>  	if (msr_val & RMID_VAL_UNAVAIL)
> @@ -200,7 +208,7 @@ void resctrl_arch_reset_rmid(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d,
>  		memset(am, 0, sizeof(*am));
>  
>  		/* Record any initial, non-zero count value. */
> -		__rmid_read(rmid, eventid, &am->prev_msr);
> +		__rmid_read(hw_dom, rmid, eventid, &am->prev_msr);
>  	}
>  }
>  
> @@ -241,7 +249,7 @@ int resctrl_arch_rmid_read(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d,
>  	if (!cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &d->cpu_mask))
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
> -	ret = __rmid_read(rmid, eventid, &msr_val);
> +	ret = __rmid_read(hw_dom, rmid, eventid, &msr_val);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  

Reinette
  
Peter Newman May 12, 2023, 1:23 p.m. UTC | #2
Hi Reinette,

On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 11:36 PM Reinette Chatre
<reinette.chatre@intel.com> wrote:
> On 4/21/2023 7:17 AM, Peter Newman wrote:
> > From: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
> >
> > In AMD PQoS Versions 1.0 and 2.0, IA32_QM_EVTSEL MSR is shared by all
> > processors in a QOS domain.  So there's a chance it can read a different
> > event when two processors are reading the counter concurrently.  Add a
> > spinlock to prevent this race.
>
> This is unclear to me. As I understand it this changelog is written as
> though there is a race that is being fixed. I believe that rdtgroup_mutex
> currently protects against such races. I thus at first thought that
> this is a prep patch for the introduction of the new soft RMID feature,
> but instead this new spinlock is used independent of the soft RMID feature.
>
> I think the spinlock is unnecessary when the soft RMID feature is disabled.

My understanding was that the race would happen a lot more when
simultaneously IPI'ing all CPUs in a domain, but I had apparently
overlooked that all of the counter reads were already serialized.


> > + * @lock:    serializes counter reads when QM_EVTSEL MSR is shared per-domain
> >   *
> >   * Members of this structure are accessed via helpers that provide abstraction.
> >   */
> > @@ -333,6 +334,7 @@ struct rdt_hw_domain {
> >       u32                             *ctrl_val;
> >       struct arch_mbm_state           *arch_mbm_total;
> >       struct arch_mbm_state           *arch_mbm_local;
> > +     raw_spinlock_t                  evtsel_lock;
> >  };
>
> Please note the difference between the member name in the struct ("evtsel_lock")
> and its description ("lock").

Will fix, thanks.


> > -static int __rmid_read(u32 rmid, enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
> > +static int __rmid_read(struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom, u32 rmid,
> > +                    enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
> >  {
> > +     unsigned long flags;
> >       u64 msr_val;
> >
> > +     if (static_branch_likely(&rmid_read_locked))
>
> Why static_branch_likely() as opposed to static_branch_unlikely()?

I read the documentation for static branches and I agree that unlikely
would make more sense so that the non-locked case is less impacted.

This instance apparently confused my understanding of static branches
and I will need to re-visit all uses of them in this patch series.

>
> > +             raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&hw_dom->evtsel_lock, flags);
> > +
> >       /*
> >        * As per the SDM, when IA32_QM_EVTSEL.EvtID (bits 7:0) is configured
> >        * with a valid event code for supported resource type and the bits
> > @@ -161,6 +166,9 @@ static int __rmid_read(u32 rmid, enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
> >       wrmsr(MSR_IA32_QM_EVTSEL, eventid, rmid);
> >       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_QM_CTR, msr_val);
> >
> > +     if (static_branch_likely(&rmid_read_locked))
> > +             raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hw_dom->evtsel_lock, flags);
> > +
>
> If the first "if (static_branch_likely(&rmid_read_locked))" was taken then the second
> if branch _has_ to be taken. It should not be optional to release a lock if it was taken. I
> think it would be more robust if a single test of the static key decides whether the
> spinlock should be used.

Is the concern that the branch value could change concurrently and
result in a deadlock?

I'm curious as to whether this case is performance critical enough to
justify using a static branch. It's clear that we should be using them
in the context switch path, but I'm confused about other places
they're used when there are also memory flags.

-Peter
  
Reinette Chatre May 12, 2023, 3:23 p.m. UTC | #3
Hi Peter,

On 5/12/2023 6:23 AM, Peter Newman wrote:
> Hi Reinette,
> 
> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 11:36 PM Reinette Chatre
> <reinette.chatre@intel.com> wrote:
>> On 4/21/2023 7:17 AM, Peter Newman wrote:

>>> +             raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&hw_dom->evtsel_lock, flags);
>>> +
>>>       /*
>>>        * As per the SDM, when IA32_QM_EVTSEL.EvtID (bits 7:0) is configured
>>>        * with a valid event code for supported resource type and the bits
>>> @@ -161,6 +166,9 @@ static int __rmid_read(u32 rmid, enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
>>>       wrmsr(MSR_IA32_QM_EVTSEL, eventid, rmid);
>>>       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_QM_CTR, msr_val);
>>>
>>> +     if (static_branch_likely(&rmid_read_locked))
>>> +             raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hw_dom->evtsel_lock, flags);
>>> +
>>
>> If the first "if (static_branch_likely(&rmid_read_locked))" was taken then the second
>> if branch _has_ to be taken. It should not be optional to release a lock if it was taken. I
>> think it would be more robust if a single test of the static key decides whether the
>> spinlock should be used.
> 
> Is the concern that the branch value could change concurrently and
> result in a deadlock?

Possibly ... it may be that the static key cannot change value during
this call but that thus requires deeper understanding of various flows
for this logic to be trusted. I think this should be explicit: if a lock
is taken then releasing it should not be optional at all.

> I'm curious as to whether this case is performance critical enough to
> justify using a static branch. It's clear that we should be using them
> in the context switch path, but I'm confused about other places
> they're used when there are also memory flags.

Alternatively, there could be a, (for example) __rmid_read_lock() that
is called from context switch and it always takes a spin lock.

Reinette
  

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
index 030d3b409768..47b1c37a81f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ 
 #include <asm/resctrl.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rmid_read_locked);
+
 /* Mutex to protect rdtgroup access. */
 DEFINE_MUTEX(rdtgroup_mutex);
 
@@ -529,6 +531,8 @@  static void domain_add_cpu(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
 	d->id = id;
 	cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &d->cpu_mask);
 
+	raw_spin_lock_init(&hw_dom->evtsel_lock);
+
 	rdt_domain_reconfigure_cdp(r);
 
 	if (r->alloc_capable && domain_setup_ctrlval(r, d)) {
@@ -829,6 +833,41 @@  static __init bool get_rdt_mon_resources(void)
 	return !rdt_get_mon_l3_config(r);
 }
 
+static __init bool amd_shared_qm_evtsel(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * From AMD64 Technology Platform Quality of Service Extensions,
+	 * Revision 1.03:
+	 *
+	 * "For PQoS Version 1.0 and 2.0, as identified by Family/Model, the
+	 * QM_EVTSEL register is shared by all the processors in a QOS domain."
+	 *
+	 * Check the inclusive Family/Model ranges for PQoS Extension versions
+	 * 1.0 and 2.0 from the PQoS Extension Versions table.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x17)
+		/* V1.0 */
+		return boot_cpu_data.x86_model >= 0x30 &&
+			boot_cpu_data.x86_model <= 0x9f;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19)
+		/* V2.0 */
+		return (boot_cpu_data.x86_model <= 0xf) ||
+			((boot_cpu_data.x86_model >= 0x20) &&
+			 (boot_cpu_data.x86_model <= 0x5f));
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static __init void __check_quirks_amd(void)
+{
+	if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL) ||
+	    rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL)) {
+		if (amd_shared_qm_evtsel())
+			static_branch_enable(&rmid_read_locked);
+	}
+}
+
 static __init void __check_quirks_intel(void)
 {
 	switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
@@ -852,6 +891,8 @@  static __init void check_quirks(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
 		__check_quirks_intel();
+	else if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+		__check_quirks_amd();
 }
 
 static __init bool get_rdt_resources(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
index 85ceaf9a31ac..02a062558c67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
@@ -325,6 +325,7 @@  struct arch_mbm_state {
  * @ctrl_val:	array of cache or mem ctrl values (indexed by CLOSID)
  * @arch_mbm_total:	arch private state for MBM total bandwidth
  * @arch_mbm_local:	arch private state for MBM local bandwidth
+ * @lock:	serializes counter reads when QM_EVTSEL MSR is shared per-domain
  *
  * Members of this structure are accessed via helpers that provide abstraction.
  */
@@ -333,6 +334,7 @@  struct rdt_hw_domain {
 	u32				*ctrl_val;
 	struct arch_mbm_state		*arch_mbm_total;
 	struct arch_mbm_state		*arch_mbm_local;
+	raw_spinlock_t			evtsel_lock;
 };
 
 static inline struct rdt_hw_domain *resctrl_to_arch_dom(struct rdt_domain *r)
@@ -428,6 +430,9 @@  extern struct rdt_hw_resource rdt_resources_all[];
 extern struct rdtgroup rdtgroup_default;
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdt_alloc_enable_key);
 
+/* Serialization required in resctrl_arch_rmid_read(). */
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rmid_read_locked);
+
 extern struct dentry *debugfs_resctrl;
 
 enum resctrl_res_level {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
index 20952419be75..2de8397f91cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
@@ -146,10 +146,15 @@  static inline struct rmid_entry *__rmid_entry(u32 rmid)
 	return entry;
 }
 
-static int __rmid_read(u32 rmid, enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
+static int __rmid_read(struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom, u32 rmid,
+		       enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
 {
+	unsigned long flags;
 	u64 msr_val;
 
+	if (static_branch_likely(&rmid_read_locked))
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&hw_dom->evtsel_lock, flags);
+
 	/*
 	 * As per the SDM, when IA32_QM_EVTSEL.EvtID (bits 7:0) is configured
 	 * with a valid event code for supported resource type and the bits
@@ -161,6 +166,9 @@  static int __rmid_read(u32 rmid, enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
 	wrmsr(MSR_IA32_QM_EVTSEL, eventid, rmid);
 	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_QM_CTR, msr_val);
 
+	if (static_branch_likely(&rmid_read_locked))
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hw_dom->evtsel_lock, flags);
+
 	if (msr_val & RMID_VAL_ERROR)
 		return -EIO;
 	if (msr_val & RMID_VAL_UNAVAIL)
@@ -200,7 +208,7 @@  void resctrl_arch_reset_rmid(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d,
 		memset(am, 0, sizeof(*am));
 
 		/* Record any initial, non-zero count value. */
-		__rmid_read(rmid, eventid, &am->prev_msr);
+		__rmid_read(hw_dom, rmid, eventid, &am->prev_msr);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -241,7 +249,7 @@  int resctrl_arch_rmid_read(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d,
 	if (!cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &d->cpu_mask))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	ret = __rmid_read(rmid, eventid, &msr_val);
+	ret = __rmid_read(hw_dom, rmid, eventid, &msr_val);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;